Yoma 79a

כְּכוֹתֶבֶת שֶׁאָמְרוּ, בְּגַרְעִינָתָהּ: אוֹ בְּלֹא גַּרְעִינָתָהּ? בָּעֵי רַב אָשֵׁי: עֶצֶם כִּשְׂעוֹרָה, בִּקְלִיפָּתָהּ אוֹ בְּלֹא קְלִיפָּתָהּ, בְּלַחָה אוֹ בִּיבֵשָׁה? רַב אָשֵׁי לָא מִבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ הָא דְּרַב פָּפָּא, ״גַּסָּה״ אִיתְּמַר — כֹּל כַּמָּה דְּגַסָּה. רַב פָּפָּא לָא מִבַּעְיָא לֵיהּ הָא דְּרַב אָשֵׁי: לַחָה — שִׁבּוֹלֶת מִיקְּרֵי, שֶׁלֹּא בִּקְלִיפָּתָהּ — אוּשְׁלָא מִיקְּרֵי. The large date-bulk that they said is the measure that determines liability for eating on Yom Kippur, does this refer to the volume of a large date with its pit or without its pit? Rav Ashi asked a similar question: The mishna that states that a bone that is a barley-grain-bulk imparts ritual impurity, does this refer to the volume of a barley grain with its husk or without its husk? And is that referring to a wet kernel or a dry one? The Gemara clarifies: Rav Ashi did not ask the question that Rav Pappa asked, regarding the size of the date-bulk on Yom Kippur because the answer was clear to him. Since it is stated in the mishna: Large, it means as large as possible, which must include the pit. Conversely, Rav Pappa did not ask the question that Rav Ashi asked regarding the size of the barley-grain-bulk because the answer was clear to him. Wet barley is called shibbolet and not barley; without its shell it is no longer called barley but is called ushla. Therefore, the mishna must be referring to dry barley within its shell.

אָמַר (רָבָא) אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה: כּוֹתֶבֶת הַגַּסָּה שֶׁאָמְרוּ, יְתֵירָה מִכְּבֵיצָה. וְקִים לְהוּ לְרַבָּנַן דִּבְהָכִי מִיַּתְּבָא דַּעְתֵּיהּ, בְּצִיר מֵהֲכִי — לָא מִיַּתְּבָא דַּעְתֵּיהּ. מֵיתִיבִי: מַעֲשֶׂה וְהֵבִיאוּ לְרַבָּן יוֹחָנָן בֶּן זַכַּאי לִטְעוֹם אֶת הַתַּבְשִׁיל, וּלְרַבָּן גַּמְלִיאֵל שְׁתֵּי כוֹתָבוֹת וּדְלִי שֶׁל מַיִם. וְאָמְרוּ: הַעֲלוּם לַסּוּכָּה. וְתָנֵי עֲלַהּ: לָא מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהֲלָכָה כָּךְ, אֶלָּא שֶׁרָצוּ לְהַחֲמִיר עַל עַצְמָן. Rava said that Rav Yehuda said: The volume of a large date that they said is larger than an egg-bulk. The Sages have an accepted tradition that with this amount of food, the mind of the one who eats is settled, and he is not afflicted. Less than this amount, the mind is not settled. The Gemara raises an objection from what we have learned: An incident happened on the festival of Sukkot. They brought a cooked dish to Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai to taste, and they brought to Rabban Gamliel two dates and a tankard of water. Rabban Yoḥanan ben Zakkai and Rabban Gamliel said to them: Bring them up to the sukka, and we will eat there. And a baraita was taught in that regard: They did not act this way because that is the halakha, that such food must be eaten in the sukka. Rather, they wished to be stringent upon themselves and not eat anything outside of the sukka.

וּכְשֶׁנָּתְנוּ לוֹ לְרַבִּי צָדוֹק אוֹכֶל פָּחוֹת מִכְּבֵיצָה — נְטָלוֹ בְּמַפָּה וַאֲכָלוֹ חוּץ לַסּוּכָּה, וְלֹא בֵּירַךְ אַחֲרָיו. On the other hand, the Gemara reports: And when they gave Rabbi Tzadok food that was less than an egg-bulk to eat, he held it in a cloth and did not wash his hands. And he ate it outside of the sukka and did not recite Grace after Meals afterward.

הָא כְּבֵיצָה — בָּעֵי סוּכָּה. וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ כּוֹתֶבֶת הַגַּסָּה שֶׁאָמְרוּ יְתֵירָה מִכְּבֵיצָה, הַשְׁתָּא שְׁתֵּי כוֹתָבוֹת בְּלֹא גַּרְעִינָן לָא הָווּ כְּבֵיצָה, כּוֹתֶבֶת הַגַּסָּה וְגַרְעִינָתָהּ מִי הָוֵי יְתֵירָה מִכְּבֵיצָה?! אֲמַר רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה: אִין, שְׁתֵּי כוֹתָבוֹת בְּלֹא גַּרְעִינָתָן לָא הָווּ כְּבֵיצָה, כּוֹתֶבֶת הַגַּסָּה וְגַרְעִינָתָהּ הָוֵי יְתֵירָה מִכְּבֵיצָה. אֲמַר רַב פָּפָּא, הַיְינוּ דְּאָמְרִי אִינָשֵׁי: תְּרֵי קַבֵּי דְּתַמְרֵי חַד קַבָּא דְּקַשְׁיָיתָא וּסְרִיחַ. The Gemara clarifies: Food that has the volume of an egg-bulk is required to be eaten in a sukka. If it should enter your mind to say that the volume of the large date that they spoke of is larger than the volume of an egg-bulk, there is a contradiction. Now, comparing the two episodes, it seems that two dates without their pits are not the volume of an egg. If so, can the volume of a large date and its pit be greater than that of an egg-bulk? Rav Yirmeya said: Yes, although two dates without their pits are not equal to an egg-bulk, the volume of a large date and its pit are larger than an egg-bulk, since date pits are very large. Rav Pappa said: This explains the folk saying that people say: In two kav of dates there is one kav and more of pits, meaning that the volume of the pit is larger than that of the fruit itself.

רָבָא אָמַר: הָתָם הַיְינוּ טַעְמָא מִשּׁוּם דְּהָווּ לְהוּ פֵּירֵי, וּפֵירֵי לָא בָּעוּ סוּכָּה. מֵיתִיבִי, אָמַר רַבִּי: כְּשֶׁהָיִינוּ לוֹמְדִים תּוֹרָה אֵצֶל רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן שַׁמּוּעַ הֵבִיאוּ לְפָנֵינוּ תְּאֵנִים וַעֲנָבִים וַאֲכַלְנוּם אֲכִילַת עֲרַאי חוּץ לְסוּכָּה. אֲכִילַת עֲרַאי — אִין, אֲכִילַת קֶבַע — לָא! אֵימָא: אֲכַלְנוּם כַּאֲכִילַת עֲרַאי חוּץ לַסּוּכָּה. Rava said: This entire line of questioning has no basis: There, in the incident of the sukka, this is the reasoning that the halakha permits eating the dates outside of the sukka, due to the fact that dates are fruit, and fruit need not be eaten in a sukka but may be eaten outside of a sukka. The Gemara raises an objection. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi said: When we would learn Torah with Rabbi Elazar ben Shamua, they brought before us figs and grapes, and we ate them as a casual meal outside of the sukka. The Gemara analyzes this: This implies that in the case of a casual meal, yes, it may be eaten outside of a sukka; but a fixed meal may not be eaten outside of a sukka. Therefore, a meal consisting of fruit must be eaten in a sukka. The Gemara rejects this: That is the wrong inference. Instead, say we ate them as if they were a casual meal, which may be eaten outside of the sukka, meaning that eating fruit is always considered a snack.

אִי בָּעֵית אֵימָא: אֲכַלְנוּם אֲכִילַת קֶבַע, וְאָכַלְנוּ פַּת אֲכִילַת עֲרַאי בַּהֲדַיְיהוּ חוּץ לַסּוּכָּה. If you wish, say instead that it can be understood in this way: We ate that fruit as a fixed meal, and we ate bread as a casual meal with the fruit, to temper their sweetness, outside of the sukka.

לֵימָא מְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ: לְפִיכָךְ, אִם הִשְׁלִים בְּמִינֵי תַרְגִּימָא — יָצָא. וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ פֵּירֵי בָּעוּ סוּכָּה, לִיתְנֵי פֵּירוֹת! מַאי מִינֵי תַרְגִּימָא — פֵּירוֹת. וְאִיבָּעֵית אֵימָא: בְּאַתְרָא דְּלָא שְׁכִיחִי פֵּירֵי. The Gemara suggests: Let us say that this baraita supports Rava. It teaches: Therefore, if one completed consuming the amount that one is required to eat in the sukka with types of sweets, he has fulfilled his obligation of sitting in the sukka. If it should enter your mind to say that fruit is required to be eaten in a sukka, then it should not say sweets; let it teach fruit. The Gemara rejects this proof: What do the words types of sweets mean? It means fruit. Therefore, this baraita is not a support for Rava’s opinion. And if you wish, say that this baraita is referring to a place where fruits are uncommon, and therefore other sweet foods are eaten, but fruit can similarly complete the requirement. Consequently, no support can be brought from here.

רַב זְבִיד אָמַר: כּוֹתֶבֶת הַגַּסָּה שֶׁאָמְרוּ — חֲסֵרָה מִכְּבֵיצָה. דִּתְנַן, בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים: שְׂאוֹר — בְּכַזַּיִת, חָמֵץ — בְּכַכּוֹתֶבֶת. Until now, the Gemara has assumed that the volume of a large date is more than that of an egg. Rav Zevid disagreed with what was mentioned earlier and said: This is not so. Rather, the volume of a large date that they spoke of is less than an egg-bulk, as we learned in a mishna: Beit Shammai say: With regard to leaven, the sourdough used to make dough rise, ownership of the volume of an olive-bulk violates the prohibitions in the following verses stated regarding Passover: “And no leavened bread shall be seen with you” (Exodus 13:7) and “Seven days shall there be no leaven found in your houses” (Exodus 12:19). However, the amount of leavened bread that must be owned to violate the prohibition is the volume of a large date.

וְהָוֵינַן בָּהּ: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּבֵית שַׁמַּאי? נִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא ״חָמֵץ״, וְלָא בָּעֵי ״שְׂאוֹר״, וַאֲנָא אָמֵינָא: וּמָה חָמֵץ שֶׁאֵין חִמּוּצוֹ קָשֶׁה — אָסוּר בִּכְזַיִת, שְׂאוֹר שֶׁחִמּוּצוֹ קָשֶׁה — לֹא כָּל שֶׁכֵּן? מִדְּפַלְגִינְהוּ רַחֲמָנָא, לִימְּדָה לְךָ שִׁיעוּרוֹ שֶׁל זֶה לֹא כְּשִׁיעוּרוֹ שֶׁל זֶה. שְׂאוֹר בְּכַזַּיִת, וְחָמֵץ בְּכַכּוֹתֶבֶת. The Gemara continues. And we discussed it: What is the reason for the opinion of Beit Shammai? If both leaven and leavened bread had the same measure that determines liability, let the Merciful One write only: “Leavened bread,” and He would not need to write: “Leaven.” I would say, based on logic: If leavened bread, whose leavening ability is not as strong, is prohibited at an olive-bulk, all the more so should not leaven, whose leavening ability is strong because it causes dough to rise, be also prohibited at an olive-bulk? Since the Merciful One distinguishes between them and states both “leaven” and “leavened bread,” this taught you that the measure for one is not the same as the measure for the other. The measure that determines liability for leaven is an olive-bulk, like in the case of most prohibitions from the Torah, and the measure that determines liability for leavened bread, whose leavening ability is weaker, is the volume of a large date.

וְאִי סָלְקָא דַּעְתָּךְ כּוֹתֶבֶת הַגַּסָּה שֶׁאָמְרוּ יְתֵירָה מִכְּבֵיצָה, מִכְּדִי בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אַשִּׁיעוּרָא דִּנְפִישׁ מִכְּזַיִת קָא מְהַדְּרִי, לִיתְנֵי כְּבֵיצָה. וְאִי נָמֵי כִּי הֲדָדֵי נִינְהוּ, נִיתְנֵי כְּבֵיצָה! אֶלָּא לָאו, שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: כּוֹתֶבֶת פְּחוּתָה מִכְּבֵיצָה. The Gemara clarifies: And if it should enter your mind to say: The volume of the large date that they spoke of is greater than an egg-bulk, since Beit Shammai are searching for the measure one size larger than an olive-bulk, as they proved that leavened bread must have a larger measure than an olive-bulk, and if the measure one size larger than an olive-bulk is an egg-bulk, then let them teach an egg-bulk and not a date. Alternatively, if they are exactly the same volume, and the volume of a large date has the same volume as an egg-bulk, they should have taught an egg-bulk, which is the more commonly used measure. Rather, must one not conclude from here that the volume of a large date is less than an egg-bulk?

מִמַּאי? דִּילְמָא לְעוֹלָם אֵימָא לְךָ כּוֹתֶבֶת הַגַּסָּה שֶׁאָמְרוּ — יְתֵירָה מִכְּבֵיצָה, הָא סְתָמָא — כְּבֵיצָה. וְאִי נָמֵי כִּי הֲדָדֵי נִינְהוּ, וַחֲדָא מִינַּיְיהוּ נְקַט. The Gemara rejects this: From where is your proof? Perhaps I could actually say to you that the measure of the volume of a large date that they said is larger than an egg-bulk; however, the volume of a date of normal size is the same as an egg-bulk, and Beit Shammai were referring to a normal-sized date. Alternatively, say that the volume of a large date and an egg-bulk are equal, and the mishna chose to use one of them. Either way, there is no proof from here that the volume of a large date is greater than an egg-bulk.

אֶלָּא מֵהָכָא: עַד כַּמָּה מְזַמְּנִין? עַד כְּזַיִת, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מֵאִיר. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: עַד כְּבֵיצָה. בְּמַאי קָא מִיפַּלְגִי — רַבִּי מֵאִיר סָבַר: ״וְאָכַלְתָּ״, זוֹ אֲכִילָה, ״וְשָׂבָעְתָּ״, זוֹ שְׁתִיָּה — וַאֲכִילָה בִּכְזַיִת. וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה סָבַר: ״וְאָכַלְתָּ וְשָׂבָעְתָּ״, אֲכִילָה שֶׁיֵּשׁ בָּהּ שְׂבִיעָה, וְאֵי זֶה — זֶה כְּבֵיצָה. Rather, it cannot be proven from here. Proof can be found from here: How much must one eat to obligate those with whom he ate in an invitation [zimmun] for Grace After Meals? An olive-bulk of food suffices to obligate those with whom they ate in a zimmun; these are the words of Rabbi Meir. Rabbi Yehuda says: An egg-bulk is the minimum measure to obligate those with whom they ate in a zimmun. The Gemara clarifies: With regard to what do they disagree? Rabbi Meir holds that the verse “And you shall eat and be satisfied and bless the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 8:10) should be understood as follows: “And you shall eat”; this is referring to eating. “And be satisfied”; this is referring to drinking. The definition of eating throughout the Torah is consuming an olive-bulk. Rabbi Yehuda holds: “And you shall eat and be satisfied” is referring to eating that causes satisfaction, and what is that? The volume of an egg-bulk. Less than that amount of food is not satisfying.

וְאִי סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ כּוֹתֶבֶת הַגַּסָּה שֶׁאָמְרוּ יְתֵירָה מִכְּבֵיצָה, הַשְׁתָּא כְּבֵיצָה שַׂבּוֹעֵי מְשַׂבְּעָא, דַּעְתָּא לָא מִיַּתְּבָא?! אֶלָּא לָאו, שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ: כּוֹתֶבֶת הַגַּסָּה שֶׁאָמְרוּ פָּחוֹת מִכְּבֵיצָה. כְּבֵיצָה — מְשַׂבְּעָא, כְּכוֹתֶבֶת — מִיַּתְּבָא דַּעְתֵּיהּ. And if it should enter your mind to say that the volume of the large date that they spoke of is larger than an egg-bulk, the following question can be asked: Now that we have said that the volume of an egg-bulk satisfies, can we say that it does not settle the mind, and thereby remove the affliction of Yom Kippur? Rather, must one not conclude from this that the volume of a large date that they said is less than the size of an egg-bulk? Eating the larger amount of an egg-bulk satisfies a person, but eating the volume of a large date only settles his mind.

תַּנְיָא, רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: It was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says:

כׇּל הַשִּׁיעוּרִין כּוּלָּן בִּכְזַיִת, חוּץ מִטּוּמְאַת אוֹכָלִין, שֶׁשִּׁינָּה הַכָּתוּב בְּמַשְׁמָעָן, וְשִׁינּוּ חֲכָמִים בְּשִׁיעוּרָן. וּרְאָיָה לַדָּבָר — יוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים. מַאי שִׁינָּה הַכָּתוּב בְּמַשְׁמָעוֹ — מִ״לֹּא תְעוּנֶּה״, וּמַאי שִׁינּוּ חֲכָמִים בְּשִׁיעוּרֵיהּ — כְּכוֹתֶבֶת. All the measures in the Torah connected to eating are the volume of an olive-bulk, except for the amount of food that renders objects impure, because the verse changed its expression in this case, and the Sages altered the measure accordingly. The proof of this, that the Sages gave it a different measure because the verse used different language for it, is from Yom Kippur. Also in the case of Yom Kippur the Sages assigned a different measure because the verse used a different phrase. The Gemara asks: How did the Sages learn that the verse changed its expression? They learned from: “Any soul which shall not be afflicted” (Leviticus 23:29). The verse does not state: Any soul that shall eat, but rather: “Any soul which shall not be afflicted.” How did the Sages change its measure? One does not violate the prohibition unless he has eaten the volume of a large date-bulk, as opposed to the usual olive-bulk.

וּמַאי רְאָיָה לַדָּבָר יוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים? דְּאִי מֵהָתָם, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא: אוֹרְחָא דִקְרָא הוּא. The Gemara asks: And what does the baraita mean when it says: A proof for this is from Yom Kippur? Why is the verse pertaining to ritual impurity not sufficient to show that the Sages changed the measure based on the different words in the verse? The Gemara answers: If we learned it only from there, the case of impurity, I would have said that that is the style of the verse, and no halakha can be derived from it. Therefore, the verse pertaining to Yom Kippur teaches that whenever a verse deviates from the usual language, it implies a change in the halakha as well.

טוּמְאַת אוֹכָלִין כְּבֵיצָה מְנָלַן? אָמַר רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: דְּאָמַר קְרָא: ״מִכׇּל הָאוֹכֶל אֲשֶׁר יֵאָכֵל״, אוֹכֶל הַבָּא מֵחֲמַת אוֹכֶל, וְאֵיזֶה — זֶה בֵּיצַת תַּרְנְגוֹלֶת. וְאֵימָא גְּדִי! מְחוּסָּר שְׁחִיטָה. וְאֵימָא בֶּן פְּקוּעָה! טָעוּן קְרִיעָה. § The Gemara asks: From where do we derive that the measure for impure foods is the volume of an egg-bulk? Rabbi Abbahu said that Rabbi Elazar said that the verse states: “Of all food [okhel] which may be eaten [ye’akhel], on which water comes shall be ritually impure” (Leviticus 11:34). The double usage of the root akhal teaches that the ritual impurity of food applies even to the amount which can be described as food that comes on account of food, i.e., food that comes from another food. And which food is that? A chicken egg. The Gemara asks: And say it is referring to a kid, which comes from a mother goat, and is therefore also food that comes from another food. The Gemara answers: It lacks ritual slaughter. The young goat is not yet food, since it is not edible until it has been slaughtered. The Gemara asks further: And say it is referring to a ben pekua. Since the slaughter of its mother made it fit to eat, the fetus itself need not be slaughtered, even if it survives and continues to live independently of its mother. The Gemara answers: The calf still requires cutting, since it cannot be eaten live, but it does not require ritual slaughter.

וְאֵימָא בֵּיצַת בַּר יוֹכָנִי! תָּפַסְתָּ מְרוּבֶּה לֹא תָּפַסְתָּ, תָּפַסְתָּ מוּעָט תָּפַסְתָּ. וְאֵימָא בֵּיעֲתָא דְּצִיפַּורְתָּא דְּזוּטַר טוּבָא! The Gemara asks: Even if we claim that the measure for impure foods is an egg-bulk, one could say it is referring to the giant egg-bulk of the bird called bar yokhani. The Gemara answers: If you grasped many, you did not grasp anything; if you grasped few, you grasped something. This means that in a case of doubt, take the smaller number, as it is included in the larger number. Therefore, the correct measure is the volume of a chicken egg. The Gemara questions this: If so, say it is referring to a very small bird’s egg. Consequently, no proof can be brought from the verse that the volume of a chicken egg is the measure for ritual impurity.

רַבִּי אֲבָהוּ דִּידֵיהּ, אָמַר: ״מִכׇּל הָאוֹכֶל אֲשֶׁר יֵאָכֵל״, אוֹכֶל שֶׁאַתָּה אוֹכְלוֹ בְּבַת אַחַת. וְשִׁיעֲרוּ חֲכָמִים: אֵין בֵּית הַבְּלִיעָה מַחֲזִיק יוֹתֵר מִבֵּיצַת תַּרְנְגוֹלֶת. Rabbi Abbahu himself said: The verse states: “Of all food which may be eaten.” This is referring to food that you can eat at one time. The Sages estimated: The esophagus cannot hold more than the volume of a chicken’s egg, and therefore this is the measure used for the ritual impurity of foods.

אָמַר רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר: הָאוֹכֵל חֵלֶב בִּזְמַן הַזֶּה צָרִיךְ שֶׁיִּכְתּוֹב לוֹ שִׁיעוּר, שֶׁמָּא יָבֹא בֵּית דִּין אַחֵר וְיַרְבֶּה בְּשִׁיעוּרִין. Incidental to the discussion on Torah measures, Rabbi Elazar said: One who unwittingly eats forbidden fat even today must write down the exact measure that he ate, lest another court come in the future and increase the measure.

מַאי יַרְבֶּה בְּשִׁיעוּרִין? אִי נֵימָא דִּמְחַיְּיבִי קׇרְבָּן אַכַּזַּיִת קָטָן, וְהָתַנְיָא: ״אֲשֶׁר לֹא תֵעָשֶׂינָה בִּשְׁגָגָה וְאָשֵׁם״, הַשָּׁב מִידִיעָתוֹ — מֵבִיא קׇרְבָּן עַל שִׁגְגָתוֹ. The Gemara asks: What does it mean to increase the measure? If we say that a future court will obligate him to bring an offering even for the bulk of a small olive, which is less than what is considered an olive-bulk today, he would not be liable to bring a guilt-offering. Wasn’t it taught in a baraita: It was said with regard to guilt-offerings: “And if any one of the common people sin through error, in doing any of the things which the Lord has commanded not to be done, and be guilty” (Leviticus 4:27)? This teaches that one who repents due to his awareness, i.e., one who repents following becoming aware that he performed a transgression, brings an offering for his unwitting transgression.

לֹא שָׁב מִידִיעָתוֹ — אֵין מֵבִיא קׇרְבָּן עַל שִׁגְגָתוֹ. However, one who does not repent due to his awareness that he sinned does not bring an offering for his unwitting action. Similarly, if one eats less than an olive-bulk, based on the current measures, he will not be obligated to bring a guilt-offering in the future if the measures change, even if the amount that he ate equals the volume of a revised olive-bulk. This is because the individual would not be bringing his offering because he became aware he had sinned, but because the Torah measures had been changed.

אֶלָּא: דְּלָא מְחַיְּיבִי קׇרְבָּן עַד דְּאִיכָּא כְּזַיִת גָּדוֹל. Rather, it should be explained as follows: It is possible that in the future a court will not obligate one to bring an offering until he has eaten the bulk of a large olive, which is more than today’s amount. One should write down how much he ate, since in the future a court might rule that the amount he ate is less than the size of an olive, and therefore he will not be obligated to bring an offering.

וּלְמַאי דִּסְלֵיק אַדַּעְתִּין מֵעִיקָּרָא דִּמְחַיְּיבִי קׇרְבָּן אַכַּזַּיִת קָטָן, מַאי ״יַרְבֶּה בְּשִׁיעוּרִין״? שֶׁמָּא יַרְבֶּה בְּקׇרְבָּנוֹת מֵחֲמַת שִׁיעוּרִין. The Gemara returns to its first suggestion: According to what entered his mind initially, that in the future a court might obligate him to bring an offering for the bulk of a small olive, what is the meaning of increase the measure? Rabbi Elazar should have said decrease the measure. The Gemara answers: The statement may have meant that perhaps there will be an increase in offerings that are brought due to the smaller measure for liability.

אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: שִׁיעוּרִין וָעוֹנָשִׁין הֲלָכָה לְמֹשֶׁה מִסִּינַי. עוֹנָשִׁין מִכְתָּב כְּתִיבִי! אֶלָּא הָכִי קָאָמַר: (אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן:) שִׁיעוּרִים שֶׁל עוֹנָשִׁין — הֲלָכָה לְמֹשֶׁה מִסִּינַי. With regard to this topic, Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Measures and punishments are halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai. The Gemara expresses surprise at this: The punishments for all transgressions are written explicitly in the Torah, and therefore are not part of an oral transmission from Moses. Rather, this is what was said: Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Measures that determine liability for punishments are halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai.

תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי: שִׁיעוּרִין שֶׁל עוֹנָשִׁין הֲלָכָה לְמֹשֶׁה מִסִּינַי. אֲחֵרִים אוֹמְרִים: בֵּית דִּינוֹ שֶׁל יַעְבֵּץ תִּיקְּנוּם. וְהָכְתִיב: ״אֵלֶּה הַמִּצְוֹת״, שֶׁאֵין נָבִיא רַשַּׁאי לְחַדֵּשׁ דָּבָר מֵעַתָּה! אֶלָּא, שְׁכָחוּם וְחָזְרוּ וְיִסְּדוּם. The Gemara comments: This was also taught in a baraita: Measures of punishments are halakha transmitted to Moses from Sinai. Others say: These measures were instituted by the court of Jabez. The Gemara questions this: How can this be? Isn’t it written: “These are the mitzvot which the Lord commanded Moses for the children of Israel at Mount Sinai” (Leviticus 27:34). The word “these” underscores that a prophet is not permitted to introduce any new element related to the Torah and its mitzvot from here on. Rather, over the course of time, the people forgot the measures; subsequently the prophets reestablished the measures and taught them to the masses.

הַשּׁוֹתֶה מְלֹא לוּגְמָיו. אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: לֹא מְלֹא לוּגְמָיו מַמָּשׁ, אֶלָּא כׇּל שֶׁאִילּוּ יְסַלְּקֶנּוּ לְצַד אֶחָד וְיֵרָאֶה כִּמְלֹא לוּגְמָיו. וְהָא אֲנַן תְּנַן ״מְלֹא לוּגְמָיו״! אֵימָא: ״כִּמְלֹא לוּגְמָיו״. § We learned in the mishna that one who drinks a cheekful on Yom Kippur is liable. Rabbi Yehuda said that Shmuel said: This does not mean two cheeks actually full. Rather, the measure that determines liability is the volume of liquid if one pushes the drink to one side of his mouth, and it appears as though his cheek were full. The Gemara questions this: Didn’t we learn in the mishna: A cheekful, in the plural form, meaning two cheeks full? The Gemara answers: Say: Like two cheeks full in appearance. If viewed from only one side, one whose cheek is full appears as if his entire mouth is full.

מֵיתִיבִי: כַּמָּה יִשְׁתֶּה וִיהֵא חַיָּיב? בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹמְרִים: רְבִיעִית, וּבֵית הִלֵּל אוֹמְרִים: מְלֹא לוּגְמָיו. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר: כִּמְלֹא לוּגְמָיו. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה בֶּן בְּתֵירָא אוֹמֵר: כְּדֵי גְמִיעָה. The Gemara raises an objection to this from a baraita: How much does one need to drink on Yom Kippur to be liable? Beit Shammai say: A quarter-log, and Beit Hillel say: Two cheeks full. Rabbi Yehuda says in the name of Rabbi Eliezer: Like two cheeks full in appearance from the side, i.e. a single cheekful. Rabbi Yehuda ben Beteira says: The amount that one can swallow in one gulp. In this baraita, Beit Hillel’s opinion is that the measure for drinking on Yom Kippur is a cheekful. This implies that a cheekful means an actual cheekful.

מִי עֲדִיפָא מִמַּתְנִיתִין דְּאוֹקֵימְנָא כְּדֵי שֶׁיֵּרָאֶה, הָכִי נָמֵי כְּדֵי שֶׁיֵּרָאֶה! אִי הָכִי, הַיְינוּ רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר! אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ מְלֹא לוּגְמָיו דָּחוּק. The Gemara expresses surprise: Is the baraita preferable to the mishna? Since it was established that the measure in the mishna is so that it appears like a cheekful, so too, the baraita can be explained as meaning an amount that looks like two cheeks full. The Gemara questions further: If so, Beit Hillel require an amount that appears like two cheeks full; this is identical with the opinion of Rabbi Eliezer, who says: Like two cheeks full. The Gemara answers: We could say that the practical difference between them is evident in the case of a paltry cheekful, which is not a complete mouthful but slightly less. According to Beit Hillel, one is not liable unless he drinks a full cheekful; but according to Rabbi Eliezer, one is liable even for a paltry mouthful.

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב הוֹשַׁעְיָא: אִם כֵּן, הָוֵה לֵיהּ מִקּוּלֵּי בֵּית שַׁמַּאי וּמֵחוּמְרֵי בֵּית הִלֵּל! אֲמַר לֵיהּ: Rav Hoshaya strongly objects to this understanding: If so, if Beit Hillel’s measure is a single cheekful, then this is an instance of Beit Shammai’s leniencies and Beit Hillel’s stringencies, since the measure of a quarter-log is larger than a single cheekful. If so, why isn’t this debate listed in tractate Eduyyot, which lists all the cases where Beit Shammai are more lenient than Beit Hillel? He said to him:

כִּי אִתְּשִׁיל, בְּעוֹג מֶלֶךְ הַבָּשָׁן אִתְּשִׁיל, דְּהָווּ לְהוּ בֵּית שַׁמַּאי לְחוּמְרָא. When this question with regard to the measure of liquid was asked, it was not asked about an average-sized person, for whom a mouthful is smaller than a quarter-log. Rather, the question was asked even about Og, king of Bashan, in which case, it is Beit Shammai who are stringent, for Og’s cheekful is much more than a quarter-log.

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַבִּי זֵירָא: מַאי שְׁנָא אֲכִילָה, דְּכׇל חַד וְחַד — בִּכְכוֹתֶבֶת, וּמַאי שְׁנָא שְׁתִיָּה, דְּכׇל חַד וְחַד בְּדִידֵיהּ? אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: קִים לְהוּ לְרַבָּנַן בִּכְכוֹתֶבֶת, דִּבְהָכִי מִיַּתְּבָא דַּעְתֵּיהּ, בְּצִיר מֵהָכִי — לָא מִיַּתְּבָא. בִּשְׁתִיָּה, בְּדִידֵיהּ מִיַּתְּבָא דַּעְתֵּיהּ, בִּדְחַבְרֵיהּ — לָא מִיַּתְּבָא דַּעְתֵּיהּ. Rabbi Zeira strongly objects to this halakha with regard to the measure for liability for drinking: What is different with regard to eating, in that all people have the same measure, the volume of a large date; and what is different with regard to drinking, where each and every person is liable according to his own measure, i.e., every individual’s measure depends on the size of his own mouth? Abaye said to him: The Sages have an accepted tradition with regard to the volume of the large date, that eating this amount settles his mind, but less than this amount does not settle his mind. However, with regard to drinking, his mind is settled with the amount of his own cheekful, but his mind is not settled with the cheekful of his fellow who is smaller than him.

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַבִּי זֵירָא: וְכׇל הָעוֹלָם כּוּלּוֹ בִּכְכוֹתֶבֶת וְעוֹג מֶלֶךְ הַבָּשָׁן בִּכְכוֹתֶבֶת? אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: קִים לְהוּ לְרַבָּנַן דִּבְהָכִי מִיַּתְּבָא דַּעְתֵּיהּ, בְּצִיר מֵהָכִי לָא מִיַּתְּבָא דַּעְתֵּיהּ, מִיהוּ, כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא — טוּבָא, וְעוֹג מֶלֶךְ הַבָּשָׁן — פּוּרְתָּא. Rabbi Zeira strongly objects to this for a different reason: Is everyone of average size satisfied with eating the volume of a large date, and even Og, king of Bashan, is also satisfied with the volume of a large date? If not, there should also be relative measures for eating. Abaye said to him: The Sages have an accepted tradition that this amount settles his mind, but less than this amount does not settle his mind. However, everyone of average size has his mind greatly settled, whereas Og, king of Bashan, has his mind only a little settled. But even so, this measure settles the mind of any person and relieves his affliction.

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַבִּי זֵירָא בָּשָׂר שָׁמֵן בִּכְכוֹתֶבֶת, וְלוּלְבֵי גְפָנִים בִּכְכוֹתֶבֶת? אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: קִים לְהוּ לְרַבָּנַן דִּבְהָכִי מִיַּתְּבָא דַּעְתֵּיהּ, בְּצִיר מֵהָכִי — לָא מִיַּתְּבָא דַּעְתֵּיהּ. מִיהוּ בָּשָׂר שָׁמֵן — טוּבָא, לוּלְבֵי גְפָנִים — פּוּרְתָּא. Rabbi Zeira strongly objects to this further: If it is on account of settling one’s mind, the following question can be raised: If one ate fatty meat, his mind would be settled with the volume of a large date, but if he ate edible grapevine shoots, would his mind similarly be settled with the volume of a large date? Abaye said to him: The Sages have an accepted tradition that with this measure one’s mind is settled, but with less than this measure his mind is not settled. However, with fatty meat, his mind is greatly settled; if one ate the same measure of grapevine shoots, his mind is only a little settled.

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רָבָא: כְּזַיִת בִּכְדֵי אֲכִילַת פְּרָס, וְכוֹתֶבֶת בִּכְדֵי אֲכִילַת פְּרָס?! אֲמַר לֵיהּ אַבָּיֵי: קִים לְהוּ לְרַבָּנַן דִּבְהָכִי מִיַּתְּבָא דַּעְתֵּיהּ, בִּטְפֵי מֵהָכִי — לָא מִיַּתְּבָא דַּעְתֵּיהּ. Rava strongly objects to this: For all prohibitions of eating, the measure that determines liability is the volume of an olive-bulk consumed within the time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread. All forbidden food eaten within that period combines to the measure of an olive-bulk. However, one who eats an olive-bulk over a longer period is exempt. Yet, on Yom Kippur one who eats the volume of a large date, which is a larger measure, is culpable if this amount is eaten within the time it would take to eat a half-loaf of bread. This appears to be a leniency, since one must eat a larger measure in the same time period of time. Why is there not a longer period of time for liability on Yom Kippur, to reflect the larger measure? Abaye said to him: The Sages have an accepted tradition that one who eats within this duration of time, his mind is settled; but one who eats within a longer duration of time, his mind is not settled, and he remains in a state of affliction.

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רָבָא: (בְּכוֹתֶבֶת) בִּכְדֵי אֲכִילַת פְּרָס, חֲצִי פְרָס — בִּכְדֵי אֲכִילַת פְּרָס?! אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב פָּפָּא: הַנַּח לְטוּמְאַת גְּוִויָּה דְּלָאו דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא הִיא. Rava strongly objects to this: The measure for liability for eating on Yom Kippur is the volume of a large date consumed within the time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread; but the measure for eating impure foods that render one ritually impure is half of a half-loaf, which is two egg-bulks, a much larger volume, and this must also be consumed within the time it takes to eat a half-loaf of bread. Rav Pappa said to him: Do not raise a challenge from here. Leave aside ritual impurity of the body contracted through consuming impure foods because that is not by Torah law but by rabbinic law. The Sages were lenient in this matter. If one does not consume that amount of impure food within this time period, he is not rendered impure.

וּמִי אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא הָכִי? וְהָכְתִיב: ״וְלֹא תִטַּמְּאוּ בָּהֶם וְנִטְמֵתֶם בָּם״, וְאָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: מִכָּאן שֶׁטּוּמְאַת גְּוִויָּה דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא! מִדְּרַבָּנַן, וּקְרָא — אַסְמַכְתָּא בְּעָלְמָא. The Gemara challenges this: But did Rav Pappa actually say that the rendering of ritual impurity of the body through the consumption of impure foods is by rabbinic law? But he appears to say the opposite in another statement: Isn’t it written: “You shall not make yourselves detestable with any creeping thing that creeps, neither shall you make yourselves impure with them, that you should be impure thereby” (Leviticus 11:43). And Rav Pappa said: From here, from the Torah’s usage of the word “impure” with regard to the prohibition of eating, we learn that ritual impurity of the body is by Torah law. The Gemara answers: Rav Pappa did not mean that the law is actually Torah law. The law is indeed rabbinic law, and the verse brought as proof is a mere support.

כׇּל הָאוֹכָלִין. אָמַר רַב פָּפָּא: אֲכַל אוּמְצָא וּמִילְחָא — מִצְטָרֵף. וְאַף עַל גַּב דְּלָאו אֲכִילָה הִיא, כֵּיוָן דְּאָכְלִי אִינָשֵׁי — מִצְטָרְפִין. אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: צִיר שֶׁעַל גַּבֵּי יָרָק מִצְטָרֵף לִכְכוֹתֶבֶת בְּיוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים. פְּשִׁיטָא! מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא מַשְׁקֶה הוּא, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן: כׇּל אַכְשׁוֹרֵי אוּכְלָא — אוּכְלָא הוּא. § We learned in the mishna: All types of foods combine to form a measure of liability with regard to eating on Yom Kippur. Rav Pappa said: If one ate meat and the salt that was on it, these combine to make the volume of a large date. Although consuming salt alone is not considered eating, since people do eat meat with salt together, they combine into one measure. Similarly, Reish Lakish said: Brine on a vegetable combines with the vegetable to make the volume of a large date with regard to the prohibition of eating on Yom Kippur. The Gemara expresses surprise at this: It is obvious. Why should the brine not combine with the vegetable, considering that it is itself food? The Gemara answers: Lest you say that brine is a beverage, and food and drinks do not combine, it teaches us that any item that prepares food for eating is considered a food.

אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: הָאוֹכֵל אֲכִילָה גַּסָּה בְּיוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים — פָּטוּר. מַאי טַעְמָא? ״אֲשֶׁר לֹא תְעוּנֶּה״ כְּתִיב, פְּרָט לְמַזִּיק. § Reish Lakish said: One who eats in an excessive manner on Yom Kippur, to the degree that he forces himself to continue eating even when full is exempt, e.g., one who ate beyond being satiated on Yom Kippur eve and then ate something else as soon as the fast began. What is the reason for that? Because the Torah does not mention the prohibition of eating on Yom Kippur, but it was written “any soul which shall not be afflicted in that same day, he shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 23:29), excluding one who harms himself, e.g., one who does not enjoy his food at all.

אָמַר רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: זָר שֶׁאָכַל תְּרוּמָה אֲכִילָה גַּסָּה — מְשַׁלֵּם אֶת הַקֶּרֶן וְאֵינוֹ מְשַׁלֵּם אֶת הַחוֹמֶשׁ. ״כִּי יֹאכַל״ — פְּרָט לְמַזִּיק. אָמַר רַבִּי יִרְמְיָה אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: זָר Similarly, Rabbi Yirmeya said that Reish Lakish said: A non-priest who ate teruma in an excessive manner pays the principal, that which he took, and does not pay the additional fifth, which one who illegally eats teruma pays to the priest as a penalty. This is because it states about one who eats teruma: “And if a man eat of the sacred thing in error, then he shall add a fifth to it, and give the priest the sacred thing” (Leviticus 22:14). The word “eat” excludes one who is not eating but harming himself. He does, however, pay the principal, since he caused a loss to the priest. The fifth is only paid by one who eats normally, not excessively. Similarly, Rabbi Yirmeya said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: A non-priest

שֶׁכּוֹסֵס שְׂעוֹרִים שֶׁל תְּרוּמָה — מְשַׁלֵּם אֶת הַקֶּרֶן וְאֵינוֹ מְשַׁלֵּם אֶת הַחוֹמֶשׁ. ״כִּי יֹאכַל״ — פְּרָט לְמַזִּיק. who chews on barley of teruma that has not been ground or baked pays the principal and not an extra fifth. The reason is that it states “eats” (Leviticus 22:14), which excludes one who harms himself. Consuming raw barley is considered self-harm, not eating.

אָמַר רַב שֵׁיזְבִי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: זָר שֶׁבָּלַע שִׁזְפִין שֶׁל תְּרוּמָה וֶהֱקִיאָן וַאֲכָלָן אַחֵר, רִאשׁוֹן — מְשַׁלֵּם (אֶת) קֶרֶן וָחוֹמֶשׁ. שֵׁנִי — אֵין מְשַׁלֵּם אֶלָּא דְּמֵי עֵצִים לָרִאשׁוֹן בִּלְבַד. Rav Sheizvi said that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: In the case of a non-priest who swallowed plums of teruma whole and vomited them out, whereupon another person ate them, the first one pays the principal plus a fifth. When the first one benefited from the plums, he acquired them and must therefore pay for them, and the second one must pay their worth to the first one. Since they are only fit for fuel after the first one vomited them out, the second person is considered to have damaged their value as fuel. Therefore, he pays only the price of wood, i.e., fuel, to the first person.

הָאוֹכֵל וְהַשּׁוֹתֶה אֵין מִצְטָרְפִין. מַאן תַּנָּא? אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: בְּמַחְלוֹקֶת שְׁנוּיָה, וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ הִיא. דִּתְנַן, כְּלָל אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ: כֹּל שֶׁטּוּמְאָתוֹ וְשִׁיעוּרוֹ שָׁוֶה — מִצְטָרֵף. § It was taught in the mishna that food and drink do not combine. The Gemara asks: Who is the tanna who taught this? Rav Ḥisda said: This halakha is taught as a dispute, and the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua. As we learned in a mishna: Rabbi Yehoshua stated a general principle: Any item that is identical to another item in its type of ritual impurity, e.g., impurity that lasts only until evening, and its measure for impurity, e.g., an olive-bulk, combines with the other item to reach one measure to render other items impure. Therefore, two half olive-bulk pieces of two corpses or of two animal carcasses, or two half lentil-bulk pieces from two creeping animals all combine to render other items impure.

טוּמְאָתוֹ וְלֹא שִׁיעוּרוֹ, שִׁיעוּרוֹ וְלֹא טוּמְאָתוֹ, לֹא טוּמְאָתוֹ וְלֹא שִׁיעוּרוֹ — אֵין מִצְטָרְפִין. However, if one item is identical to another in its ritual impurity but not its measure, e.g., half a lentil-bulk of a creeping animal and half an olive-bulk of an animal carcass, which both impart impurity until nightfall; or if its measure is identical but not its type of ritual impurity, e.g., half an olive-bulk from a corpse, which imparts impurity for seven days, and half an olive-bulk from an animal carcass, which imparts impurity until nightfall; and all the more so, when neither its ritual impurity nor its measure are identical, then the items do not combine. Here, too, although both eating and drinking are prohibited on their own, they do not combine because they do not have the same measure that imparts impurity.

רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא רַבָּנַן, עַד כָּאן לָא קָא אָמְרִי רַבָּנַן הָתָם, אֶלָּא לְעִנְיַן טוּמְאָה, דְּשֵׁם טוּמְאָה חַד הִיא. אֲבָל הָכָא, מִשּׁוּם יַתּוֹבֵי דַּעְתָּא הוּא, וְהַאי לָא מִיַּתְּבָא דַּעְתֵּיהּ. Rav Naḥman said: Even if you say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, until now we have heard the Rabbis say there that items with different measures combine only with respect to ritual impurity. Since the phenomenon of ritual impurity is one concept, different types combine. But here, in the case of Yom Kippur, the measure that determines liability is set due to settling the mind, and this combination of eating and drinking together does not settle the mind.

וְכֵן אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: בְּמַחְלוֹקֶת שְׁנוּיָה, וְרַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ הִיא, דִּתְנַן: כְּלָל אָמַר רַבִּי יְהוֹשֻׁעַ כּוּ׳. וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא רַבָּנַן, עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמְרִי רַבָּנַן הָתָם אֶלָּא לְעִנְיַן טוּמְאָה, אֲבָל הָכָא, מִשּׁוּם יַתּוֹבֵי דַּעְתֵּיהּ הוּא, וְהַאי לָא קָא מִיַּתְּבָא דַּעְתֵּיהּ. And similarly, Reish Lakish said: This question of whether food and drink combine to reach a measure that determines liability on Yom Kippur is taught as a dispute. The approach brought in the mishna that states that they do not combine is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehoshua, as we learned in a mishna: Rabbi Yehoshua stated a general principle with regard to whether items with different types of impurity and measures combine, as Rav Ḥisda explained above. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said in accordance with the opinion of Rav Naḥman: Even if you say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, until now we have heard the Rabbis say there that items with different measures combine only with regard to ritual impurity. But here, in the case of Yom Kippur, the measure that determines liability is set due to settling the mind, and this combination of eating and drinking together does not settle the mind.

מַתְנִי׳ אָכַל וְשָׁתָה בְּהֶעְלֵם אֶחָד — אֵינוֹ חַיָּיב אֶלָּא חַטָּאת אַחַת. אָכַל וְעָשָׂה מְלָאכָה — חַיָּיב שְׁתֵּי חַטָּאוֹת. אָכַל אוֹכָלִין שֶׁאֵינָן רְאוּיִן לַאֲכִילָה, וְשָׁתָה מַשְׁקִין שֶׁאֵינָן רְאוּיִן לִשְׁתִיָּה, וְשָׁתָה צִיר אוֹ מוּרְיָיס — פָּטוּר. MISHNA: If one ate and drank unwittingly within one lapse of awareness, e.g., he forgot that it is Yom Kippur, he is liable to bring only one sin-offering. However, if he ate and performed labor unwittingly, he is liable to bring two sin-offerings, as by doing so he violated two separate prohibitions. If he ate foods that are not fit for eating, or drank liquids that are not fit for drinking, or drank fish brine or the briny liquid in which fish are pickled, he is exempt, as that is not the typical manner of eating or drinking.

גְּמָ׳ אָמַר רֵישׁ לָקִישׁ: מִפְּנֵי מָה לֹא נֶאֶמְרָה אַזְהָרָה בְּעִינּוּי? מִשּׁוּם דְּלָא אֶפְשָׁר. הֵיכִי נִכְתּוֹב? נִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא ״לֹא יֵאָכֵל״ — אֲכִילָה בִּכְזַיִת! נִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא ״לֹא תְעוּנֶּה״ — קוּם אֱכוֹל מַשְׁמַע. GEMARA: Reish Lakish said: Why is there no warning stated about affliction; why did the Torah not state explicitly that it is prohibited to eat and drink on Yom Kippur? It is because it was not possible to write it that way. The Gemara explains: How could the Merciful One write it? Let the Merciful One write: One shall not eat on Yom Kippur. The term eat prohibits eating the amount of an olive-bulk, whereas on Yom Kippur the actual prohibited measure is a large date-bulk. Let the Merciful One write: Do not be afflicted. That indicates the opposite of affliction, and would mean: Get up and eat. Therefore, it is written: “For whatsoever soul it be that shall not be afflicted on that same day, he shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 23:29).

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב הוֹשַׁעְיָא: נִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא ״הִשָּׁמֶר פֶּן לֹא תְעוּנֶּה״! אִם כֵּן נְפִישִׁי לְהוּ לָאוֵי. Rav Hoshaya strongly objects to this: Let the Merciful One write it in this manner: Guard yourself lest you not be afflicted. The Gemara answers: If so, there would be too many negative mitzvot, as the following are all expressions of prohibition: Guard, lest, and not. One would then say that there are three prohibitions against eating.

מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב בִּיבִי בַּר אַבָּיֵי: נִכְתּוֹב רַחֲמָנָא ״הִשָּׁמֶר בְּמִצְוַת עִינּוּי״! אִם כֵּן ״הִשָּׁמֶר״ דְּלָאו — לָאו, ״הִשָּׁמֶר״ דַּעֲשֵׂה — עֲשֵׂה! מַתְקֵיף לַהּ רַב אָשֵׁי: נִכְתּוֹב: ״אַל תָּסוּר מִן הָעִינּוּי״! קַשְׁיָא. Rav Beivai bar Abaye strongly objects to this: Let the Merciful One write: Guard yourself in the mitzva of affliction. The Gemara rejects this: If so, there is a principle: If the words guard yourself are written about a prohibition, it is considered to be a prohibition; if the words guard yourself are written about a positive mitzva, it is considered to be a positive mitzva. Had the Torah written it that way, one would understand that there is a positive mitzva of affliction, but there is no element of prohibition. Rav Ashi strongly objects to this: Let the Merciful One write: Do not stray from afflicting yourself, which would imply a negative mitzva. The Gemara says: Indeed, this is difficult. The Gemara concedes that it could have been written in this manner.

וְתַנָּא מַיְיתֵי לַהּ מֵהָכָא: ״וְעִנִּיתֶם אֶת נַפְשׁוֹתֵיכֶם וְכׇל מְלָאכָה לֹא תַעֲשׂוּ״. יָכוֹל יְהֵא עָנוּשׁ עַל תּוֹסֶפֶת מְלָאכָה — תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְכׇל הַנֶּפֶשׁ אֲשֶׁר תַּעֲשֶׂה כׇּל מְלָאכָה בְּעֶצֶם הַיּוֹם הַזֶּה״ — עַל עִיצּוּמוֹ שֶׁל יוֹם עָנוּשׁ כָּרֵת, וְאֵינוֹ עָנוּשׁ כָּרֵת עַל תּוֹסֶפֶת מְלָאכָה. § With regard to the prohibitions against eating and labor, the Gemara says: And a tanna cites the prohibitions relating to affliction on Yom Kippur from here: It is stated: “And you shall afflict your souls, you shall do no manner of labor” (Numbers 29:7). The Gemara considers: One might have thought that performing labor during the extension of the period of prohibition of labor, added before Yom Kippur actually begins, is punishable by karet. Therefore, the verse states: “And whatsoever soul it be that does any manner of labor on that same day” (Leviticus 23:30), which teaches that performing labor on that very day is punishable by karet, but labor performed during the extension of the period of prohibition of labor is not punishable by karet.

יָכוֹל לֹא יְהֵא עָנוּשׁ כָּרֵת עַל תּוֹסֶפֶת מְלָאכָה, אֲבָל יְהֵא עָנוּשׁ כָּרֵת עַל תּוֹסֶפֶת עִינּוּי — תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״כִּי כׇל הַנֶּפֶשׁ אֲשֶׁר לֹא תְעוּנֶּה בְּעֶצֶם הַיּוֹם הַזֶּה וְנִכְרְתָה״. עַל עִיצּוּמוֹ שֶׁל יוֹם עָנוּשׁ כָּרֵת, וְאֵינוֹ עָנוּשׁ כָּרֵת עַל תּוֹסֶפֶת עִינּוּי. The baraita continues: One might have thought that performing labor during the extension of the period of prohibition of labor is not punishable by karet, but not afflicting oneself during the extension of the period of affliction is punishable by karet. Therefore, the verse states: “For whatsoever soul it be that shall not be afflicted on that same day, he shall be cut off from his people” (Leviticus 23:29), which teaches that not afflicting oneself on that very day is punishable by karet, but not afflicting oneself during the extension of the period of affliction is not punishable by karet.

יָכוֹל לֹא יְהֵא בִּכְלַל עוֹנֶשׁ, אֲבָל יְהֵא מוּזְהָר עַל תּוֹסֶפֶת מְלָאכָה — תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״וְכׇל מְלָאכָה לֹא תַעֲשׂוּ בְּעֶצֶם הַיּוֹם הַזֶּה״. עַל עִיצּוּמוֹ שֶׁל יוֹם הוּא מוּזְהָר, וְאֵינוֹ מוּזְהָר עַל תּוֹסֶפֶת מְלָאכָה. The baraita continues: One might have thought that one who performs labor during the extension would not be included in the punishment of karet, but he would be warned against performing labor during the extension of the period of prohibition of labor with a prohibition incurring the punishment of lashes; therefore, the verse states: “And you shall do no manner of labor on that same day” (Leviticus 23:28). That teaches that he is warned not to perform labor on that very day, but he is not warned against performing labor during the extension of the period of prohibition of labor, and therefore he is not liable to receive lashes for doing so.

יָכוֹל לֹא יְהֵא מוּזְהָר עַל תּוֹסֶפֶת מְלָאכָה, אֲבָל יְהֵא מוּזְהָר עַל תּוֹסֶפֶת עִינּוּי — וְדִין הוּא: וּמָה מְלָאכָה שֶׁנּוֹהֶגֶת בְּשַׁבָּתוֹת וְיוֹם טוֹב אֵינוֹ מוּזְהָר עָלֶיהָ, עִינּוּי, שֶׁאֵינוֹ נוֹהֵג בְּשַׁבָּתוֹת וְיוֹם טוֹב — אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁלֹּא יְהֵא מוּזְהָר עָלָיו?! The baraita continues: One might have thought: He would not be warned with regard to performing labor during the extension of the period of prohibition of labor that it is a prohibition that incurs lashes; but he would be warned with regard to not being in a state of affliction during the extension of the period of affliction that it is a prohibition that incurs lashes. However, that is incorrect, and it is learned from a logical derivation that it is not so: Just as with regard to labor, whose prohibition is observed on both Shabbatot and Festivals, one is not warned about the extension added to the day, is it not logical that with regard to affliction, which is not observed on Shabbatot and Festivals, he should not be warned about or liable to receive lashes for the extension?

אֲבָל אַזְהָרָה לְעִינּוּי שֶׁל יוֹם עַצְמוֹ לֹא לָמַדְנוּ מִנַּיִין. לֹא יֹאמַר עוֹנֶשׁ בִּמְלָאכָה, דְּגָמַר מֵעִינּוּי: וּמָה עִינּוּי שֶׁאֵינוֹ נוֹהֵג בְּשַׁבָּתוֹת וְיוֹם טוֹב עָנוּשׁ כָּרֵת, מְלָאכָה שֶׁנּוֹהֶגֶת בְּשַׁבָּתוֹת וְיָמִים טוֹבִים — לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן? לָמָּה נֶאֱמַר — מוּפְנֶה לְהַקִּישׁ וְלָדוּן מִמֶּנּוּ גְּזֵרָה שָׁוָה: נֶאֱמַר עוֹנֶשׁ בְּעִינּוּי וְנֶאֱמַר עוֹנֶשׁ בִּמְלָאכָה, מָה מְלָאכָה — לֹא עָנַשׁ אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן הִזְהִיר, אַף עִינּוּי — לֹא עָנַשׁ אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן הִזְהִיר. The baraita comments: But the warning about lashes during the very day itself we have not learned. From where is it derived? The Torah need not state the punishment of karet for performing labor, since one can learn it by logical derivation from the punishment of not being in a state of affliction, as follows: Just as the requirement of affliction, which is not observed on Shabbatot and Festivals, is punishable by karet on Yom Kippur, with regard to the prohibition of labor, which is observed on all Shabbatot and Festivals, is it not all the more so? If so, why is the punishment for labor stated explicitly? It is available to compare and learn a verbal analogy from it: A punishment with regard to affliction is stated, and a punishment with regard to labor is stated. Just as with regard to labor one is punished only if he was warned first with a negative mitzva, so too, with regard to affliction, one is punished only if he was warned.

אִיכָּא לְמִיפְרַךְ: מָה לְעִינּוּי שֶׁלֹּא הוּתַּר מִכְּלָלוֹ, תֹּאמַר בִּמְלָאכָה שֶׁהוּתְּרָה מִכְּלָלָהּ! The Gemara rejects this: This comparison can be refuted. How so? Whereas affliction has no permitted exceptions from its general prohibition, as the mitzva to afflict oneself applies to all the Jewish people, what can you say with regard to labor, which has permitted exceptions from its general prohibition? It is permitted to perform the Temple services on Yom Kippur, which include prohibited labors, e.g., slaughtering animals and offering incense. Consequently, there is no proof that the mitzva of affliction is more lenient than the prohibition of labor.

אֶלָּא: לֹא יֵאָמֵר עוֹנֶשׁ בְּעִינּוּי, דְּגָמַר מִמְּלָאכָה. מָה מְלָאכָה שֶׁהוּתְּרָה מִכְּלָלָהּ — עָנוּשׁ כָּרֵת, עִינּוּי שֶׁלֹּא הוּתַּר מִכְּלָלוֹ — לֹא כׇּל שֶׁכֵּן. לָמָּה נֶאֱמַר — מוּפְנֶה, לְהַקִּישׁ וְלָדוּן מִמֶּנּוּ גְּזֵירָה שָׁוָה: נֶאֱמַר עוֹנֶשׁ בְּעִינּוּי וְנֶאֱמַר עוֹנֶשׁ בִּמְלָאכָה, מָה מְלָאכָה עָנַשׁ וְהִזְהִיר — אַף עִינּוּי עָנַשׁ וְהִזְהִיר. Rather, say as follows: The Torah need not say the punishment for not being in a state of affliction, since one can learn it from the punishment for performing labor through an a fortiori inference. How so? Just as labor, for which exceptions from the general prohibition are permitted, e.g., performing the Temple service on Yom Kippur, and yet labor is punishable by karet, with regard to not being in a state of affliction, which has no permitted exceptions from its general prohibition, is it not all the more so that one who does not afflict himself should be liable to receive karet? If so, why is it nevertheless stated? It is available to compare and learn a verbal analogy: Punishment is stated with regard to affliction, and punishment is stated with regard to labor. Just as for labor the Torah punished and warned, so too, for affliction the Torah punished and warned.

אִיכָּא לְמִיפְרַךְ: מָה לִמְלָאכָה — שֶׁכֵּן נוֹהֶגֶת בְּשַׁבָּתוֹת וְיָמִים טוֹבִים. תֹּאמַר בְּעִינּוּי — שֶׁאֵינוֹ נוֹהֵג בְּשַׁבָּתוֹת וְיָמִים טוֹבִים! The Gemara rejects this: This comparison can be refuted, and one might say the opposite: Whereas the prohibition of labor is observed on Shabbatot and Festivals, can you say the same about affliction, which is not observed on Shabbatot and Festivals?

אָמַר רָבִינָא: הַאי תַּנָּא, ״עֶצֶם״ ״עֶצֶם״ גָּמַר. מוּפְנֶה, דְּאִי לָא מוּפְנֶה — אִיכָּא לְמִיפְרַךְ כִּדְפָרְכִינַן! Ravina said: We did not properly understand the teaching of this baraita, as this tanna derived a verbal analogy from the words “on that same day” (Leviticus 23:29) stated with regard to affliction, and “on that same day” (Leviticus 23:28) stated with regard to labor. The Gemara comments: We must say that it is available, meaning that in both places, the phrase “on that same day” is unnecessary within its own context and comes only to teach this verbal analogy; as, if it were not available, it could be refuted, as we refuted it above.

לָאיֵי, אִפְּנוֹיֵי מוּפְנֶה. חַמְשָׁה קְרָאֵי כְּתִיבִי בִּמְלָאכָה, חַד לְאַזְהָרָה דִימָמָא, וְחַד לְאַזְהָרָה דְלֵילְיָא, וְחַד לְעוֹנֶשׁ דִּימָמָא, וְחַד לְעוֹנֶשׁ דְּלֵילְיָא, וְחַד לְאַפְנוֹיֵי לְמִגְמַר עִינּוּי מִמְּלָאכָה, בֵּין דִּימָמָא בֵּין דְּלֵילְיָא. The Gemara responds: No, it is certainly available, and we may learn from it, as five verses are written with regard to the prohibition of labor on Yom Kippur. One to teach a warning with regard to the prohibition of labor on the day of Yom Kippur itself; and one for a warning with regard to labor on the night of Yom Kippur; and one for the punishment of karet for performing labor on the day; and one for the punishment for performing labor at night; and one verse to be available to derive the requirement of affliction from the prohibition of labor, both during the day and night, using a verbal analogy.

רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל תָּנָא: נֶאֱמַר כָּאן עִינּוּי, וְנֶאֱמַר לְהַלָּן עִינּוּי. מָה לְהַלָּן — לֹא עָנַשׁ אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן הִזְהִיר, אַף כָּאן — לֹא עָנַשׁ אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן הִזְהִיר. רַב אַחָא בַּר יַעֲקֹב אָמַר: יָלֵיף ״שַׁבַּת שַׁבָּתוֹן״ מִשַּׁבַּת בְּרֵאשִׁית: מָה לְהַלָּן — לֹא עָנַשׁ אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן הִזְהִיר, אַף כָּאן — לֹא עָנַשׁ אֶלָּא אִם כֵּן הִזְהִיר. The school of Rabbi Yishmael taught an alternative verbal analogy for the derivation: “Affliction” is stated here, with regard to Yom Kippur, and “affliction” is stated later, with regard to a man who rapes a woman: “Because he has afflicted his neighbor’s wife” (Deuteronomy 22:24). Just as there, in the case of rape, the Torah did not punish unless there was prior warning, so too here, in the case of Yom Kippur, the Torah did not punish unless there was prior warning. Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov said a different proof: Derive a verbal analogy from the words “Shabbat of solemn rest” (Leviticus 16:31) written with regard to Yom Kippur from the words “Shabbat of solemn rest” (Exodus 31:15, 32:5; Leviticus 23:3) written with regard to the weekly Shabbat, which commemorates the Shabbat of Creation. Just as there, in the case of Shabbat, the Torah did not punish unless there was prior warning, so too here, in the case of Yom Kippur, the Torah did not punish unless there was prior warning.

רַב פָּפָּא אָמַר: Rav Pappa said:

הוּא גּוּפֵיהּ שַׁבָּת אִיקְּרִי, דִּכְתִיב: ״תִּשְׁבְּתוּ שַׁבַּתְּכֶם״. בִּשְׁלָמָא רַב פָּפָּא לָא אָמַר כְּרַב אַחָא בַּר יַעֲקֹב — דִּקְרָא דִּכְתִיב בְּגוּפֵיהּ עֲדִיף. אֶלָּא רַב אַחָא בַּר יַעֲקֹב, מַאי טַעְמָא לָא אָמַר כְּרַב פָּפָּא? Yom Kippur itself is called “Shabbat,” as it is written: “From evening until evening, you shall rest on your Shabbat” (Leviticus 23:32). The Gemara compares the various opinions. Granted, Rav Pappa did not say as Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov did because a verse that is written about the matter itself is preferable to a verbal analogy. But what is the reason that Rav Aḥa bar Ya’akov did not state his opinion in accordance with the opinion of Rav Pappa?

מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְתַנְיָא: ״וְעִנִּיתֶם אֶת נַפְשׁוֹתֵיכֶם בְּתִשְׁעָה לַחוֹדֶשׁ״. יָכוֹל יַתְחִיל וְיִתְעַנֶּה בְּתִשְׁעָה — תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״בָּעֶרֶב״. אִי בָּעֶרֶב — יָכוֹל מִשֶּׁתֶּחְשַׁךְ? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״בְּתִשְׁעָה״. הָא כֵּיצַד? מַתְחִיל וּמִתְעַנֶּה מִבְּעוֹד יוֹם, מִכָּאן שֶׁמּוֹסִיפִין מֵחוֹל עַל הַקּוֹדֶשׁ. The Gemara answers: He requires this verse of “keep your Shabbat” for that which was taught in a baraita: The verse states: “And you shall afflict your souls on the ninth day of the month at evening, from evening until evening, you shall rest on your Shabbat” (Leviticus 23:32). One might have thought that one should start to afflict oneself on the ninth of Tishrei; therefore, the verse states “at evening.” If the Torah had stated only “at evening,” one might have thought that the fast starts only when darkness falls; therefore, the verse states “on the ninth,” implying that one begins to fast on the ninth of Tishrei. How can these verses be reconciled? One begins to fast while it is still daytime; from here it is derived that one sanctifies and extends from the non-sacred weekday to the sacred day of Yom Kippur.

וְאֵין לִי אֶלָּא בִּכְנִיסָתוֹ, בִּיצִיאָתוֹ מִנַּיִן — תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״מֵעֶרֶב עַד עֶרֶב״. וְאֵין לִי אֶלָּא יוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים, (יָמִים טוֹבִים) מִנַּיִין — תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״תִּשְׁבְּתוּ״. אֵין לִי אֶלָּא (יָמִים טוֹבִים, שַׁבָּתוֹת) מִנַּיִן — תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״שַׁבַּתְּכֶם״. הָא כֵּיצַד? כׇּל מָקוֹם שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר שְׁבוּת, (מִכָּאן שֶׁ)מוֹסִיפִין מֵחוֹל עַל הַקּוֹדֶשׁ. I have derived only that one must add time at the beginning of Yom Kippur. From where do I derive that one adds time at the conclusion of Yom Kippur? The verse states: “From evening until evening” (Leviticus 23:32), implying that one adds at the end as well, just as he does at the beginning. And I have derived only the mitzva of adding to Yom Kippur; from where is it derived that one must also sanctify and append time before and after Festivals? The verse states: “You shall rest” (Leviticus 23:32), to teach that this rule applies even to Festivals, on which one is commanded to rest. I have derived only that one adds an extension to Festivals; from where do I derive that one must also sanctify and append to Shabbatot? The verse states: “Your Shabbat” (Leviticus 23:32). How so? Every place the term: Rest [shevut] is stated, it teaches from here that one sanctifies and appends from the non-sacred weekday to the sacred.

וְתַנָּא דְּ״עֶצֶם״ ״עֶצֶם״, הַאי ״בְּתִשְׁעָה לַחוֹדֶשׁ״ מַאי עָבֵיד לֵיהּ? מִיבְּעֵי לֵיהּ לְכִדְתָנֵי חִיָּיא בַּר רַב מִדִּיפְתִּי. דְּתָנֵי חִיָּיא בַּר רַב מִדִּיפְתִּי: ״וְעִנִּיתֶם אֶת נַפְשׁוֹתֵיכֶם בְּתִשְׁעָה״, וְכִי בְּתִשְׁעָה מִתְעַנִּין? וַהֲלֹא בֶּעָשׂוֹר מִתְעַנִּין! אֶלָּא לוֹמַר לְךָ: כָּל הָאוֹכֵל וְשׁוֹתֶה בִּתְשִׁיעִי, מַעֲלֶה עָלָיו הַכָּתוּב כְּאִילּוּ הִתְעַנָּה תְּשִׁיעִי וַעֲשִׂירִי. The Gemara asks: And the tanna who learns a verbal analogy from the words “that same day,” “that same day,” what does he do with the phrase: “On the ninth day of the month”? The Gemara answers: He requires it, in accordance with that which Ḥiyya bar Rav of Difti taught. As Ḥiyya bar Rav of Difti taught: It states: “And you shall afflict your souls on the ninth day of the month” (Leviticus 23:32). But does one afflict oneself on the ninth of Tishrei? Doesn’t one in fact afflict oneself on the tenth of Tishrei? Rather, the verse comes to tell you: Anyone who eats and drinks on the ninth of Tishrei and then fasts on the tenth, the verse ascribes him credit as though he fasted on both the ninth and the tenth. The verse alludes to this when it states that the fast is on the ninth.

אָכַל אוֹכָלִין שֶׁאֵין רְאוּיִן לַאֲכִילָה. אָמַר רָבָא: כַּס פִּלְפְּלֵי בְּיוֹמָא דְכִפּוּרֵי — פָּטוּר. כַּס זַנְגְּבִילָא בְּיוֹמָא דְכִפּוּרֵי — פָּטוּר. § It was taught in the mishna: If one ate food that is not fit for eating, he is exempt. Rava said: If one chews raw pepper on Yom Kippur, he is exempt, since this is not considered eating. Similarly, if one chews ginger [zangvila] on Yom Kippur, he is exempt.

מֵיתִיבִי, הָיָה רַבִּי מֵאִיר אוֹמֵר: מִמַּשְׁמַע שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וַעֲרַלְתֶּם עׇרְלָתוֹ אֶת פִּרְיוֹ״, אֵינִי יוֹדֵעַ שֶׁעֵץ מַאֲכָל הוּא! אֶלָּא מָה תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״עֵץ מַאֲכָל״? עֵץ שֶׁטַּעַם עֵצוֹ וּפִרְיוֹ שָׁוֶה, הֱוֵי אוֹמֵר זֶה פִּלְפְּלִין, לְלַמֶּדְךָ שֶׁהַפִּלְפְּלִין חַיָּיבִין בְּעׇרְלָה. וְאֵין אֶרֶץ יִשְׂרָאֵל חֲסֵרָה כְּלוּם, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״לֹא תֶחְסַר כֹּל בָּהּ״! The Gemara raises an objection to this. Rabbi Meir would say about the verse: “And when you shall come into the land, and shall have planted all manner of trees for food, then you shall count the fruit of it as forbidden [orla]; three years it shall be forbidden to you, it shall not be eaten” (Leviticus 19:23). From the implication of what is stated: “Then you shall count the fruit of it as forbidden,” do I not know that the verse is referring to “trees for food,” since it uses the word “fruit”? Rather, what is the meaning when the verse states “trees for food”? It includes a tree whose wood and fruit taste the same, i.e., a tree that is itself eaten in addition to its fruit. One must say that this is referring to pepper that grows on a tree, to teach you that even pepper is subject to the halakha of orla. And this also teaches that Eretz Yisrael lacks nothing, as even pepper can grow there, as it is stated among the listed praises of Eretz Yisrael: “You will not lack anything in it” (Deuteronomy 8:9). In any event, it has been derived that pepper is called food, which contradicts Rava’s statement.

לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא — בְּרַטִּיבְתָּא, וְהָא — בְּיַבִּישְׁתָּא. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult. This statement about edible pepper is referring to fresh pepper, which is moist; and that halakha pertaining to Yom Kippur is referring to dry pepper, which is not considered food.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבִינָא לְמָרִימָר: וְהָאָמַר רַב נַחְמָן, הַאי הִימְלְתָא דְּאָתֵי מִבֵּי הִנְדּוּאֵי — שַׁרְיָא, וּמְבָרְכִינַן עֲלֵיהּ: ״בּוֹרֵא פְּרִי הָאֲדָמָה״. לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא בְּרַטִּיבְתָּא, וְהָא בְּיַבִּישְׁתָּא. Ravina said to Mareimar: But didn’t Rav Naḥman say that it is permitted to eat this cooked ginger [himalta] that comes from India, and there is no concern that gentiles may have cooked it. And we recite the blessing: Who creates the fruit of the ground, over it. Apparently, ginger is edible. The Gemara answers: This is not difficult: This statement is referring to wet ginger, which is considered food; and that earlier statement pertaining to Yom Kippur, which maintained that ginger is not food, is referring to dry ginger.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: אָכַל עֲלֵי קָנִים — פָּטוּר. לוּלְבֵי גְפָנִים — חַיָּיב. אֵלּוּ הֵן לוּלְבֵי גְפָנִים? אָמַר רַבִּי יִצְחָק מִגְדְּלָאָה: כׇּל שֶׁלִּבְלְבוּ מֵרֹאשׁ הַשָּׁנָה וְעַד יוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים. וְרַב כָּהֲנָא אָמַר: כׇּל שְׁלֹשִׁים יוֹם. תַּנְיָא כְּווֹתֵיהּ דְּרַבִּי יִצְחָק מִגְדְּלָאָה: אָכַל עֲלֵי קָנִים — פָּטוּר, וְלוּלְבֵי גְפָנִים — חַיָּיב. אֵלּוּ הֵן לוּלְבֵי גְפָנִים — כׇּל שֶׁלִּבְלְבוּ מֵרֹאשׁ הַשָּׁנָה וְעַד יוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים. The Sages taught in a baraita: If one ate leaves of reeds on Yom Kippur, he is exempt, but if one ate grapevine shoots he is liable. The Gemara clarifies: What are these grapevine shoots? Rabbi Yitzḥak from the city of Migdal said: All shoots that sprouted between Rosh HaShana and Yom Kippur and are still very soft are considered food. And Rav Kahana said: All shoots that sprouted up to thirty days before Yom Kippur are considered food. The Gemara comments: It was taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yitzḥak from Migdal: If one ate leaves of reeds he is exempt, but if one ate grapevine shoots he is liable. What are these grapevine shoots? They are all those that sprouted between Rosh HaShana and Yom Kippur.

שָׁתָה צִיר אוֹ מוּרְיָיס — פָּטוּר. הָא חוֹמֶץ — חַיָּיב. מַתְנִיתִין מַנִּי? רַבִּי הִיא. דְּתַנְיָא: רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: חוֹמֶץ מֵשִׁיב אֶת הַנֶּפֶשׁ. It was taught in the mishna that if on Yom Kippur one drank fish brine or the briny liquid in which fish are pickled, he is exempt. The Gemara comments: From the language of the mishna it may be inferred that if one drank vinegar, he is liable. Who is the tanna of the mishna? It is Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, as it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: Vinegar revives the spirit and is therefore considered a beverage.

דָּרֵשׁ רַב גִּידֵּל בַּר מְנַשֶּׁה מִבֵּירֵי דְנַרֶשׁ: אֵין הֲלָכָה כְּרַבִּי. לְשָׁנָה נָפְקִי כּוּלֵּי עָלְמָא מָזְגוּ וְשָׁתוּ חַלָּא. שְׁמַע רַב גִּידֵּל וְאִיקְּפַד. אֲמַר: אֵימַר דַּאֲמַרִי אֲנָא — דִּיעֲבַד, לְכַתְּחִלָּה מִי אֲמַרִי? אֵימַר דַּאֲמַרִי אֲנָא — פּוּרְתָּא, טוּבָא מִי אֲמַרִי? אֵימַר דַּאֲמַרִי אֲנָא — חַי, מָזוּג מִי אֲמַרִי? The Gemara relates: Rav Giddel bar Menashe from the town of Birei DeNeresh taught in a public lecture that the halakha is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, and vinegar is not considered a beverage. The next year everyone went out and mixed vinegar with water and drank vinegar on Yom Kippur. Rav Giddel heard this and became angry with them for their actions. He said: Say that I said one is not liable for drinking vinegar only after the fact; however, did I say it is permitted to drink it ab initio? Furthermore: Say that I said my statement with regard to one who drinks a little, but did I say it is permitted to drink a lot? Furthermore: Say that I said my statement in reference to pure vinegar, which is very strong, but did I say anything about diluted vinegar? That is certainly prohibited.

מַתְנִי׳ הַתִּינוֹקוֹת אֵין מְעַנִּין אוֹתָן בְּיוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים, אֲבָל מְחַנְּכִין אוֹתָן לִפְנֵי שָׁנָה וְלִפְנֵי שְׁנָתַיִים, בִּשְׁבִיל שֶׁיִּהְיוּ רְגִילִין בְּמִצְוֹת. MISHNA: With regard to the children, one does not afflict them by withholding food on Yom Kippur; however, one trains them one year before or two years before they reach majority, by means of a partial fast lasting several hours, so that they will be accustomed to fulfill mitzvot.

גְּמָ׳ הַשְׁתָּא בִּפְנֵי שְׁתַּיִם מְחַנְּכִין לְהוּ — בִּפְנֵי שָׁנָה מִבַּעְיָא? אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא, לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא — בְּחוֹלֶה, הָא — בְּבָרִיא. GEMARA: The Gemara asks about the wording of the mishna: Since it is stated that one trains children two years before their maturity, is it necessary to say that one trains them one year before? This expression in the mishna is superfluous. Rav Ḥisda said: This is not difficult. This statement that one trains children one year before their maturity is referring to a feeble child; that statement that one trains children two years before their maturity is referring to a healthy child.

אָמַר רַב הוּנָא: בֶּן שְׁמוֹנֶה וּבֶן תֵּשַׁע — מְחַנְּכִין אוֹתוֹ לְשָׁעוֹת. בֶּן עֶשֶׂר וּבֶן אַחַת עֶשְׂרֵה — מַשְׁלִימִין מִדְּרַבָּנַן, בֶּן שְׁתֵּים עֶשְׂרֵה — מַשְׁלִימִין מִדְּאוֹרָיְיתָא בְּתִינוֹקֶת. וְרַב נַחְמָן אָמַר: בֶּן תֵּשַׁע בֶּן עֶשֶׂר — מְחַנְּכִין אוֹתָן לְשָׁעוֹת, בֶּן אַחַת עֶשְׂרֵה בֶּן שְׁתֵּים עֶשְׂרֵה — מַשְׁלִימִין מִדְּרַבָּנַן, בֶּן שְׁלֹשׁ עֶשְׂרֵה — מַשְׁלִימִין מִדְּאוֹרָיְיתָא בְּתִינוֹק. וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן אָמַר: הַשְׁלָמָה דְּרַבָּנַן לֵיכָּא. בֶּן עֶשֶׂר בֶּן אַחַת עֶשְׂרֵה — מְחַנְּכִין אוֹתוֹ לְשָׁעוֹת, בֶּן שְׁתֵּים עֶשְׂרֵה — מַשְׁלִימִין מִדְּאוֹרָיְיתָא. Rav Huna said: One trains a healthy child of eight years and nine years to fast for several hours; at ten years and eleven years, they complete the fast by rabbinic law; at twelve years they complete the fast by Torah law. This applies to girls who reach maturity and become obligated in mitzvot at age twelve. And Rav Naḥman said: At nine years and ten years one trains them to fast for several hours; at eleven and twelve years they complete the fast by rabbinic law; at thirteen years they complete the fast by Torah law. This applies to boys. And Rabbi Yoḥanan said: There is no obligation with regard to children completing the fast by rabbinic law. Rather, at ten and eleven years, one trains them to fast for several hours; and at twelve years girls are obligated to complete their fast by Torah law.

תְּנַן: הַתִּינוֹקוֹת אֵין מְעַנִּין אוֹתָן בַּיּוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים, אֲבָל מְחַנְּכִין אוֹתָן לִפְנֵי שָׁנָה וְלִפְנֵי שְׁתַּיִם. בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַב הוּנָא וְרַב נַחְמָן — לִפְנֵי שָׁנָה וְלִפְנֵי שְׁתַּיִם. לִפְנֵי שָׁנָה — לְדִבְרֵיהֶן, וְלִפְנֵי שְׁתַּיִם — לְדִבְרֵיהֶן. § We learned in the mishna: With regard to the children, one does not afflict them by withholding food on Yom Kippur; however, one trains them for one year before or two years before they reach maturity. Granted, this makes sense according to the opinion of Rav Huna and Rav Naḥman, who hold that for one or two years before reaching maturity there is a rabbinic law requiring children to complete the fast. The mishna that states one year before or two years before should be understood as follows: A feeble child is obligated to complete the fast on Yom Kippur in the year before reaching maturity by rabbinic law, and a healthy child is obligated to complete the fast on Yom Kippur in the two years before reaching maturity by rabbinic law (Vilna Gaon).

אֶלָּא לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן, קַשְׁיָא? אָמַר לָךְ רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: מַאי שָׁנָה אוֹ שְׁתַּיִם — סָמוּךְ לְפִירְקָן. But according to Rabbi Yoḥanan, who holds that there is no rabbinic law to complete the fast, this is difficult. In his opinion, what is the difference between one year before and two years before? Rabbi Yoḥanan could have said to you: What is the meaning of one year or two years? One year is referring not to the year before the year preceding their maturity, i.e. the two years preceding it, but actually to the year preceding their maturity. The phrase: One or two years, indicates that there is a difference between those who are required for one year and those who required for two, which depends on their health: The healthy child is required to fast two years, but one year is sufficient for a feeble child.

תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּתָנֵי רַבָּה בַּר שְׁמוּאֵל: תִּינוֹקוֹת אֵין מְעַנִּין אוֹתָן בְּיוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים, אֲבָל מְחַנְּכִין אוֹתָן שָׁנָה אוֹ שְׁתַּיִם סָמוּךְ לְפִירְקָן. בִּשְׁלָמָא לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן — נִיחָא, אֶלָּא לְרַב הוּנָא וּלְרַב נַחְמָן — קַשְׁיָא! אָמְרִי לָךְ רַבָּנַן: מַאי חִינּוּךְ נָמֵי דְּקָתָנֵי — הַשְׁלָמָה. Come and hear that which Rabba bar Shmuel taught in a baraita: With regard to children, one does not afflict them by withholding food on Yom Kippur; however, one trains them one year for a feeble child or two years for a healthy child preceding their maturity. Granted, according to the opinion of Rabbi Yoḥanan, this works out well; but according to Rav Huna and Rav Naḥman, who say that there is an additional year that one is required to complete the fast according to rabbinic law, this is difficult. The Rabbis could say to you: What is this training that is also taught there? It is referring to fasting a complete day, which is required by rabbinic law. By rabbinic law, the time of completing the fast for a healthy child is two years before he reaches maturity.

וּמִי קָרֵי לְחִינּוּךְ הַשְׁלָמָה, וְהָא תַּנְיָא: אֵי זֶה חִינּוּךְ? הָיָה רָגִיל לֶאֱכוֹל בִּשְׁתֵּי שָׁעוֹת — מַאֲכִילִין אוֹתוֹ לְשָׁלֹשׁ. בְּשָׁלֹשׁ — מַאֲכִילִין אוֹתוֹ בְּאַרְבַּע. אָמַר רָבָא בַּר עוּלָּא: תְּרֵי חִנּוּכֵי הָווּ. The Gemara asks: And is training called completion? Doesn’t training mean that the child performs only part of the mitzva? Wasn’t it taught explicitly in a baraita: What is training? If the child was accustomed to eat every day at the second hour of the day, one feeds him at the third hour, so he will begin to understand the concept of affliction. If he was accustomed to eat at the third hour, one feeds him at the fourth hour. Rava bar Ulla said: This is not difficult; these are two different types of training. There is training of small children to wait slightly longer before eating, and training of older children, in which one habituates them to fasting a full day.

מַתְנִי׳ עוּבָּרָה שֶׁהֵרִיחָה — מַאֲכִילִין אוֹתָהּ עַד שֶׁתָּשִׁיב נַפְשָׁהּ. חוֹלֶה — מַאֲכִילִין אוֹתוֹ עַל פִּי בְּקִיאִין, וְאִם אֵין שָׁם בְּקִיאִין — מַאֲכִילִין אוֹתוֹ עַל פִּי עַצְמוֹ עַד שֶׁיֹּאמַר דַּי. MISHNA: With regard to a pregnant woman who smelled food and was overcome by a craving to eat it, one feeds her until she recovers, as failure to do so could lead to a life-threatening situation. If a person is ill and requires food due to potential danger, one feeds him according to the advice of medical experts who determine that he indeed requires food. And if there are no experts there, one feeds him according to his own instructions, until he says that he has eaten enough and needs no more.

גְּמָ׳ תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: עוּבָּרָה שֶׁהֵרִיחָה בְּשַׂר קוֹדֶשׁ אוֹ בְּשַׂר חֲזִיר — תּוֹחֲבִין לָהּ כּוּשׁ בְּרוֹטֶב, וּמַנִּיחִין לָהּ עַל פִּיהָ, אִם נִתְיַישְּׁבָה דַּעְתָּהּ — מוּטָב, וְאִם לָאו — מַאֲכִילִין אוֹתָהּ רוֹטֶב עַצְמוֹ, וְאִם נִתְיַישְּׁבָה דַּעְתָּהּ — מוּטָב, וְאִם לָאו — מַאֲכִילִין אוֹתָהּ שׁוּמָּן עַצְמוֹ. שֶׁאֵין לְךָ דָּבָר שֶׁעוֹמֵד בִּפְנֵי פִּקּוּחַ נֶפֶשׁ, חוּץ מֵעֲבוֹדָה זָרָה וְגִילּוּי עֲרָיוֹת וּשְׁפִיכוּת דָּמִים. GEMARA: The Sages taught in a baraita: With regard to a pregnant woman who smelled consecrated meat or pig meat and craved those specific foods, one inserts a thin reed into the juice of that item and places it on her mouth. If her mind become settled with that, it is well. And if not, one feeds her the gravy itself of that forbidden food. If her mind becomes settled with that, it is well. And if not, one feeds her the fat of the forbidden food itself, as there is no halakha that stands in the way of saving a life except for the prohibitions against idol worship, and forbidden sexual relationships, and bloodshed.

עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה מְנָלַן — דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: אִם נֶאֱמַר ״בְּכׇל נַפְשְׁךָ״, לָמָּה נֶאֱמַר ״בְּכׇל מְאֹדֶךָ״? וְאִם נֶאֱמַר ״בְּכׇל מְאֹדֶךָ״, לָמָּה נֶאֱמַר ״בְּכׇל נַפְשְׁךָ״? The Gemara clarifies: With regard to the halakha that the prohibition against idol worship takes precedence over saving one’s life, from where do we derive this? As it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Eliezer says: If it is stated: “And you shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul” (Deuteronomy 6:5), why is it stated in the continuation of the verse: “And with all your might” (Deuteronomy 6:5)? And if it is stated: “With all your might,” why is it stated: “With all your soul”? One of these statements appears to be superfluous.

אִם יֵשׁ לְךָ אָדָם שֶׁגּוּפוֹ חָבִיב עָלָיו מִמָּמוֹנוֹ — לְכָךְ נֶאֱמַר ״בְּכׇל נַפְשְׁךָ״, וְאִם יֵשׁ לָךְ אָדָם שֶׁמָּמוֹנוֹ חָבִיב עָלָיו מִגּוּפוֹ — לְכָךְ נֶאֱמַר ״וּבְכׇל מְאֹדֶךָ״. Rather, it is to teach that if there is a person whose body is more beloved to him than his property, therefore it is stated: “With all your soul.” The verse teaches that one must be willing to sacrifice his life to sanctify God’s name. And if there is a person whose property is more beloved to him than his body, therefore it is stated: “With all your might.” Rabbi Eliezer understands the phrase “with all your might” to mean: With all your possessions. Therefore, one must be prepared to forfeit his life rather than be saved through idol worship.

גִּילּוּי עֲרָיוֹת וּשְׁפִיכַת דָּמִים מְנָא לַן — דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: ״כִּי כַּאֲשֶׁר יָקוּם אִישׁ עַל רֵעֵהוּ וּרְצָחוֹ נֶפֶשׁ כֵּן הַדָּבָר הַזֶּה״. וְכִי מָה עִנְיָן לָמַדְנוּ מֵרוֹצֵחַ לְנַעֲרָה הַמְאוֹרָסָה? § With regard to the concept that one must surrender his life rather than have forbidden sexual relations or shed blood through murder, from where do we derive this? As it was taught in a baraita that Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: It is stated about the rape of a betrothed woman: “For as when a man rises against his fellow and slays him, even so is this matter” (Deuteronomy 22:26). One might ask: What idea did we learn about a betrothed woman from a murderer? The halakha of a betrothed woman is clear; what new point is learned by comparing it to the halakha of a murderer?

אֶלָּא: הֲרֵי זֶה בָּא לְלַמֵּד, וְנִמְצָא לָמֵד: מָה נַעֲרָה הַמְאוֹרָסָה נִיתָּן לְהַצִּילָהּ בְּנַפְשׁוֹ — אַף רוֹצֵחַ (כּוּ׳). מָה רוֹצֵחַ יֵהָרֵג וְאַל יַעֲבוֹר — אַף נַעֲרָה הַמְאוֹרָסָה יֵהָרֵג וְאַל יַעֲבוֹר. Rather, this halakha about the murderer, which appears to come to teach about the betrothed woman, is found to actually be the subject of teaching. The inference is as follows: Just as with regard to the betrothed woman, permission is given to save her at the cost of the life of her attacker, so too, the murderer may be saved from committing the crime at the cost of his life, i.e., one may save the victim by killing the attacker. Another teaching is derived in the opposite direction, from the case of murder to the case of rape. Just as the murderer is subject to the halakha of let him be killed, and let him not transgress, i.e., one must even allow himself to be killed rather than take the life of another, so too, a man must surrender his life rather than engage in forbidden sexual relations with a betrothed young woman. By inference, the halakha of let him be killed, and let him not transgress, applies to all forbidden sexual relations.

״זוֹרוּ רְשָׁעִים מֵרָחֶם״. נְפַק מִינַּהּ שַׁבְּתַאי אָצַר פֵּירֵי. “The wicked are estranged from the womb” (Psalms 58:4), i.e., it is clear they are estranged already in their mother’s womb. Indeed, Shabbetai the hoarder of fruits came out of her. He hoarded fruit during years of famine in order to inflate its price and profit at the expense of poor people.

חוֹלֶה מַאֲכִילִין אוֹתוֹ עַל פִּי בְּקִיאִין. אָמַר רַבִּי יַנַּאי: חוֹלֶה אוֹמֵר צָרִיךְ, וְרוֹפֵא אוֹמֵר אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ — שׁוֹמְעִין לַחוֹלֶה. מַאי טַעְמָא — ״לֵב יוֹדֵעַ מׇרַּת נַפְשׁוֹ״. פְּשִׁיטָא! מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: רוֹפֵא קִים לֵיהּ טְפֵי, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן. § It was taught in the mishna: If a person is ill and requires food due to potential danger, one feeds him according to the advice of medical experts. Rabbi Yannai said: If an ill person says he needs to eat, and a doctor says he does not need to eat, one listens to the ill person. What is the reason for this halakha? It is because the verse states: “The heart knows the bitterness of its soul” (Proverbs 14:10), meaning an ill person knows the intensity of his pain and weakness, and doctors cannot say otherwise. The Gemara asks: It is obvious that a person knows himself better than anyone else does. Why does this need to be stated explicitly? The Gemara answers: It is lest you say that the doctor is more certain because he has had more experience with this condition. Therefore, the verse teaches us that even so, it is the ill person who knows his own suffering better than anyone else.

רוֹפֵא אוֹמֵר צָרִיךְ, וְחוֹלֶה אוֹמֵר אֵינוֹ צָרִיךְ — שׁוֹמְעִין לָרוֹפֵא. מַאי טַעְמָא — תּוּנְבָּא הוּא דְּנָקֵיט לֵיהּ. However, in the opposite case, if a doctor says that the ill person needs food, but the ill person himself says he does not need to eat, one listens to the doctor. What is the reason for this halakha? It is because confusion [tunba] has taken hold of the ill person on account of his illness, and his judgment is impaired. Consequently, he himself does not know how much he needs food.

תְּנַן: חוֹלֶה — מַאֲכִילִין אוֹתוֹ עַל פִּי בְּקִיאִין. עַל פִּי בְּקִיאִין — אִין, עַל פִּי עַצְמוֹ — לָא! עַל פִּי בְּקִיאִין — אִין, עַל פִּי בָּקִי אֶחָד — לָא! § We learned in the mishna: If a person is ill, one feeds him according to the advice of medical experts. This implies that if there are experts present, then according to the advice of experts, yes, one feeds the ill person; but at his own instructions, no, one does not feed him, contrary to Rabbi Yannai’s opinion. It further implies that according to the advice of several experts, yes, one feeds an ill person; however, according to the advice of only one expert, no, one does not feed him. There appears to be a requirement for at least two doctors, which also contradicts Rabbi Yannai’s opinion that the opinion of one expert is sufficient to override the opinion of the ill person.

הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן, דְּאָמַר לָא צְרִיכְנָא. וְלִיסְפּוֹ לֵיהּ עַל פִּי בָּקִי! לָא צְרִיכָא, דְּאִיכָּא אַחֲרִינָא בַּהֲדֵיהּ דְּאָמַר לָא צְרִיךְ — מַאֲכִילִין אוֹתוֹ עַל פִּי בְּקִיאִין. The Gemara rejects this: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with a unique circumstance: The ill person says I do not need food, and the consultation of experts is required. The Gemara suggests: But let them feed him according to the advice of one expert, as Rabbi Yannai said that in such a circumstance one feeds the ill person based on the advice of one doctor. The Gemara answers: No, the requirement of two experts is necessary in a case where there is another, third expert with him who says that the ill person does not need to eat. In such a case, one feeds the ill person according to the advice of two experts who agree that he requires it.

פְּשִׁיטָא, סְפֵק נְפָשׁוֹת הוּא, וּסְפֵק נְפָשׁוֹת לְהָקֵל! לָא צְרִיכָא, דְּאִיכָּא תְּרֵי אַחֲרִינֵי בַּהֲדֵיהּ דְּאָמְרִי לָא צְרִיךְ. וְאַף עַל גַּב דְּאָמַר רַב סָפְרָא: תְּרֵי כִּמְאָה וּמְאָה כִּתְרֵי, הָנֵי מִילֵּי לְעִנְיַן עֵדוּת, אֲבָל לְעִנְיַן אוּמְדָּנָא — בָּתַר דֵּעוֹת אָזְלִינַן. The Gemara asks: If so, this is obvious, since it is a case of uncertainty concerning a life-threatening situation, and in all cases of uncertainty concerning a life-threatening situation, the halakha is lenient. The Gemara answers: No, this halakha is necessary in a case where there are two other doctors who, along with the ill person, say that he does not need food. And although Rav Safra said that two witnesses are like one hundred witnesses, and one hundred witnesses are like two witnesses, that rule applies specifically to the matter of testimony; however, in the matter of assessing a situation, we follow the majority of opinions. Therefore, one might think in this case that the ill person should not be fed because the opinion of two doctors plus the ill person should override the opposing opinion of two other doctors.

וְהָנֵי מִילֵּי לְעִנְיַן אוּמְדָּנָא דְמָמוֹנָא, אֲבָל הָכָא סְפֵק נְפָשׁוֹת הוּא. Generally speaking, two or more witnesses constitute complete testimony, and there is no difference between the testimony of two and the testimony of a large number of people. However, this principle of following the majority applies specifically to assessing monetary issues, but here it is a case of uncertainty concerning a life-threatening situation. Therefore, although it is the opinion of two doctors against the opinion of two doctors and the ill person, the ill person must eat.

וְהָא מִדְּקָתָנֵי סֵיפָא: וְאִם אֵין שָׁם בְּקִיאִין מַאֲכִילִין אוֹתוֹ עַל פִּי עַצְמוֹ, מִכְּלָל דְּרֵישָׁא דְּאָמַר צָרִיךְ! חַסּוֹרֵי מִיחַסְּרָא וְהָכִי קָתָנֵי: בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים — דְּאָמַר לֹא צָרִיךְ אֲנִי, אֲבָל אָמַר צָרִיךְ אֲנִי, אֵין שָׁם בְּקִיאִין תְּרֵי אֶלָּא חַד דְּאָמַר לֹא צָרִיךְ — מַאֲכִילִין אוֹתוֹ עַל פִּי עַצְמוֹ. The Gemara asks: But from the fact that it is taught in the latter clause of the mishna that if there are no experts present one feeds him according to his own opinion, by inference, the first clause of the mishna is referring to a case where the ill person said he needs to eat. In that case, the mishna states that one follows the experts’ opinion, not his own, and feeds him. The Gemara answers: The mishna is incomplete and is teaching the following: In what case is this statement that he may eat only based on the advice of experts said? It is when the ill person said: I do not need to eat. But if he said: I do need to eat, and instead of two experts there is only one who says that he does not need to eat, one feeds him according to his own opinion.

מָר בַּר רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: כֹּל הֵיכָא דְּאָמַר צָרִיךְ אֲנִי, אֲפִילּוּ אִיכָּא מְאָה דְּאָמְרִי לֹא צָרִיךְ לְדִידֵיהּ שָׁמְעִינַן — שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״לֵב יוֹדֵעַ מׇרַּת נַפְשׁוֹ״. Mar bar Rav Ashi said: Any instance where an ill person says: I need to eat, even if there are one hundred expert doctors who say that he does not need to eat, we listen to his own opinion and feed him, as it is stated: “The heart knows the bitterness of its soul” (Proverbs 14:10).

תְּנַן: אִם אֵין שָׁם בְּקִיאִין — מַאֲכִילִין אוֹתוֹ עַל פִּי עַצְמוֹ. טַעְמָא דְּלֵיכָּא בְּקִיאִין, הָא אִיכָּא בְּקִיאִין לָא! הָכִי קָאָמַר: בַּמֶּה דְּבָרִים אֲמוּרִים — דְּאָמַר ״לֹא צָרִיךְ אֲנִי״, אֲבָל אָמַר ״צָרִיךְ אֲנִי״, אֵין שָׁם בְּקִיאִין כְּלָל — מַאֲכִילִין אוֹתוֹ עַל פִּי עַצְמוֹ, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״לֵב יוֹדֵעַ מׇרַּת נַפְשׁוֹ״. We learned in the mishna: If an ill person himself says he needs to eat and there are no experts present, one feeds him according to his own opinion. This implies that the reason one feeds him is because there are no experts present. One may infer from this that if there were experts present, no, one would not feed the ill person based on his own opinion but would instead listen to the advice of the experts. The Gemara rejects this: This is what the mishna is saying: In what case is this statement that one follows the opinion of the experts said? It is when the ill person said: I do not need to eat. However, if he said: I do need to eat, it is considered as if there were no experts there at all; we feed him based on his opinion, as it is stated: “The heart knows the bitterness of its soul” (Proverbs 14:10). All the experts are ignored in the face of the ill person’s own sensitivities.

מַתְנִי׳ מִי שֶׁאֲחָזוֹ בּוּלְמוֹס — מַאֲכִילִין אוֹתוֹ אֲפִילּוּ דְּבָרִים טְמֵאִים, עַד שֶׁיֵּאוֹרוּ עֵינָיו. מִי שֶׁנְּשָׁכוֹ כֶּלֶב שׁוֹטֶה — אֵין מַאֲכִילִין אוֹתוֹ מֵחֲצַר כָּבֵד שֶׁלּוֹ. וְרַבִּי מַתְיָא בֶּן חָרָשׁ מַתִּיר. MISHNA: In the case of one who is seized with the life-threatening illness bulmos, causing him unbearable hunger pangs and impaired vision, one may feed him even impure foods on Yom Kippur or any other day until his eyes recover, as the return of his sight indicates that he is recovering. In the case of one whom a mad dog bit, one may not feed him from the lobe of the dog’s liver. This was thought to be a remedy for the bite, but the Rabbis deem it ineffective. And Rabbi Matya ben Ḥarash permits feeding it to him, as he deems it effective.

וְעוֹד אָמַר רַבִּי מַתְיָא בֶּן חָרָשׁ: הַחוֹשֵׁשׁ בִּגְרוֹנוֹ — מְטִילִין לוֹ סַם בְּתוֹךְ פִּיו בְּשַׁבָּת, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁהוּא סְפֵק נְפָשׁוֹת, וְכׇל סְפֵק נְפָשׁוֹת דּוֹחֶה אֶת הַשַּׁבָּת. And furthermore, Rabbi Matya ben Ḥarash said: With regard to one who suffers pain in his throat, one may place medicine inside his mouth on Shabbat, although administering a remedy is prohibited on Shabbat. This is because there is uncertainty whether or not it is a life-threatening situation for him, as it is difficult to ascertain the severity of internal pain. And a case of uncertainty concerning a life-threatening situation overrides Shabbat.

מִי שֶׁנָּפְלָה עָלָיו מַפּוֹלֶת, סָפֵק הוּא שָׁם סָפֵק אֵינוֹ שָׁם, סָפֵק חַי סָפֵק מֵת, סָפֵק גּוֹי סָפֵק יִשְׂרָאֵל, מְפַקְּחִין עָלָיו אֶת הַגַּל. מְצָאוּהוּ חַי — מְפַקְּחִין, וְאִם מֵת — יְנִיחוּהוּ. Similarly, with regard to one upon whom a rockslide fell, and there is uncertainty whether he is there under the debris or whether he is not there; and there is uncertainty whether he is still alive or whether he is dead; and there is uncertainty whether the person under the debris is a gentile or whether he is a Jew, one clears the pile from atop him. One may perform any action necessary to rescue him from beneath the debris. If they found him alive after beginning to clear the debris, they continue to clear the pile until they can extricate him. And if they found him dead, they should leave him, since one may not desecrate Shabbat to preserve the dignity of the dead.

גְּמָ׳ תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: מִנַּיִין הָיוּ יוֹדְעִין שֶׁהֵאִירוּ עֵינָיו — מִשֶּׁיַּבְחִין בֵּין טוֹב לָרַע. אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: וּבְטַעְמָא. GEMARA: The Sages taught: From where would they know that his eyes had recovered their sight? It is from when he can discern between good and bad food, since under the influence of bulmos one eats food indiscriminately. Abaye said: It is with tasting. When he can distinguish the tastes of different foods his eyesight must have also recovered. For example, at night, although it is dark, the sign that his eyesight has been restored is that he is able to detect difference in tastes (Me’iri).

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: מִי שֶׁאֲחָזוֹ בּוּלְמוֹס — מַאֲכִילִין אוֹתוֹ הַקַּל הַקַּל, טֶבֶל וּנְבֵילָה — מַאֲכִילִין אוֹתוֹ נְבֵילָה. טֶבֶל וּשְׁבִיעִית — שְׁבִיעִית. § The Sages taught: In the case of one who is seized with bulmos and must be fed until his vision is restored, one feeds him the items whose prohibition is least severe first. If he must be fed forbidden foods, he should first be fed those whose level of prohibition is least severe. For instance, if there is untithed produce and an unslaughtered animal carcass [neveila] or any other non-kosher meat, one feeds him the neveila, as the prohibition of untithed produced warrants death at the hand of Heaven, but eating non-kosher meat is a transgression punishable only by lashes. If there is untithed produce and produce from the Sabbatical Year, he is fed the produce from the Sabbatical Year. Untithed produce warrants death at the hand of Heaven, whereas the produce of a Sabbatical Year is prohibited by a positive mitzva and there is no punishment associated with it.

טֶבֶל וּתְרוּמָה — תַּנָּאֵי הִיא. דְּתַנְיָא: מַאֲכִילִין אוֹתוֹ טֶבֶל וְאֵין מַאֲכִילִין אוֹתוֹ תְּרוּמָה. בֶּן תֵּימָא אוֹמֵר: תְּרוּמָה וְלֹא טֶבֶל. אָמַר רַבָּה: הֵיכָא דְּאֶפְשָׁר בְּחוּלִּין, דְּכוּלֵּי עָלְמָא לָא פְּלִיגִי דִּמְתַקְּנִינַן לֵיהּ וּמַסְפִּינַן לֵיהּ. If they have untithed produce and teruma, there is a dispute between tanna’im as to which food they should feed him, as it was taught in a baraita: One feeds him untithed produce and does not feed him teruma. Ben Teima says: It is better to feed him teruma and not feed him untithed produce. Rabba said: Where it is possible to feed him non-sacred food by separating tithes from untithed produce and thereby rendering the remainder permitted, everyone agrees that one should make the produce fit for consumption by separating tithes and then feed it to him, even on Shabbat, when it is otherwise prohibited to separate tithes.

כִּי פְּלִיגִי בִּדְלָא אֶפְשָׁר בְּחוּלִּין. מָר סָבַר טֶבֶל חָמוּר, וּמַר סָבַר תְּרוּמָה חֲמוּרָה. מָר סָבַר טֶבֶל חָמוּר — אֲבָל תְּרוּמָה חַזְיָא לְכֹהֵן. וּמַר סָבַר תְּרוּמָה חֲמוּרָה, אֲבָל טֶבֶל אֶפְשָׁר לְתַקּוֹנֵיהּ. Where they disagree, it is in a case where it is impossible to feed him non-sacred food because there is no way to separate tithes. One Sage holds that the prohibition of untithed produce is more severe; and one Sage holds that the prohibition of teruma is more severe. The two sides reason as follows. One Sage holds that the prohibition of untithed produce is more severe because it is prohibited to everyone; but teruma is fit for a priest, and therefore one could say that its prohibition is less severe. And one Sage holds that teruma is more severe because non-priests may never eat it, while untithed produce can be made fit to eat, and therefore, even while it is still untithed, the prohibition against eating it is less severe.

אֶפְשָׁר בְּחוּלִּין — פְּשִׁיטָא? לָא צְרִיכָא, בְּשַׁבָּת. It was stated that, according to Rabba, if it is possible to make the untithed produce fit and then feed him with non-sacred food, one should do so. The Gemara is surprised at this: It is obvious that if it is possible to tithe the produce and feed him that, one should do so. Why must it be stated? The Gemara explains: No, it is necessary to state this with regard to a case on Shabbat, when it is generally prohibited to separate terumot and tithes. Even so, the Sages said that it is better to separate terumot and tithes on Shabbat rather than feed the ill person untithed produce.

בְּשַׁבָּת נָמֵי, פְּשִׁיטָא — טִלְטוּל מִדְּרַבָּנַן הוּא! הָכָא בְּמַאי עָסְקִינַן — בְּעָצִיץ שֶׁאֵינוֹ נָקוּב, דְּרַבָּנַן. The Gemara asks: With regard to Shabbat it is also obvious, since the prohibition against separating terumot and tithes is merely a prohibition against moving, which is prohibited by rabbinic law. That is certainly less severe than the prohibition against eating untithed produce. The Gemara answers: With what are we dealing here? We are dealing with fruits grown in an imperforate container, which are not subject to teruma by Torah law but by rabbinic law. The Gemara teaches that it is preferable to transgress the rabbinic prohibition of tithing the fruit on Shabbat rather than feed the ill person untithed produce, although in this case the prohibition is rabbinic.

מָר סָבַר טֶבֶל חָמוּר, וּמַר סָבַר תְּרוּמָה חֲמוּרָה. § The Gemara now discusses the aforementioned two opinions: One Sage, ben Teima, holds that untithed produce is more severe, and therefore one must tithe the fruit although it is prohibited to separate teruma on Shabbat; and one Sage, the first tanna, holds that teruma is more severe.

לֵימָא תַּנָּאֵי הִיא. דְּתַנְיָא: מִי שֶׁנְּשָׁכוֹ נָחָשׁ — קוֹרִין לוֹ רוֹפֵא מִמָּקוֹם לְמָקוֹם, וּמְקָרְעִין לוֹ אֶת הַתַּרְנְגוֹלֶת, וְגוֹזְזִין לוֹ אֶת הַכְּרֵישִׁין, וּמַאֲכִילִין אוֹתוֹ, וְאֵין צָרִיךְ לְעַשֵּׂר, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי. רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן אוֹמֵר: לֹא יֹאכַל עַד שֶׁיְּעַשֵּׂר. Let us say that Rabba’s view is one side of a dispute between tanna’im, as it was taught in a baraita: In the case of one whom a snake bit on Shabbat and who is in danger, one calls a doctor for him to come from one place to another; and one tears a chicken apart for him if he needs its meat for healing; and one harvests leeks from the ground and feeds them to him for healing purposes, and one need not separate tithes; this is the statement of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi. Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon, says: He should not eat it unless it has been tithed.

נֵימָא רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בְּרַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן הִיא, וְלָא רַבִּי! Let us say that Rabba’s statement that one must separate teruma and tithes from the fruit for the ill person on Shabbat, even from untithed produce prohibited by rabbinic law, corresponds to the view of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Shimon. He says that one must tithe the leeks for the ill person even on Shabbat, although leeks, like all other vegetables, are considered untithed produce only by rabbinic law. And Rabba’s opinion does not follow the view of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.

אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא רַבִּי, עַד כָּאן לָא קָאָמַר רַבִּי הָתָם — אֶלָּא לְעִנְיַן מַעְשַׂר יָרָק דְּרַבָּנַן, אֲבָל בְּמַעְשַׂר דָּגָן דְּטֶבֶל דְּאוֹרָיְיתָא הוּא, אֲפִילּוּ רַבִּי מוֹדֶה, דְּאִי שָׁרֵית לֵיהּ בְּעָצִיץ שֶׁאֵינוֹ נָקוּב — אָתֵי לְמֵיכַל בְּעָצִיץ שֶׁהוּא נָקוּב. The Gemara rejects this: Even if you say that Rabba holds in accordance with the view of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi is saying that one should not separate tithes only there, with regard to the requirement to take the tithe from vegetables, like leeks, which is rabbinic in origin. This requirement was decreed lest one come to confuse vegetables with produce that is untithed by Torah law. However, with regard to the tithe of grains, which have the status of untithed produce by Torah law, although in this particular circumstance their untithed status is rabbinic because the grains grew in an imperforate container, even Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi concedes that the produce must be tithed. Because if it is permitted for him to eat without separating tithes from produce grown in an imperforate container, he may err and come to eat from grain grown in a perforated pot, which is considered untithed produce by Torah law. Consequently, one must separate tithes on Shabbat before feeding an ill person, even according to the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן מִי: שֶׁאֲחָזוֹ בּוּלְמוּס — מַאֲכִילִין אוֹתוֹ דְּבַשׁ וְכׇל מִינֵי מְתִיקָה, שֶׁהַדְּבַשׁ וְכׇל מִינֵי מְתִיקָה מְאִירִין מְאוֹר עֵינָיו שֶׁל אָדָם. וְאַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין רְאָיָה לַדָּבָר, זֵכֶר לַדָּבָר: ״רְאוּ נָא כִּי אוֹרוּ עֵינַי כִּי טָעַמְתִּי מְעַט דְּבַשׁ הַזֶּה״. The Sages taught in a baraita: In the case of one who is seized with bulmos, one feeds him honey and all types of sweet foods, as the honey and all types of sweet foods restore the sight of his eyes. And although there is no clear proof for the matter, there is an allusion to the matter. Jonathan said: “See, I pray you, how my eyes are brightened because I tasted a little of this honey” (I Samuel 14:29).

וּמַאי: ״אַף עַל פִּי שֶׁאֵין רְאָיָה לַדָּבָר״! דְּהָתָם לָאו בּוּלְמוּס אַחְזֵיה. The Gemara asks: And why does the baraita say: Although there is no clear proof for the matter, when that verse is a strong proof? The Gemara answers: There, Jonathan was not seized with bulmos, he was merely very hungry. Therefore, the episode provides no evidence that honey or sweet foods are the remedy for bulmos.

אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: לֹא שָׁנוּ, אֶלָּא לְאַחַר אֲכִילָה, אֲבָל קוֹדֶם אֲכִילָה מִגְרָר גָּרֵיר, דִּכְתִיב: ״וַיִּמְצְאוּ אִישׁ מִצְרִי בַּשָּׂדֶה וַיִּקְחוּ אוֹתוֹ אֶל דָּוִד וַיִּתְּנוּ לוֹ לֶחֶם וַיֹּאכַל וַיַּשְׁקוּהוּ מָיִם. וַיִּתְּנוּ לוֹ פֶלַח דְּבֵילָה וּשְׁנֵי צִמּוּקִים וַיֹּאכַל וַתָּשׇׁב רוּחוֹ אֵלָיו כִּי לֹא אָכַל לֶחֶם וְלֹא שָׁתָה מַיִם שְׁלֹשָׁה יָמִים וּשְׁלֹשָׁה לֵילוֹת״. Abaye said: They taught that honey restores one’s eyesight only after eating other food, but before eating other food it whets one’s appetite, as it is written: “And they found an Egyptian man in the field, and brought him to David, and they gave him bread and he ate, and they gave him water to drink; and they gave him a piece of a cake of figs, and two clusters of raisins, and he ate, and his spirit was restored; for he had eaten no bread nor drunk any water for three days and three nights” (I Samuel 30:11–12). This indicates that sweets are given after the main course and not before it.

אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: מִי שֶׁאֲחָזוֹ בּוּלְמוּס — מַאֲכִילִין אוֹתוֹ אַלְיָה בִּדְבַשׁ. רַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוֹשֻׁעַ אָמַר: אַף סוֹלֶת נְקִיָּה בִּדְבַשׁ. רַב פָּפָּא אָמַר: אֲפִילּוּ קִמְחָא דִשְׂעָרֵי בְּדוּבְשָׁא. אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: פַּעַם אַחַת אֲחָזַנִי בּוּלְמוּס וְרַצְתִּי לְמִזְרָחָהּ שֶׁל תְּאֵנָה, וְקִיַּימְתִּי בְּעַצְמִי: ״הַחׇכְמָה תְּחַיֶּה בְעָלֶיהָ״. דְּתָנֵי רַב יוֹסֵף: הָרוֹצֶה לִטְעוֹם טַעַם תְּאֵנָה — יִפְנֶה לְמִזְרָחָהּ, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וּמִמֶּגֶד תְּבוּאוֹת שָׁמֶשׁ״. Rav Naḥman said that Shmuel said: In the case of one who is seized with bulmos, one feeds him a sheep’s tail with honey, since the combination of the fatty meat and the honey helps greatly. Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, said: Also, fine wheat flour with honey is a remedy. Rav Pappa said: Even barley flour with honey is good for curing bulmos. Rabbi Yoḥanan said: Once I was seized with bulmos and I ran to the east side of a fig tree and found ripe figs there, which I ate. Figs on a tree do not all ripen at once but ripen first on the side where the sun rises, so Rabbi Yoḥanan searched first for figs on the east side of the tree. And I thereby fulfilled the verse: “Wisdom preserves the lives of those who have it” (Ecclesiastes 7:12). As Rav Yosef taught: One who wishes to taste the flavor of the fig should turn to the east, as it is stated: “And for the precious things of the sun’s fruits” (Deuteronomy 33:14), implying that the sun ripens fruit and makes them sweet.

רַבִּי יְהוּדָה וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי הֲווֹ קָא אָזְלִי בְּאוֹרְחָא. אַחְזֵיה בּוּלְמוּס לְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה, קַפְּחֵיהּ לְרוֹעֶה אַכְלֵיהּ לְרִיפְתָּא. אָמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי יוֹסֵי: קִפַּחְתָּ אֶת הָרוֹעֶה. כִּי מְטוֹ לְמָתָא, אַחְזֵיה בּוּלְמוּס לְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי. אַהְדְּרוּהוּ בְּלָגֵי וְצָעֵי, אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַבִּי יְהוּדָה: אֲנִי קִפַּחְתִּי אֶת הָרוֹעֶה, וְאַתָּה קִפַּחְתָּ אֶת הָעִיר כּוּלָּהּ. The Gemara relates that Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei were walking on the road when Rabbi Yehuda was seized with bulmos. He overpowered a nearby shepherd and ate the bread that the shepherd had in his hand, since his life was in danger. Rabbi Yosei said to him: You have robbed that shepherd. When they reached the city, Rabbi Yosei was seized with bulmos, and all the people of the city surrounded him with jugs [lagei] and plates with all sorts of sweets. Rabbi Yehuda said to him in jest: I robbed only the shepherd, but you have robbed the entire city.

וְתוּ: רַבִּי מֵאִיר וְרַבִּי יְהוּדָה וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי הֲווֹ קָא אָזְלִי בְּאוֹרְחָא, רַבִּי מֵאִיר הֲוָה דָּיֵיק בִּשְׁמָא, רַבִּי יְהוּדָה וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי לָא הֲווֹ דָּיְיקִי בִּשְׁמָא. כִּי מְטוֹ לְהָהוּא דּוּכְתָּא, בְּעוֹ אוּשְׁפִּיזָא. יְהַבוּ לְהוּ. אֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ: מָה שְׁמָךְ? אֲמַר לְהוּ: ״כִּידוֹר״. אֲמַר: שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ אָדָם רָשָׁע הוּא, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״כִּי דוֹר תַּהְפּוּכוֹת הֵמָּה״. רַבִּי יְהוּדָה וְרַבִּי יוֹסֵי אַשְׁלִימוּ לֵיהּ כִּיסַיְיהוּ. רַבִּי מֵאִיר לָא אַשְׁלֵים לֵיהּ כִּיסֵיהּ, אֲזַל אוֹתְבֵיהּ בֵּי קִיבְרֵיהּ דַּאֲבוּהּ. § And furthermore, it is told: Rabbi Meir and Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei were walking on the road together. Rabbi Meir would analyze names and discern one’s nature from his name, while Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei were not apt to analyze names. When they came to a certain place, they looked for lodging and were given it. They said to the innkeeper: What is your name? He said to them: My name is Kidor. Rabbi Meir said to himself: Perhaps one can learn from this that he is a wicked person, as it is stated: “For they are a generation [ki dor] of upheavals” (Deuteronomy 32:20). Since it was Friday afternoon, Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei entrusted their purses to him. Rabbi Meir did not entrust his purse to him but went and placed it at the grave of the innkeeper’s father.

אִתְחֲזִי לֵיהּ בְּחֶלְמֵיהּ: תָּא שְׁקֵיל כִּיסָא דְּמַנַּח אַרֵישָׁא דְּהָהוּא גַּבְרָא. לִמְחַר אֲמַר לְהוּ: הָכִי אִתְחֲזִי לִי בְּחֶלְמַאי. אָמְרִי לֵיהּ: חֶלְמָא דְּבֵי שִׁמְשֵׁי לֵית בְּהוּ מַמָּשָׁא, אֲזַל רַבִּי מֵאִיר וְנַטְרֵיהּ כּוּלֵּי יוֹמָא וְאַיְּיתְיֵהּ. The innkeeper’s father appeared to the innkeeper in a dream and said to him: Go take the purse placed at the head of that man, i.e., the innkeeper’s father. The following day, he said to the Sages: This is what appeared to me in my dream. They said to him: Dreams during twilight on Shabbat evening have no substance and should not be trusted. Even so, Rabbi Meir went and guarded his money all that day and then took it.

לִמְחַר אֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ: הַב לַן כִּיסַן. אֲמַר לְהוּ: לֹא הָיוּ דְבָרִים מֵעוֹלָם. אֲמַר לְהוּ רַבִּי מֵאִיר: אַמַּאי לָא דָּיְיקִיתוּ בִּשְׁמָא? אֲמַרוּ לֵיהּ: אַמַּאי לָא אֲמַרְתְּ לַן מָר? אֲמַר לְהוּ: אֵימַר דַּאֲמַרִי אֲנָא חֲשָׁשָׁא, אַחְזוֹקֵי מִי אֲמַרִי? The next day, the rabbis said to the innkeeper: Give us our purses. He said to them: These matters never occurred; you never gave me any purses. Rabbi Meir said to them: Why didn’t you analyze his name to learn that he is a wicked man? They said to him: Why didn’t the Master tell us? He said to them: I said one should be suspicious, but have I said a person should be established as wicked? Could I say to you with certainty that he is wicked based on his name alone?

מַשְׁכוּהוּ וְעַיְּילוּהוּ לַחֲנוּתָא, חֲזוֹ טְלָפְחֵי אַשְּׂפָמֵיהּ, אֲזַלוּ וִיהַבוּ סִימָנָא לִדְבֵיתְהוּ וְשַׁקְלוּהּ לְכִיסַיְיהוּ וְאַיְיתוֹ. אֲזַל אִיהוּ וְקַטְלֵיהּ לְאִיתְּתֵיהּ. What did they do? They dragged the innkeeper and brought him to a store and gave him wine to drink. After he drank the wine, they saw lentils on his mustache, showing that he had eaten lentils that day. They went and gave this sign to his wife. They said that the innkeeper had ordered that their money be returned to them upon the sign that he ate lentils at his last meal. And they took their purses and went. He went and killed his wife out of anger that she did this.

הַיְינוּ (דִּתְנַן): מַיִם רִאשׁוֹנִים הֶאֱכִילוּ בְּשַׂר חֲזִיר. מַיִם אַחֲרוֹנִים הָרְגוּ אֶת הַנֶּפֶשׁ. This is as we learned in a baraita: Due to a person’s laxity in the first washing, they fed him pork. There was an innkeeper who was accustomed to feed pork to gentiles and kosher meat to Jews. He distinguished between Jews and gentiles by watching to see whether they performed the ritual hand-washing before eating. One time, a Jew came and ate without washing his hands before the meal, and the innkeeper gave him pork to eat. Laxity in the final washing, the washing of one’s hands and mouth after a meal, caused the innkeeper to kill the person. This is similar to that story, as had the wicked innkeeper washed his mouth, the rabbis would not have known that he had eaten lentils.

וּלְבַסּוֹף הֲווֹ דָּיְיקִי בִּשְׁמָא. כִּי מְטוֹ לְהָהוּא בֵּיתָא דִּשְׁמֵיהּ ״בָּלָה״, לָא עֲיַילוּ לְגַבֵּיהּ. אָמְרִי: שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ רָשָׁע הוּא. דִּכְתִיב: ״וָאֹמַר לַבָּלָה נִאוּפִים״, (כְּמוֹ: ״אַחֲרֵי בְלוֹתִי הָיְתָה לִּי עֶדְנָה״, כְּלוֹמַר: זָקְנָה בְּנִאוּפִים). And in the end, they too, Rabbi Yehuda and Rabbi Yosei, would analyze names. When they came to a house of a landlord named Bala, they did not enter. They said: Conclude from here that he is certainly wicked, as it is written: “I said of her who was worn out [bala] by adulteries” (Ezekiel 23:43), as it states: “After I am grown old [beloti] shall I have pleasure?” (Genesis 18:12). “Worn out by adulteries” means aged through adulteries.

מִי שֶׁנְּשָׁכוֹ כֶּלֶב שׁוֹטֶה וְכוּ׳. תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן, חֲמִשָּׁה דְּבָרִים נֶאֶמְרוּ בְּכֶלֶב שׁוֹטֶה: פִּיו פָּתוּחַ, וְרִירוֹ נוֹטֵף, וְאׇזְנָיו סְרוּחוֹת, וּזְנָבוֹ מוּנָּח עַל יַרְכוֹתָיו, וּמְהַלֵּךְ בְּצִידֵּי דְּרָכִים. וְיֵשׁ אוֹמְרִים: אַף נוֹבֵחַ וְאֵין קוֹלוֹ נִשְׁמָע. מִמַּאי הָוֵי? רַב אָמַר: נָשִׁים כַּשְׁפָנִיּוֹת מְשַׂחֲקוֹת בּוֹ, וּשְׁמוּאֵל אָמַר: רוּחַ רָעָה שׁוֹרָה עָלָיו. § It was taught that in the case of one whom a mad dog bit, one does not feed him the lobe of its liver. The Gemara clarifies the concept of the mad dog. The Sages taught in a baraita: Five signs were said about a mad dog: Its mouth is always open; and its saliva drips; and its ears are floppy and do not stand up; and its tail rests on its legs; and it walks on the edges of roads. And some say it also barks and its voice is not heard. The Gemara asks: From where did the dog become mad? Rav said: Witches play with it and practice their magic on it, causing it to become mad. And Shmuel said: An evil spirit rests upon it.

מַאי בֵּינַיְיהוּ? אִיכָּא בֵּינַיְיהוּ The Gemara asks: What is the practical difference between these two opinions? The Gemara answers: There is a practical difference between them with regard to

לְמִקְטְלֵיהּ בְּדָבָר הַנִּזְרָק. killing it with an object that is thrown from a distance like an arrow rather than with one’s hands. If the dog is possessed by an evil spirit, one should avoid direct contact with it.

תַּנְיָא כְּווֹתֵיהּ דִּשְׁמוּאֵל. כְּשֶׁהוֹרְגִין אוֹתוֹ — אֵין הוֹרְגִין אוֹתוֹ אֶלָּא בְּדָבָר הַנִּזְרָק. דְּחָיֵיף בֵּיהּ — מִסְתַּכַּן, דְּנָכֵית לֵיהּ — מָיֵית. דְּחָיֵיף בֵּיהּ — מִסְתַּכַּן: מַאי תַּקַּנְתֵּיהּ? נִישַׁלַּח מָאנֵיהּ וְנִירְהַיט. רַב הוּנָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב יְהוֹשֻׁעַ חַף בֵּיהּ חַד מִינַּיְיהוּ בְּשׁוּקָא, שַׁלְּחִינְהוּ לְמָאנֵיהּ וְרָהֵיט. אֲמַר: קִיַּימְתִּי בְּעַצְמִי ״הַחׇכְמָה תְּחַיֶּה בְעָלֶיהָ״. The Gemara comments: This was taught in a baraita in accordance with the opinion of Shmuel: When one kills a mad dog, he should kill it only with a thrown object. Furthermore, one who is rubbed by a mad dog will become dangerously ill, while one bitten by the dog will die. The Gemara asks: What is the remedy for one who is rubbed by mad dog and becomes dangerously ill? The Gemara answers: Let him take off his clothing and run. The Gemara relates: Rav Huna, son of Rav Yehoshua, was rubbed by one of these mad dogs in the market, whereupon he took off his clothing and ran. He said: I have fulfilled the verse: “Wisdom preserves the lives of those who have it” (Ecclesiastes 7:12).

דְּנָכֵית לֵיהּ מָיֵית: מַאי תַּקַּנְתֵּיהּ? אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: נֵיתֵי מַשְׁכָּא דְּאַפָּא דִּיכְרָא וְנִיכְתּוֹב עֲלֵיהּ: אֲנָא פְּלָנְיָא בַּר פְּלָנִיתָא אַמַּשְׁכָּא דְּאַפָּא דִּיכְרָא כָּתֵיבְנָא עֲלָךְ: ״כַּנְתִּי כַּנְתִּי קְלֵירוֹס״. וְאָמְרִי לַהּ: ״קַנְדִּי קַנְדִּי קְלוֹרוֹס, יָהּ יָהּ ה׳ צְבָאוֹת אָמֵן אָמֵן סֶלָה״. וְנִשְׁלְחִינְהוּ לְמָאנֵיהּ וְלִקְבְּרִינְהוּ בֵּי קִבְרֵי עַד תְּרֵיסַר יַרְחֵי שַׁתָּא, וְנַפְּקִינְהוּ וְנִקְלִינְהוּ בְּתַנּוּרָא וּנְבַדְּרִינְהוּ לְקִטְמֵיהּ אַפָּרָשַׁת דְּרָכִים. וְהָנָךְ תְּרֵיסַר יַרְחֵי שַׁתָּא, כִּי שָׁתֵי מַיָּא — לָא לִישְׁתֵּי אֶלָּא בְּגוּבְתָּא דִנְחָשָׁא, דִּילְמָא חָזֵי בָּבוּאָה דְּשֵׁידָא וְלִיסְתַּכַּן. כִּי הָא דְּאַבָּא בַּר מָרְתָא הוּא אַבָּא בַּר מִנְיוֹמֵי, עֲבַדָא לֵיהּ אִימֵּיהּ גּוּבְתָּא דְּדַהֲבָא. The Gemara continues to discuss the baraita: One bitten by a mad dog will die. The Gemara asks: What is the remedy? Abaye said: Let him bring the skin of a male hyena and write on it: I, so-and-so, son of so-and-so, am writing this spell about you upon the skin of a male hyena: Kanti kanti kelirus. And some say he should write: Kandi kandi keloros. He then writes names of God, Yah, Yah, Lord of Hosts, amen amen Selah. And let him take off his clothes and bury them in a cemetery for twelve months of the year, after which he should take them out, and burn them in an oven, and scatter the ashes at a crossroads. And during those twelve months of the year, when his clothes are buried, when he drinks water, let him drink only from a copper tube and not from a spring, lest he see the image of the demon in the water and be endangered, like the case of Abba bar Marta, who is also called Abba bar Manyumi, whose mother made him a gold tube for this purpose.

וְעוֹד אָמַר רַבִּי מַתְיָא: רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן חָשׁ בְּצַפְדִּינָא. אֲזַל גַּבַּהּ דְּהַהִיא מַטְרוֹנִיתָא, עֲבַדָא לֵיהּ מִלְּתָא חַמְשָׁא וּמַעֲלֵי שַׁבְּתָא. אֲמַר לַהּ: בְּשַׁבָּת מַאי? אֲמַרָה לֵיהּ: לָא צְרִיכַתְּ. אִי מִצְטְרִיכְנָא מַאי? אֲמַרָה לֵיהּ: אִישְׁתְּבַע לִי דְּלָא מְגַלֵּית, אִישְׁתְּבַע: לֵאלָהָא דְיִשְׂרָאֵל לָא מְגַלֵּינָא. נְפַק דַּרְשַׁהּ בְּפִירְקָא. § The mishna said: And furthermore, Rabbi Matya ben Ḥarash said: With regard to one who suffers pain in his throat, one may place medicine inside his mouth on Shabbat, although administering a remedy is prohibited on Shabbat. The Gemara discusses a related incident: Rabbi Yoḥanan suffered from the illness tzefidna, which first affects the teeth and gums and then the intestines. He went to a certain gentile matron [matronita] who was a well-known healer. She prepared a medicine for him on Thursday and Friday. He said to her: What shall I do on Shabbat, when I cannot come to collect the medicine from you? She said to him: You will not need it. He asked her: If I do need it, what shall I do? She said to him: Swear to me that you will not reveal the remedy; then I will tell you, and you can prepare it yourself should you need it. He swore: To the God of the Jews, I will not reveal it. She told him the remedy. Rabbi Yoḥanan then went out and taught it publicly, revealing the secret of the remedy.

וְהָא אִישְׁתְּבַע לַהּ! לֵאלָהָא דְיִשְׂרָאֵל לָא מְגַלֵּינָא. הָא לְעַמּוֹ יִשְׂרָאֵל — מְגַלֵּינָא. וְהָא אִיכָּא חִלּוּל הַשֵּׁם! דִּמְגַלֵּי לַהּ מֵעִיקָּרָא. The Gemara is surprised at this: But he swore to her that he would not reveal it. The Gemara answers that in his vow he declared: I will not reveal it to the God of the Jews. However, his words imply: I will reveal it to His people, the Jews. The Gemara asks: Still, there is a desecration of God’s name, as the matron now thinks that a great man of Rabbi Yoḥanan’s stature broke his vow. The Gemara answers: He revealed it to her at the outset. As soon as she revealed the remedy to him, he told her that his vow would not prevent him from publicizing the remedy.

מַאי עֲבַדָא לֵיהּ? אָמַר רַב אַחָא בְּרֵיהּ דְּרַב אַמֵּי: מֵי שְׂאוֹר, שֶׁמֶן זַיִת, וָמֶלַח. רַב יֵימַר אֲמַר: שְׂאוֹר גּוּפֵיהּ, שֶׁמֶן זַיִת, וָמֶלַח. רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: מִשְׁחָא דְּגַדְפָּא דַאֲווֹזָא. אָמַר אַבָּיֵי: אֲנָא עֲבַדִי לְכוּלְּהוּ וְלָא אִיתַּסַּאי, עַד דַּאֲמַר לִי הַהוּא טַיָּיעָא: אַיְיתִי קַשְׁיָיתָא דְזֵיתָא דְּלָא מְלוֹ תִּילְתָּא, וּקְלִינְהוּ בְּנוּרָא אַמָּרָא חַדְתָּא, וְאַדְבֵּיק בְּכַכֵּי דָרֵיה. עֲבַדִי הָכִי וְאִיתַּסַּאי. The Gemara asks: What was the medicine that she prepared for him? Rav Aḥa, son of Rav Ami, said: It was water in which leaven was steeped, olive oil, and salt. Rav Yeimar said: It was leaven itself, olive oil, and salt. Rav Ashi said: The remedy was fat from the bone marrow of a goose’s wing. Abaye said: I made all of these medicines and was not cured from this ailment, until a certain Arab told me the remedy for it: Take olive seeds that are less than one-third ripe, and burn them in a fire on top of a new hoe, and stick them along the row of gums. I did this and was cured.

מִמַּאי הֲוָה? מֵחַמִּימֵי חַמִּימֵי דְּחִיטֵּי, וּמִשִּׁיּוּרֵי כָּסָא דְהַרְסָנָא. וּמַאי סִימָנֵיהּ — כַּד רָמֵי מִידֵּי בְּכַכֵּיהּ וְאָתֵא דְּמָא מִבֵּי דָרֵי. רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן כִּי חָשׁ בְּצַפְדִּינָא, עֲבַד הָכִי בְּשַׁבְּתָא וְאִיתַּסִּי. וְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן הֵיכִי עָבֵיד הָכִי? אֲמַר רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: שָׁאנֵי צַפְדִּינָא הוֹאִיל וּמַתְחִיל בַּפֶּה, וְגוֹמֵר בִּבְנֵי מֵעַיִים. § The Gemara asks: From where does this disease tzefidna come? It is from eating wheat bread that is too hot and fish remains fried in oil. What is the sign of this sickness? When one puts something between his teeth, blood comes out from his gums. When Rabbi Yoḥanan suffered from tzefidna, he prepared this medicine described above on Shabbat and was cured. The Gemara asks: And how did Rabbi Yoḥanan prepare this medicine on Shabbat for an ailment which affects only the gums but is not life-threatening? Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak said: Tzefidna is different, since it does indeed begin in the mouth and appears to be an illness of the teeth, but it ends up in the intestines and is dangerous.

אֲמַר לֵיהּ רַב חִיָּיא בַּר אַבָּא לְרַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: כְּמַאן — כְּרַבִּי מַתְיָא בֶּן חָרָשׁ, דְּאָמַר: הַחוֹשֵׁשׁ בְּפִיו מְטִילִין לוֹ סַם בְּשַׁבָּת. אֲמַר לֵיהּ: שֶׁאֲנִי אוֹמֵר בְּזוֹ, וְלֹא בְּאַחֶרֶת. Rav Ḥiyya bar Abba said to Rabbi Yoḥanan: In accordance with whose opinion did you do this? Was it not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Matya ben Ḥarash, who said: In the case of one who suffers pain in his mouth, one puts medicine in his mouth on Shabbat, which is a minority opinion? Rabbi Yoḥanan said to him: It is so, but I say the Sages agreed with him about taking medicine in this case alone, but no other. If so, with regard to medicine on Shabbat, the view of Rabbi Matya ben Ḥarash is not a minority opinion.

לֵימָא מְסַיַּיע לֵיהּ: מִי שֶׁאֲחָזוֹ יֵרָקוֹן — מַאֲכִילִין אוֹתוֹ בְּשַׂר חֲמוֹר, מִי שֶׁנְּשָׁכוֹ כֶּלֶב שׁוֹטֶה — מַאֲכִילִין אוֹתוֹ מֵחֲצַר כָּבֵד שֶׁלּוֹ, וְהַחוֹשֵׁשׁ בְּפִיו — מְטִילִין לוֹ סַם בְּשַׁבָּת, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי מַתְיָא בֶּן חָרָשׁ. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: בְּאֵילּוּ אֵין בָּהֶם מִשּׁוּם רְפוּאָה. ״בְּאֵלּוּ״ לְמַעוֹטֵי מַאי? מַאי לָאו, לְמַעוֹטֵי סַם? Let us say that this baraita supports him: With regard to one who is seized with yerakon, one feeds him donkey meat as medicine; with regard to one whom a mad dog bit, one feeds him the lobe of its liver; in the case of one who has pain in his mouth, one puts medicine in his mouth on Shabbat; this is the statement of Rabbi Matya ben Ḥarash. And the Rabbis say: These have no value as a remedy. The Rabbis used the term these, to exclude what? What, is it not to exclude this medicine for tzefidna, which the Rabbis agree is permitted on Shabbat?

לָא, לְמַעוֹטֵי: מַקִּיזִין דָּם לִסְרוֹנְכֵי. הָכִי נָמֵי מִסְתַּבְּרָא. דְּתַנְיָא: שְׁלֹשָׁה דְּבָרִים אָמַר רַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל בְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי שֶׁשָּׁמַע מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי מַתְיָא בֶּן חָרָשׁ: מַקִּיזִין דָּם לִסְרוֹנְכֵי בְּשַׁבָּת, וּמִי שֶׁנְּשָׁכוֹ כֶּלֶב שׁוֹטֶה — מַאֲכִילִין אוֹתוֹ מֵחֲצַר כָּבֵד שֶׁלּוֹ, וְהַחוֹשֵׁשׁ בְּפִיו מְטִילִין לוֹ סַם בְּשַׁבָּת. The Gemara rejects this: No, it excludes a different remedy, which Rabbi Matya suggests: Bloodletting to heal the ailment serunkhi is permitted on Shabbat. The Gemara comments: So too, this is reasonable to say, as it was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yishmael, son of Rabbi Yosei, said three things that he heard in the name of Rabbi Matya ben Ḥarash: One may let blood for serunkhi on Shabbat; and in the case of one whom a mad dog bit, one feeds him the lobe of its liver; and in the case of one who has pain in his mouth, one puts medicine in his mouth on Shabbat.

וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: בְּאֵילּוּ אֵין בָּהֶן מִשּׁוּם רְפוּאָה. ״בְּאֵילּוּ״ לְמַעוֹטֵי מַאי? מַאי לָאו, אַתַּרְתֵּי בָּתְרָיָיתָא וּלְמַעוֹטֵי דְּרֵישָׁא! לָא: אַתַּרְתֵּי דְּרֵישָׁא קַמָּיָיתָא, וּלְמַעוֹטֵי דְּסֵיפָא. And the Rabbis say: These have no value as a remedy. The Rabbis used the term these to exclude what? What, is it not to limit their argument only to the latter two items, which do not cure anything, and to exclude the first item, bloodletting for serunkhi, which everyone agrees is an effective remedy? The Gemara rejects this: No, there is no proof from here, since it is possible to say that it is referring to the first two items of the first baraita and excludes the latter clause with regard to medicine on Shabbat, which they agree with.

תָּא שְׁמַע, דְּתָנֵי רַבָּה בַּר שְׁמוּאֵל: עוּבָּרָה שֶׁהֵרִיחָה — מַאֲכִילִין אוֹתָהּ עַד שֶׁתָּשׁוּב נַפְשָׁהּ, וּמִי שֶׁנְּשָׁכוֹ כֶּלֶב שׁוֹטֶה — מַאֲכִילִין אוֹתוֹ מֵחֲצַר כָּבֵד שֶׁלּוֹ, וְהַחוֹשֵׁשׁ בְּפִיו — מְטִילִין לוֹ סַם בְּשַׁבָּת, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בְּרַבִּי יוֹסֵי, שֶׁאָמַר מִשּׁוּם רַבִּי מַתְיָא בֶּן חָרָשׁ. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: בָּזוֹ וְלֹא בְּאַחֶרֶת. ״בְּזוֹ״ אַהֵיָיא? אִילֵּימָא אַעוּבָּרָה, פְּשִׁיטָא! עוּבָּרָה מִי אִיכָּא לְמַאן דְּאָמַר דְּלָא? אֶלָּא לָאו — אַסַּם. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ. Come and hear a proof for the matter, as Rabba bar Shmuel taught in the following baraita: With regard to a pregnant woman who smells and craves food, one feeds her until she is satisfied, even on Yom Kippur; and in the case of one whom a mad dog bit, one feeds him from the lobe of its liver; and in the case of one who has pain in his mouth, one places medicine in his mouth on Shabbat; this is the statement of Rabbi Elazar, son of Rabbi Yosei, who said it in the name of Rabbi Matya ben Ḥarash. And the Rabbis say: In this case and no other. The Gemara clarifies: To which case is this one referring? If we say they said this about a pregnant woman, it is obvious; is there anyone who says one should not give a pregnant woman food? Rather, is it not referring to the halakha pertaining to medicine on Shabbat, which they agree is permitted? Learn from this that the Rabbis did not disagree about this.

רַב אָשֵׁי אָמַר: מַתְנִיתִין נָמֵי דַּיְקָא — וְעוֹד אָמַר רַבִּי מַתְיָא בֶּן חָרָשׁ: הַחוֹשֵׁשׁ בְּפִיו מְטִילִין לוֹ סַם בְּשַׁבָּת, וְלָא פְּלִיגִי רַבָּנַן עֲלֵיהּ. וְאִם אִיתָא דִּפְלִיגִי רַבָּנַן עֲלֵיהּ, לִיעָרְבִינְהוּ וְלִיתְנִינְהוּ, וְלִיפַּלְגוּ רַבָּנַן בְּסֵיפָא. שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ. Rav Ashi said: The wording of the mishna is also precise in accordance with this approach, as it was taught in the mishna: And furthermore, Rabbi Matya ben Ḥarash said: In the case of one who suffers pain in his mouth, one places medicine in his mouth on Shabbat, and the Rabbis do not disagree with him and say otherwise. And if it is so that the Rabbis disagree with him, then let the mishna combine the two halakhot and teach them together, and let the Rabbis disagree with both points in the latter clause. Since the mishna was not written this way, but instead the dispute of the Rabbis appears after Rabbi Matya’s statement about the mad dog, learn from here that the Rabbis did not disagree with him about the halakha with regard to medicine.

מִפְּנֵי שֶׁסְּפֵק נְפָשׁוֹת הוּא וְכוּ׳. לְמָה לִי תּוּ לְמֵימַר: ״וְכׇל סְפֵק נְפָשׁוֹת דּוֹחֶה אֶת הַשַּׁבָּת״? אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר רַב: לֹא סָפֵק שַׁבָּת זוֹ בִּלְבַד אָמְרוּ, אֶלָּא אֲפִילּוּ סָפֵק שַׁבָּת אַחֶרֶת. § The mishna states that one with pain in his throat should be given medicine on Shabbat because it is a case of uncertainty concerning a life-threatening situation. The Gemara asks: Why do I need to say furthermore: And any case of uncertainty concerning a life-threatening situation overrides Shabbat? Rav Yehuda said that Rav said: They stated this not only in a case where there is uncertainty with regard to this Shabbat, but even if the uncertainty is with regard to a different future Shabbat.

הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? כְּגוֹן דְּאַמְדוּהּ לִתְמָנְיָא יוֹמֵי, וְיוֹמָא קַמָּא שַׁבְּתָא. מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: לִיעַכַּב עַד לְאוּרְתָּא כִּי הֵיכִי דְּלָא נֵיחוּל עֲלֵיהּ תְּרֵי שַׁבָּתָא, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן. What are the circumstances in which uncertainty would arise as to whether or not his life will be in danger in the future? They are a case where doctors assess that an ill person needs a certain treatment for eight days, and the first day of his illness is Shabbat. Lest you say: He should wait until evening and begin his treatment after Shabbat so they will not need to desecrate two Shabbatot for his sake, therefore it teaches us that one must immediately desecrate Shabbat for his sake. This is the halakha, despite the fact that an additional Shabbat will be desecrated as a result, because there is uncertainty about whether his life is in danger.

תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי: מְחַמִּין חַמִּין לַחוֹלֶה בְּשַׁבָּת, בֵּין לְהַשְׁקוֹתוֹ בֵּין לְהַבְרוֹתוֹ. וְלֹא שַׁבָּת זוֹ בִּלְבַד אָמְרוּ, אֶלָּא לְשַׁבָּת אַחֶרֶת. וְאֵין אוֹמְרִים: נַמְתִּין לוֹ שֶׁמָּא יַבְרִיא, אֶלָּא מְחַמִּין לוֹ מִיָּד, מִפְּנֵי שֶׁסְּפֵק נְפָשׁוֹת דּוֹחֶה אֶת הַשַּׁבָּת. וְלֹא סָפֵק שַׁבָּת זוֹ, אֶלָּא אֲפִילּוּ סָפֵק שַׁבָּת אַחֶרֶת. That was also taught in a baraita: One heats water for an ill person on Shabbat, whether to give him to drink or to wash him, since it might help him recover. And they did not say it is permitted to desecrate only the current Shabbat for him, but even a different, future Shabbat. And one must not say: Let us wait and perform this labor for him after Shabbat, perhaps he will get well in the meantime. Rather, one heats it for him immediately because any case of uncertainty concerning a life-threatening situation overrides Shabbat. And this is so not only with regard to uncertainty whether his life is in danger on the current Shabbat, but even in a case of uncertainty with regard to danger on a different Shabbat.

וְאֵין עוֹשִׂין דְּבָרִים הַלָּלוּ, לֹא עַל יְדֵי גּוֹיִם, וְלֹא עַל יְדֵי כּוּתִיִּים, אֶלָּא עַל יְדֵי גְּדוֹלֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל. וְאֵין אוֹמְרִין יֵעָשׂוּ דְּבָרִים הַלָּלוּ, לֹא עַל פִּי נָשִׁים, וְלֹא עַל פִּי כּוּתִיִּים, אֲבָל מִצְטָרְפִין לְדַעַת אַחֶרֶת. And these acts should not be performed by gentiles or Samaritans but should be done by the greatest of the Jewish people, i.e., their scholars, who know how to act properly. And one does not say: These actions may be performed based on the advice of women or Samaritans, since they are not considered experts able to declare a person ill enough to override Shabbat. However, the opinions of these people do combine with an additional opinion, meaning that if there is a dispute, their opinions may be considered when coming to a decision.

תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: מְפַקְּחִין פִּקּוּחַ נֶפֶשׁ בְּשַׁבָּת, וְהַזָּרִיז הֲרֵי זֶה מְשׁוּבָּח, וְאֵין צָרִיךְ לִיטּוֹל רְשׁוּת מִבֵּית דִּין. הָא כֵּיצַד? רָאָה תִּינוֹק שֶׁנָּפַל לַיָּם — פּוֹרֵשׂ מְצוּדָה וּמַעֲלֵהוּ, וְהַזָּרִיז הֲרֵי זֶה מְשׁוּבָּח, וְאֵין צָרִיךְ לִיטּוֹל רְשׁוּת מִבֵּית דִּין. וְאַף עַל גַּב דְּקָא צָיֵיד כְּווֹרֵי. רָאָה תִּינוֹק שֶׁנָּפַל לְבוֹר — עוֹקֵר חוּלְיָא וּמַעֲלֵהוּ, וְהַזָּרִיז הֲרֵי זֶה מְשׁוּבָּח, וְאֵין צָרִיךְ לִיטּוֹל רְשׁוּת מִבֵּית דִּין. אַף עַל גַּב דִּמְתַקֵּן דַּרְגָּא. § The Sages taught in a baraita: One engages in saving a life on Shabbat, and one who is vigilant to do so is praiseworthy. And one need not take permission from a court but hurries to act on his own. How so? If one sees a child who fell into the sea, he spreads a fisherman’s net and raises him from the water. And one who is vigilant and acts quickly is praiseworthy, and one need not seek permission from a court, although in doing so he catches fish in the net as well. Similarly, if one sees a child fall into a pit and the child cannot get out, he digs part of the ground out around the edge of the pit to create a makeshift step and raises him out. And one who is vigilant and acts quickly is praiseworthy, and one need not seek permission from a court, although in doing so he fashions a step.

רָאָה שֶׁנִּנְעֲלָה דֶּלֶת בִּפְנֵי תִּינוֹק — שׁוֹבְרָהּ וּמוֹצִיאוֹ, וְהַזָּרִיז הֲרֵי זֶה מְשׁוּבָּח, וְאֵין צָרִיךְ לִיטּוֹל רְשׁוּת מִבֵּית דִּין. וְאַף עַל גַּב דְּקָא מִיכַּוֵּין לְמִיתְבַּר בְּשִׁיפֵי. מְכַבִּין וּמַפְסִיקִין מִפְּנֵי הַדְּלֵיקָה בְּשַׁבָּת, וְהַזָּרִיז הֲרֵי זֶה מְשׁוּבָּח, וְאֵין צָרִיךְ לִיטּוֹל רְשׁוּת מִבֵּית דִּין. וְאַף עַל גַּב דְּקָא מְמַכֵּיךְ מַכּוֹכֵי. Similarly, if one sees that a door is locked before a child and the child is scared and crying, he breaks the door and takes the child out. And one who is vigilant and acts quickly is praiseworthy, and one need not seek permission from a court, although he intends to break it into boards to be used later. Similarly, one may extinguish a fire by placing a barrier of metal or clay vessels filled with water in front of it on Shabbat when life is endangered. And one who is vigilant and acts quickly is praiseworthy, and one need not seek permission from a court, although he leaves the coals, which can be used for cooking after Shabbat.

וּצְרִיכָא: דְּאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן יָם — מִשּׁוּם דְּאַדְּהָכִי וְהָכִי אָזֵל לֵיהּ, אֲבָל בּוֹר, דְּקָא יָתֵיב — אֵימָא לָא, צְרִיכָא. The Gemara comments: And it is necessary to teach these examples, since each one suggests an original idea. As, had it taught us the halakha of the child who fell into the sea, we would have said: He must act quickly in that case because in the meantime, if he delays, the child will be swept away by the waves and disappear, and therefore the rescuer need not seek permission; but in the case of a child who fell into a pit, who remains there and is in no further danger, one might say the rescuer need not hurry but should request permission from the court first. Therefore, the baraita explains: No, it is necessary to tell us that case, too.

וְאִי אַשְׁמְעִינַן בּוֹר — מִשּׁוּם דְּקָא מִיבְּעִית, אֲבָל נִנְעֲלָה דֶּלֶת, אֶפְשָׁר דְּיָתֵיב בְּהַאי גִּיסָא וּמְשַׁבֵּישׁ לֵיהּ בְּאַמְגּוֹזֵי. צְרִיכָא. And if it had taught us the case of the pit, one might have thought it is because the child is scared at being trapped; but when a door is locked before a child, it is possible to sit on the other side of the door and amuse him with the sound of nuts until Shabbat is over. Therefore, it is necessary to teach that in this case, too, one does not delay but acts immediately because a life is possibly in danger.

מְכַבִּין וּמַפְסִיקִין. לְמָה לִי? דַּאֲפִילּוּ לְחָצֵר אַחֶרֶת. It was taught in a baraita that one may extinguish a fire by placing a barrier in front of it on Shabbat. The Gemara asks: Why do I need this? What new point is taught by this additional case of a life-endangering situation? The Gemara answers: This halakha applies even if the fire is spreading toward another courtyard. Not only may this be done to save the lives of people in the courtyard on fire; it may also be done to prevent the fire from spreading to an adjacent courtyard.

אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: לֹא הָלְכוּ בְּפִקּוּחַ נֶפֶשׁ אַחַר הָרוֹב. הֵיכִי דָּמֵי? אִי נֵימָא דְּאִיכָּא תִּשְׁעָה יִשְׂרָאֵל וְגוֹי אֶחָד בֵּינַיְיהוּ — רוּבָּא יִשְׂרָאֵל נִינְהוּ, (אֶלָּא) פַּלְגָא וּפַלְגָא, סְפֵק נְפָשׁוֹת לְהָקֵל. § Rav Yosef said that Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: With regard to saving a life, the Sages did not follow the majority as they do in other areas of halakha. The Gemara asks: What are the circumstances? When does one not follow the majority? If we say that one does not follow the majority in a case where there are nine Jews and one gentile among them and a building collapses on one of them, then in that case the majority of people are Jews and yet one desecrates Shabbat to save the trapped person. In such a case one is in fact following the majority. Alternatively, if the group is half Jews and half gentiles, the ruling is lenient with regard to a case of uncertainty concerning a life-threatening situation. But this, too, is not a case where one follows the minority, as there is an even chance that the victim is a Jew.

אֶלָּא דְּאִיכָּא תִּשְׁעָה גּוֹיִם וְיִשְׂרָאֵל אֶחָד. הָא נָמֵי פְּשִׁיטָא — דְּהָוֵה לֵיהּ קָבוּעַ, וְכׇל קָבוּעַ כְּמֶחֱצָה עַל מֶחֱצָה דָּמֵי! Rather, it is referring to a case where there are nine gentiles and one Jew. However, this too is obvious. One saves the trapped individual because the group is in a fixed location, and there is a principle that whenever a group is in a fixed location it is considered as though it were evenly divided. In this case, despite the fact that the group’s majority is gentile, it is considered as though it were composed half of Jews and half of gentiles.

לָא צְרִיכָא, דִּפְרוּשׁ לְחָצֵר אַחֶרֶת, מַהוּ דְּתֵימָא: כׇּל דְּפָרֵישׁ — מֵרוּבָּא פָּרֵישׁ, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן דְּלָא הָלְכוּ בְּפִקּוּחַ נֶפֶשׁ אַחַר הָרוֹב. The Gemara answers: No, it is necessary to teach that one does not follow the majority in a case where one individual did not remain with the group in their courtyard but separated and went to another courtyard, and a building collapses on him. Lest you say: One should follow the principle that whatever is separated from a group is considered to have left from the majority, and since there was a majority of gentiles there the individual who left the group was probably a gentile, and it is not necessary to clear the debris for a gentile on Shabbat, therefore it teaches us that with regard to uncertainty in a situation of saving a life, one does not follow the majority.

אִינִי?! וְהָאָמַר רַבִּי אַסִּי אָמַר רַבִּי יוֹחָנָן: תִּשְׁעָה גּוֹיִם וְיִשְׂרָאֵל אֶחָד בְּאוֹתָהּ חָצֵר — מְפַקְּחִין, בְּחָצֵר אַחֶרֶת — אֵין מְפַקְּחִין! לָא קַשְׁיָא: הָא דִּפְרוּשׁ כּוּלְּהוּ, הָא דִּפְרוּשׁ מִקְצָתַיְיהוּ. The Gemara asks: Is that so? But didn’t Rav Asi say that Rabbi Yoḥanan said: If there are nine gentiles and one Jew and a building collapses on one of them, if it is in that same courtyard one removes the debris, but in another courtyard one does not remove the debris? The Gemara answers: This is not difficult; there is no contradiction between the halakhot. This case, where one removes the debris, is when they all left for another courtyard and it is clear that the Jew was among them. Consequently, the principle of being in a fixed location still applies, and it is considered a case of uncertainty. That other situation is when only a minority of them left for the other courtyard, and it is unknown whether the Jew left with them.

וּמִי אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל הָכִי? וְהָתְנַן: מָצָא בָהּ תִּינוֹק מוּשְׁלָךְ, אִם רוֹב גּוֹיִם — גּוֹי, וְאִם רוֹב יִשְׂרָאֵל — יִשְׂרָאֵל, מֶחֱצָה עַל מֶחֱצָה — יִשְׂרָאֵל. וְאָמַר רַב: לֹא שָׁנוּ אֶלָּא לְהַחְיוֹתוֹ, אֲבָל לְיַיחֲסוֹ לֹא. The Gemara asks: Did Shmuel actually say this, that one does not follow the majority with regard to saving a life? Didn’t we learn in a mishna: If one finds an abandoned child in a city and his parents are unknown, if the majority of the city are gentiles the child is considered a gentile; and if the majority of the city are Jews the child is considered a Jew; if the city is composed of half gentiles and half Jews, the child is considered a Jew? And Rav said: They taught this, that he is a Jew, only with respect to sustaining him but not with respect to attributing a lineage to him. One does not say that he is definitely Jewish based on the majority. Therefore, with regard to the halakhot of marriage, his status remains uncertain. If the abandoned child is a girl, she is not permitted to marry a priest, who may marry only a woman of certain lineage.

אֲבָל לְהַחֲיוֹת — אֲפִילּוּ מֵעַל מִזְבְּחִי. וּמָה זֶה, שֶׁסָּפֵק יֵשׁ מַמָּשׁ בִּדְבָרָיו סָפֵק אֵין מַמָּשׁ בִּדְבָרָיו, וַעֲבוֹדָה דּוֹחָה שַׁבָּת — קַל וָחוֹמֶר לְפִקּוּחַ נֶפֶשׁ שֶׁדּוֹחֶה אֶת הַשַּׁבָּת. נַעֲנָה רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר וְאָמַר: וּמָה מִילָה שֶׁהִיא אֶחָד מִמָּאתַיִם וְאַרְבָּעִים וּשְׁמוֹנָה אֵיבָרִים שֶׁבָּאָדָם דּוֹחָה אֶת הַשַּׁבָּת — קַל וָחוֹמֶר לְכׇל גּוּפוֹ שֶׁדּוֹחֶה אֶת הַשַּׁבָּת. but to preserve a life, e.g., if the priest can testify to the innocence of one who is sentenced to death, one removes him even from on top of My altar, even while he is sacrificing an offering. Just as this priest, about whom there is uncertainty whether there is substance to his words of testimony or whether there is no substance to his words, is taken from the Temple service in order to save a life, and Temple service overrides Shabbat, so too, a fortiori, saving a life overrides Shabbat. Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya answered and said: Just as the mitzva of circumcision, which rectifies only one of the 248 limbs of the body, overrides Shabbat, so too, a fortiori, saving one’s whole body, which is entirely involved in mitzvot, overrides Shabbat.

רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: ״אֶת שַׁבְּתוֹתַי תִּשְׁמוֹרוּ״, יָכוֹל לַכֹּל — תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר: ״אַךְ״ חָלַק. רַבִּי יוֹנָתָן בֶּן יוֹסֵף אוֹמֵר: ״כִּי קוֹדֶשׁ הִיא לָכֶם״, הִיא מְסוּרָה בְּיֶדְכֶם וְלֹא אַתֶּם מְסוּרִים בְּיָדָהּ. Other tanna’im debated this same issue. Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, says that it is stated: “But keep my Shabbatot” (Exodus 31:13). One might have thought that this applies to everyone in all circumstances; therefore, the verse states “but,” a term that restricts and qualifies. It implies that there are circumstances where one must keep Shabbat and circumstances where one must desecrate it, i.e., to save a life. Rabbi Yonatan ben Yosef says that it is stated: “For it is sacred to you” (Exodus 31:14). This implies that Shabbat is given into your hands, and you are not given to it to die on account of Shabbat.

רַבִּי שִׁמְעוֹן בֶּן מְנַסְיָא אוֹמֵר: ״וְשָׁמְרוּ בְנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל אֶת הַשַּׁבָּת״, אָמְרָה תּוֹרָה: חַלֵּל עָלָיו שַׁבָּת אַחַת כְּדֵי שֶׁיִּשְׁמוֹר שַׁבָּתוֹת הַרְבֵּה. אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל: אִי הֲוַאי הָתָם, הֲוָה אָמֵינָא דִּידִי עֲדִיפָא מִדִּידְהוּ: ״וְחַי בָּהֶם״ — וְלֹא שֶׁיָּמוּת בָּהֶם. Rabbi Shimon ben Menasya said: It is stated: “And the children of Israel shall keep Shabbat, to observe Shabbat” (Exodus 31:16). The Torah said: Desecrate one Shabbat on his behalf so he will observe many Shabbatot. Rav Yehuda said that Shmuel said: If I would have been there among those Sages who debated this question, I would have said that my proof is preferable to theirs, as it states: “You shall keep My statutes and My ordinances, which a person shall do and live by them” (Leviticus 18:5), and not that he should die by them. In all circumstances, one must take care not to die as a result of fulfilling the mitzvot.

אָמַר רָבָא: לְכוּלְּהוּ אִית לְהוּ פִּירְכָא, בַּר מִדִּשְׁמוּאֵל דְּלֵית לֵיהּ פִּירְכָא. דְּרַבִּי יִשְׁמָעֵאל — דִּילְמָא כִּדְרָבָא. דְּאָמַר רָבָא: מַאי טַעְמָא דְּמַחְתֶּרֶת? חֲזָקָה, אֵין אָדָם מַעֲמִיד עַצְמוֹ עַל מָמוֹנוֹ. וְהַאי מִידָּע יָדַע דְּקָאֵי לְאַפֵּיהּ, וְאָמַר אִי קָאֵי לְאַפַּאי — קָטֵילְנָא לֵיהּ, וְהַתּוֹרָה אָמְרָה: בָּא לְהׇרְגְּךָ — הַשְׁכֵּם לְהׇרְגוֹ. וְאַשְׁכְּחַן וַדַּאי, סָפֵק מְנָלַן? Rava commented on this: All of these arguments have refutations except for that of Shmuel, which has no refutation. The Gemara explains Rava’s claim: The proof brought by Rabbi Yishmael from the thief who breaks in could perhaps be refuted based on the principle of Rava, as Rava said: What is the reason for the halakha about the thief who breaks in? There is a presumption that while a person is being robbed he does not restrain himself with respect to his money. And this thief knows that the homeowner will rise to oppose him and said to himself from the start: If he rises against me, I will kill him. And the Torah states: If a person comes to kill you, rise to kill him first. We found a source for saving a life that is in certain danger, but from where do we derive that even in a case where there is uncertainty as to whether a life is in danger one may desecrate Shabbat? Consequently, Rabbi Yishmael’s argument is refuted.

דְּרַבִּי עֲקִיבָא נָמֵי — דִּילְמָא כִּדְאַבָּיֵי. דְּאָמַר אַבָּיֵי: מָסְרִינַן לֵיהּ זוּגָא דְרַבָּנַן לֵידַע אִם מַמָּשׁ בִּדְבָרָיו. וְאַשְׁכְּחַן וַדַּאי, סָפֵק מְנָא לַן? The proof of Rabbi Akiva can also be refuted. He brought the case of removing a priest from altar service in order to have him testify on another’s behalf, since his testimony might acquit the accused and save him from execution. But perhaps that halakha is in accordance with the opinion of Abaye, as Abaye said: If the accused says he has a witness in his favor, we send a pair of rabbis on his behalf to determine if his words of testimony have substance. These rabbis would first check that the testimony of the priest is substantive before removing him from the altar. If so, we have found that one interrupts the Temple service to save a life from certain danger, but from where do we derive that one interrupts the Temple service when the likelihood of saving life is uncertain?

וְכוּלְּהוּ אַשְׁכְּחַן וַדַּאי, סָפֵק מְנָא לַן? וְדִשְׁמוּאֵל, וַדַּאי לֵית לֵיהּ פִּירְכָא. אָמַר רָבִינָא וְאִיתֵּימָא רַב נַחְמָן בַּר יִצְחָק: טָבָא חֲדָא פִּלְפַּלְתָּא חֲרִיפָא מִמְּלָא צַנָּא דְקָרֵי. And for all the other arguments as well, we have found proofs for saving a life from certain danger. But for cases of uncertainty, from where do we derive this? For this reason, all the arguments are refuted. However, the proof that Shmuel brought from the verse: “And live by them,” which teaches that one should not even put a life in possible danger to observe mitzvot, there is certainly no refutation. Ravina said, and some say it was Rav Naḥman bar Yitzḥak who said with regard to this superior proof of Shmuel: One spicy pepper is better than a whole basket of squash, since its flavor is more powerful than all the others.

מַתְנִי׳ חַטָּאת וְאָשָׁם וַדַּאי — מְכַפְּרִין. מִיתָה וְיוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים — מְכַפְּרִין עִם הַתְּשׁוּבָה. תְּשׁוּבָה — מְכַפֶּרֶת עַל עֲבֵירוֹת קַלּוֹת: עַל עֲשֵׂה, וְעַל לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה. וְעַל הַחֲמוּרוֹת הוּא תּוֹלֶה, עַד שֶׁיָּבֹא יוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים וִיכַפֵּר. הָאוֹמֵר: אֶחֱטָא וְאָשׁוּב, אֶחֱטָא וְאָשׁוּב — אֵין מַסְפִּיקִין בְּיָדוֹ לַעֲשׂוֹת תְּשׁוּבָה. אֶחֱטָא וְיוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים מְכַפֵּר — אֵין יוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים מְכַפֵּר. עֲבֵירוֹת שֶׁבֵּין אָדָם לַמָּקוֹם — יוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים מְכַפֵּר, עֲבֵירוֹת שֶׁבֵּין אָדָם לַחֲבֵירוֹ — אֵין יוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים מְכַפֵּר, עַד שֶׁיְּרַצֶּה אֶת חֲבֵירוֹ. MISHNA: A sin-offering, which atones for unwitting performance of transgressions punishable by karet, and a definite guilt-offering, which is brought for robbery and misuse of consecrated items, atone for those sins. Death and Yom Kippur atone for sins when accompanied by repentance. Repentance itself atones for minor transgressions, for both positive mitzvot and negative mitzvot. And repentance places punishment for severe transgressions in abeyance until Yom Kippur comes and completely atones for the transgression. With regard to one who says: I will sin and then I will repent, I will sin and I will repent, Heaven does not provide him the opportunity to repent, and he will remain a sinner all his days. With regard to one who says: I will sin and Yom Kippur will atone for my sins, Yom Kippur does not atone for his sins. Furthermore, for transgressions between a person and God, Yom Kippur atones; however, for transgressions between a person and another, Yom Kippur does not atone until he appeases the other person.

דָּרַשׁ רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר בֶּן עֲזַרְיָה: ״מִכֹּל חַטֹּאתֵיכֶם לִפְנֵי ה׳ תִּטְהָרוּ״. עֲבֵירוֹת שֶׁבֵּין אָדָם לַמָּקוֹם — יוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים מְכַפֵּר. עֲבֵירוֹת שֶׁבֵּין אָדָם לַחֲבֵירוֹ — אֵין יוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים מְכַפֵּר עַד שֶׁיְּרַצֶּה אֶת חֲבֵירוֹ. אָמַר רַבִּי עֲקִיבָא: אַשְׁרֵיכֶם יִשְׂרָאֵל! לִפְנֵי מִי אַתֶּם מִטַּהֲרִין, מִי מְטַהֵר אֶתְכֶם? אֲבִיכֶם שֶׁבַּשָּׁמַיִם, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר: ״וְזָרַקְתִּי עֲלֵיכֶם מַיִם טְהוֹרִים וּטְהַרְתֶּם״, וְאוֹמֵר: ״מִקְוֵה יִשְׂרָאֵל (ה׳)״, מָה מִקְוֶה מְטַהֵר אֶת הַטְּמֵאִים — אַף הַקָּדוֹשׁ בָּרוּךְ הוּא מְטַהֵר אֶת יִשְׂרָאֵל. Similarly, Rabbi Elazar ben Azarya taught that point from the verse: “From all your sins you shall be cleansed before the Lord” (Leviticus 16:30). For transgressions between a person and God, Yom Kippur atones; however, for transgressions between a person and another, Yom Kippur does not atone until he appeases the other person. In conclusion, Rabbi Akiva said: How fortunate are you, Israel; before Whom are you purified, and Who purifies you? It is your Father in Heaven, as it is stated: “And I will sprinkle purifying water upon you, and you shall be purified” (Ezekiel 36:25). And it says: “The ritual bath of Israel is God” (Jeremiah 17:13). Just as a ritual bath purifies the impure, so too, the Holy One, Blessed be He, purifies Israel.

גְּמָ׳ אָשָׁם וַדַּאי — אִין, אָשָׁם תָּלוּי — לָא. וְהָא כַּפָּרָה כְּתִיבָא בֵּיהּ? הָנָךְ מְכַפְּרִי כַּפָּרָה גְּמוּרָה, אָשָׁם תָּלוּי אֵינוֹ מְכַפֵּר כַּפָּרָה גְּמוּרָה. GEMARA: The mishna says that a definite guilt-offering atones for sins. The Gemara analyzes this: With regard to a definite guilt-offering, yes, it does atone for sins. This implies that an uncertain guilt-offering does not. The Gemara asks: But isn’t atonement written with regard to it? Why, then, doesn’t it atone? The Gemara answers: Those, the sin-offerings and definite guilt-offerings, facilitate complete atonement, but an uncertain guilt-offering does not facilitate complete atonement. Instead, this offering provides temporary atonement for an individual, to protect him from punishment until he becomes aware of his sin and brings the appropriate offering.

אִי נָמֵי: הָנָךְ אֵין אַחֵר מְכַפֵּר כַּפָּרָתָן, אָשָׁם תָּלוּי אַחֵר מְכַפֵּר כַּפָּרָתָן, דִּתְנַן: חַיָּיבֵי חַטָּאוֹת וַאֲשָׁמוֹת וַדָּאִין שֶׁעָבַר עֲלֵיהֶן יוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים — חַיָּיבִין, אֲשָׁמוֹת תְּלוּיִן — פְּטוּרִין. Alternatively, there is this distinction: Nothing else facilitates the atonement of those sin-offerings and definite guilt-offerings, whereas something else does facilitate the atonement of the uncertain guilt-offering, as we learned in a mishna: If Yom Kippur passed, those who are obligated to bring sin-offerings and definite guilt-offerings are still obligated to bring their offerings; however, those obligated to bring uncertain guilt-offerings are exempt because Yom Kippur atoned for them.

מִיתָה וְיוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים מְכַפְּרִין עִם הַתְּשׁוּבָה. עִם הַתְּשׁוּבָה — אִין, בִּפְנֵי עַצְמָן — לָא. נֵימָא דְּלָא כְּרַבִּי. דְּתַנְיָא, רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: עַל כׇּל עֲבֵירוֹת שֶׁבַּתּוֹרָה, בֵּין עָשָׂה תְּשׁוּבָה בֵּין לֹא עָשָׂה תְּשׁוּבָה — יוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים מְכַפֵּר, חוּץ (מִפּוֹרֵק עוֹל), וּמְגַלֶּה פָּנִים בַּתּוֹרָה, וּמֵיפֵר בְּרִית בָּשָׂר, שֶׁאִם עָשָׂה תְּשׁוּבָה — יוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים מְכַפֵּר, וְאִם לֹא עָשָׂה תְּשׁוּבָה — אֵין יוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים מְכַפֵּר. § It was taught in the mishna that death and Yom Kippur atone for sins when accompanied by repentance. The Gemara analyzes this: With repentance, yes, they do atone for sins; but by themselves, without repentance, they do not. Let us say that the mishna is not in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, as it was taught in a baraita: Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says that for all transgressions in the Torah, whether one repented or did not repent, Yom Kippur atones, with the exception of rejecting the yoke of Torah and mitzvot; and denying the Holy One, Blessed be He; and interpreting the Torah falsely; and violating the covenant of the flesh, i.e., circumcision. In these cases, if one repents Yom Kippur atones for his sin, and if one does not repent Yom Kippur does not atone for his sin.

אֲפִילּוּ תֵּימָא רַבִּי: תְּשׁוּבָה בָּעֲיָא יוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים, יוֹם הַכִּפּוּרִים לָא בָּעֲיָא תְּשׁוּבָה. The Gemara rejects this: This is no proof; even if you say that the mishna is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, the mishna can be understood as follows: Repentance still requires Yom Kippur in order to complete the atonement, whereas Yom Kippur does not require repentance but atones even without it.

תְּשׁוּבָה מְכַפֶּרֶת עַל עֲבֵירוֹת קַלּוֹת: עַל עֲשֵׂה וְעַל לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה. הַשְׁתָּא עַל לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה מְכַפֶּרֶת, עַל עֲשֵׂה מִיבַּעְיָא? אָמַר רַב יְהוּדָה, הָכִי קָאָמַר: עַל עֲשֵׂה, וְעַל לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה שֶׁנִּיתַּק לַעֲשֵׂה. § It was taught in the mishna: Repentance itself atones for minor transgressions, for both a positive mitzva and for a negative mitzva. The Gemara is surprised at this: Now that it was stated that repentance atones for a negative mitzva, which is severe and warrants lashes, is it necessary to also teach that it atones for a positive mitzva, which is more lenient? Rav Yehuda said: This is what it said, i.e., the mishna should be understood as follows: Repentance atones for a positive mitzva and for a negative mitzva whose violation can be rectified by a positive mitzva. One is not punished by a court for violating a prohibition for which the Torah prescribes a positive act as a corrective measure and which thereby has the same halakha as a positive mitzva.

וְעַל לֹא תַעֲשֶׂה גָּמוּר לָא? וּרְמִינְהוּ, אֵלּוּ הֵן קַלּוֹת: עֲשֵׂה וְלֹא תַעֲשֶׂה, The Gemara asks: But does repentance not atone for a full-fledged negative mitzva? The Gemara raises a contradiction from a separate source: It was taught that these are minor transgressions: A positive mitzva and a negative mitzva,