רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר הִיא, דְּאָמַר: פָּנוּי הַבָּא עַל הַפְּנוּיָה שֶׁלֹּא לְשׁוּם אִישׁוּת עֲשָׂאָהּ זוֹנָה. אִי רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר, מַאי אִירְיָא אַלְמָנָה? נִיתְנֵי פְּנוּיָה! It is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, who says: With regard to an unmarried man who engaged in intercourse with an unmarried woman not for the purpose of marriage, he has thereby caused her to become a prostitute. It is for this reason that her payment is prohibited to be sacrificed on the altar. By contrast, Abaye holds in accordance with the opinion of the Rabbis, who disagree with Rabbi Elazar. The Gemara asks: If the baraita is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Elazar, why mention specifically the prohibition of a widow who is paid for engaging in intercourse with a High Priest? Let it teach that payment is prohibited even in the case of an unmarried man who engaged in intercourse with an unmarried woman.
אַלְמָנָה אִיצְטְרִיךְ, סָלְקָא דַעְתָּךְ אָמֵינָא: הוֹאִיל וּבִנְיַן אָב הוּא — לָא נִיתַּסְרוּ, קָא מַשְׁמַע לַן. The Gemara answers that it was necessary for the tanna to cite the example of a widow who is paid for engaging in intercourse with a High Priest, as it might enter your mind to say: Since the case of an unmarried man who engaged in intercourse with an unmarried woman, which is not a forbidden relationship by Torah law, is the paradigm example of prohibited payment to a prostitute, perhaps in a situation where the relationship is forbidden by Torah law, the payment should not be prohibited. Therefore, the baraita teaches us that payment to a prostitute is prohibited to be sacrificed on the altar even when the relationship is forbidden by Torah law, as in the case of a widow who is paid for engaging in intercourse with a High Priest.
הָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵירוֹ ״הֵא לָךְ טָלֶה זֶה״ כּוּ׳. וְהָא שִׁפְחָה לְעֶבֶד מִישְׁרָא שַׁרְיָא! אָמַר רַב הוּנָא: אֶצְלוֹ קָאָמַר, וְהָא דְּקָתָנֵי ״עֶבֶד״ — לִישָּׁנָא מְעַלְּיָא קָאָמַר. § The mishna teaches: With regard to one who says to another: Here is this lamb and in return your maidservant will lie with my slave and engage in intercourse with him, Rabbi Meir, or according to a different version of the text, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, says: The lamb’s halakhic status is not that of payment to a prostitute, and the Rabbis say: Its halakhic status is that of payment to a prostitute. The Gemara raises an objection with regard to the opinion of the Rabbis: But a maidservant is permitted to a Canaanite slave. Since this is not an act of prostitution, why should the payment be prohibited? Rav Huna said: He means to say that the lamb is given for the maidservant to lie with him, the master, not the slave. And as for that which it teaches: Lie with my slave, he employs a euphemism.
אִי הָכִי, מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבִּי? אָמַר שְׁמוּאֵל בַּר רַב יִצְחָק: לְעוֹלָם עַבְדִּי, וְכִי קָתָנֵי בְּעֶבֶד עִבְרִי. The Gemara asks: If that is so, what is the reason for the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who maintains that this payment is not prohibited? Shmuel bar Rav Yitzḥak said: Actually, the mishna is not employing a euphemism, and the master meant: My slave. And as for the difficulty that a maidservant is permitted to a slave, when the mishna teaches this case it is referring to a Hebrew slave, which is why Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi rules that the payment is permitted.
אִי הָכִי, מַאי טַעְמָא דְּרַבָּנַן? שִׁפְחָה לְעֶבֶד עִבְרִי מִישְׁרָא שַׁרְיָא! הָכָא בְמַאי עָסְקִינַן — כְּגוֹן דְּלֵית לֵיהּ אִשָּׁה וּבָנִים, דְּתַנְיָא: אֵין לוֹ אִשָּׁה וּבָנִים — אֵין רַבּוֹ מוֹסֵר לוֹ שִׁפְחָה כְּנַעֲנִית, יֵשׁ לוֹ אִשָּׁה וּבָנִים — רַבּוֹ מוֹסֵר לוֹ שִׁפְחָה כְּנַעֲנִית. The Gemara asks: If so, what is the reason for the ruling of the Rabbis? After all, a maidservant is permitted to a Hebrew slave. The Gemara answers: Here we are dealing with a case where the Hebrew slave does not have a wife and children, and in that situation the Canaanite maidservant is not permitted to the Hebrew slave. As it is taught in a baraita: If a Hebrew servant does not have a wife and children when he is enslaved, his master may not give him a Canaanite maidservant. If he has a wife and children, his master may give him a Canaanite maidservant. By contrast, Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi maintains that the master may give a Canaanite maidservant to his Hebrew slave even if the slave does not have a wife and children, and therefore the relationship is not considered an act of prostitution.
מַתְנִי׳ וְאֵיזֶהוּ ״מְחִיר כֶּלֶב״? הָאוֹמֵר לַחֲבֵירוֹ ״הֵולָיךְ טָלֶה זֶה תַּחַת כֶּלֶב״. MISHNA: And which is the case where an animal has the halakhic status of the price of a dog, and it is therefore prohibited to sacrifice the animal on the altar? It is the case of one who says to another: Here is this lamb in place of a dog.
וְכֵן שְׁנֵי שׁוּתָּפִין שֶׁחָלְקוּ, אֶחָד נָטַל עֲשָׂרָה וְאֶחָד תִּשְׁעָה וָכֶלֶב, שֶׁכְּנֶגֶד הַכֶּלֶב אָסוּר, וְשֶׁעִם הַכֶּלֶב מוּתָּר. And likewise, this prohibition applies in the case of two partners who divided their common property, which included nineteen lambs and one dog, and one took ten lambs and the other one took nine lambs and a dog. Sacrifice of the ten lambs taken by the partner in exchange for the nine lambs and the dog is prohibited, and sacrifice of the nine lambs that were taken by the partner with the dog is permitted.
אֶתְנַן הַכֶּלֶב וּמְחִיר זוֹנָה — הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ מוּתָּרִין, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״שְׁנַיִם״ וְלֹא אַרְבָּעָה. וַלְדוֹתֵיהֶן מוּתָּרִין — ״הֵן״ וְלֹא וַלְדוֹתֵיהֶן. With regard to lambs given as payment to another for engaging in intercourse with his dog, or as the price of a prostitute to purchase her as his maidservant, their sacrifice is permitted, as it is stated: “As both of them are an abomination to the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 23:19), from which it is inferred: Two are prohibited, payment to a prostitute and the price of a dog, and not four, i.e., the additional two cases of payment for intercourse with a dog and the price of a prostitute, which are permitted. Furthermore, with regard to the two prohibited cases of payment to a prostitute and the price of a dog, sacrifice of their offspring is permitted, as it is stated “them,” and not their offspring.
גְּמָ׳ תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״מְחִיר כֶּלֶב״ — זֶהוּ חֲלִיפֵי כֶלֶב, וְכֵן הוּא אוֹמֵר: ״תִּמְכֹּר עַמְּךָ בְלֹא הוֹן וְלֹא רִבִּיתָ בִּמְחִירֵיהֶם״. GEMARA: With regard to the definition of the price of a dog, the Sages taught: “The price of a dog” (Deuteronomy 23:19), this is referring to an animal given in exchange for a dog. In this context the word “price” means an item given in exchange for another item, not money. And likewise the verse states: “You sell Your people without wealth, and have not set their prices high” (Psalms 44:13). The phrase “without wealth” indicates that the term “their prices” means an item given in exchange, rather than money.
אֵימָא אֶתְנַן (זונה) [מַמָּשׁ], אִם כֵּן (לא קרב) הָווּ תְּלָתָא, ״גַּם שְׁנֵיהֶם״ — וְלֹא שְׁלֹשָׁה! The Gemara objects: You can say instead that the verse: “Price of a dog,” is referring to payment to a prostitute, payment for intercourse with a dog, as well as the price of a dog. The Gemara explains that one cannot explain the verse in this manner, as if so, there are three categories of items that may not be sacrificed to the altar, whereas the verse states: “Both of them,” indicating that there are two categories, and not three.
מִי קָאָמְרִינַן אֲנַן אֶתְנַן וּמְחִיר? אֶתְנַן וְלֹא מְחִיר קָאָמְרִינַן. The Gemara rephrases its objection: Did we say that payment to a prostitute, payment for intercourse with a dog, and the price of a dog should all be prohibited? We said that perhaps the phrase: The price of a dog, means the payment for intercourse with a dog, and not the price, i.e., the animal given in exchange for a dog. According to this suggestion, the verse indeed mentions only two categories: Payment given to a prostitute for services rendered, and payment for intercourse with a dog.
אִם כֵּן, נֵימָא קְרָא ״לֹא תָבִיא אֶתְנַן זוֹנָה וָכֶלֶב״, מִדִּכְתִיב ״אֶתְנַן זוֹנָה וּמְחִיר כֶּלֶב״ — שְׁמַע מִינַּהּ. The Gemara responds: If that is so, let the verse state: You shall not bring the payment to a prostitute or a dog, as in this formulation the word “payment” refers both to the prostitute and the dog. From the fact that it is written: “The payment of a harlot or the price of a dog,” one can learn from here that the verse is referring to two different matters: Payment to a prostitute, and an animal exchanged for a dog.
הַשּׁוּתָּפִין שֶׁחָלְקוּ, אֶחָד נָטַל כּוּ׳. [אַמַּאי]? נִיפּוֹק חַדא לַהֲדֵי כַּלְבָּא, וְהָנָךְ כּוּלְּהוּ לִישְׁתְּרוֹ! הָכָא בְמַאי עָסְקִינַן? כְּגוֹן דִּטְפֵי דְּמֵי כֶלֶב מֵחַד מִינַּיְיהוּ, (והאי) [וְהָהוּא] טוּפְיָינָא דְּכֶלֶב שְׁדֵי בְּכוּלְּהוּ. § The mishna teaches: With regard to two partners who divided their common property, and one took ten lambs and the other one took nine lambs and a dog, sacrifice of the ten lambs taken by the partner in exchange for nine lambs and a dog is prohibited. The Gemara asks: Why should all ten lambs be prohibited? Let us remove one of the lambs corresponding to the dog, and all the rest of these lambs will be permitted. The Gemara answers: Here we are dealing with a case where the value of the dog is worth more than each one of the ten lambs seperately. Therefore, one cannot set aside one of the lambs in exchange for the dog. And consequently, one casts this addition of the value of the dog between all of the lambs. As a result, all ten lambs are prohibited, since the price of the dog is included in each of them.
אֶתְנַן כֶּלֶב וּמְחִיר זוֹנָה מוּתָּר כּוּ׳. אֲמַר לֵיהּ רָבָא מִפַּרְזַקְיָא לְרַב אָשֵׁי: § The mishna further teaches with regard to animals given as payment to another for engaging in intercourse with a dog, or as the price of a prostitute to purchase her as his maidservant, that their sacrifice is permitted. Rava from Parzakya said to Rav Ashi:
מְנַָא הָא מִילְּתָא דַאֲמוּר רַבָּנַן אֵין זְנוּת לִבְהֵמוֹת? אֲמַר לֵיהּ: לָא (נִישְׁמוֹט) [לִישְׁתְּמִיט] קְרָא לִכְתּוֹב ״אֶתְנַן זוֹנָה וָכֶלֶב״. From where is this matter that the Sages stated, that there is no prostitution with regard to an animal derived? I.e., from where is it derived that a woman who copulates with an animal is not considered a prostitute, in accordance with the ruling of the mishna that payment for intercourse with an animal is permitted? Rav Ashi said to Rava from Parzakya: There was nothing preventing the verse from writing: You shall not bring the payment of a prostitute or a dog into the House of the Lord your God. Since the verse states: “You shall not bring the payment of a prostitute or the price of a dog,” this indicates that these are two different cases, and there is no prostitution with regard to an animal.
תַּנְיָא נָמֵי הָכִי: מִנַּיִן לְאֶתְנַן כֶּלֶב וּמְחִיר זוֹנָה שֶׁמּוּתָּרִין? שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״שְׁנַיִם״ וְלֹא אַרְבָּעָה. וַלְדוֹתֵיהֶן מוּתָּרִין, שֶׁנֶּאֱמַר ״גַּם שְׁנֵיהֶם״ — ״הֵם״ וְלֹא וַלְדוֹתֵיהֶן. The Gemara adds that this is also taught in a baraita: From where is it derived with regard to the payment of a lamb to another for engaging in intercourse with a dog, or as the price of a prostitute to purchase her as his maidservant, that their sacrifice is permitted? As it is stated: “For even both of them are an abomination to the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 23:19), from which it is inferred: Two are prohibited, payment to a prostitute and the price of a dog, and not four, i.e., payment for intercourse with a dog and the price of a prostitute, which are permitted. Furthermore, sacrifice of their offspring is permitted, as it is stated: “Even both of them,” which indicates that it is “them” that are forbidden, and not their offspring.
אָמַר רָבָא: וְלַד הַנִּרְבַּעַת אֲסוּרָה, הִיא וּוְלָדָהּ נִרְבְּעוּ. נוֹגַחַת אֲסוּרָה, הִיא וּוְלָדָהּ נָגְחוּ. The Gemara discusses other cases of offspring of animals with regard to sacrifice on the altar. Rava says: The offspring of a female animal that was the object of bestiality when it was pregnant is prohibited to be sacrificed on the altar, like its mother. The reason is that it is considered as though it, the mother, and its offspring both were the object of bestiality. Likewise, if a pregnant cow gores and kills a Jew, its offspring is prohibited to be sacrificed, like its mother, as it is as though it, the mother, and its offspring both gored.
וְלַד מוּקְצֶה וְנֶעֱבָד — מוּתָּר. מַאי טַעְמָא? לְאִימֵּיהּ אַקְצְיַהּ, לְאִימֵּיהּ פָּלְחִי לַהּ. אִיכָּא דְאָמְרִי: וְלַד מוּקְצֶה וְנֶעֱבָד — אָסוּר. מַאי טַעְמָא? דְּנִיחָא לֵיהּ בְּנִיפְחֵיהּ. But the offspring of a set-aside animal and an animal worshipped as an idol are permitted to be sacrificed on the altar. What is the reason? It is that only the mother was set aside, and not the offspring. Likewise, they worshipped only its mother, not the offspring. There are those who say a different version of Rava’s statement: The offspring of a set-aside animal and the offspring of an animal worshipped as an idol are prohibited. What is the reason? It is that it is beneficial to the owner if its girth is large, as a pregnant animal is more impressive than an ordinary one. Consequently, its offspring is also considered set-aside and worshipped, and it is therefore prohibited.
אָמַר רַב אַחָדְבוּי בַּר אַמֵּי, אָמַר רַב: הַמְקַדֵּשׁ בְּפֶרֶשׁ שׁוֹר הַנִּסְקָל, מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. בְּפֶרֶשׁ עֶגְלֵי עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה, אֵינָהּ מְקוּדֶּשֶׁת. מַאי טַעְמָא? אִי בָּעֵית אֵימָא קְרָא, וְאִי בָּעֵית אֵימָא סְבָרָא. Rav Aḥadevoi bar Ami says that Rav says: With regard to one who betroths a woman with the excrement of an ox that is sentenced to be stoned, if the excrement is worth at least one peruta, the woman is betrothed. Although it is not permitted to derive benefit from the ox itself, one may derive benefit from its excrement. But if one betroths her with the excrement of calves that were used for idol worship, she is not betrothed, as even their excrement is prohibited. The Gemara explains: What is the reason for the difference between the excrement of an ox that is stoned and the excrement of calves used for idolatry? If you wish, say that this is learned from a verse; if you wish, say instead that it is derived by means of a logical argument.
אִי בָּעֵית אֵימָא סְבָרָא: נִיחָא לֵיהּ גַּבֵּי עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה בְּנִיפְחֵיהּ, גַּבֵּי שׁוֹר הַנִּסְקָל — לָא נִיחָא לֵיהּ בְּנִיפְחֵיהּ. The Gemara elaborates: If you wish, say it is derived by means of a logical argument: With regard to calves used for idol worship, a calf’s additional girth due to the excrement stored in its body is beneficial to the owner, as fatter animals are more impressive. Therefore, the excrement is considered part of the offering and is prohibited. By contrast, with regard to an ox that is stoned, its additional girth is not beneficial to him, as he gains nothing from it, and consequently it is not considered part of the animal.
אִי בָּעֵית אֵימָא קְרָא, גַּבֵּי עֲבוֹדָה זָרָה כְּתִיב: ״וְהָיִיתָ חֵרֶם כָּמוֹהוּ״, כֹּל שֶׁאַתָּה מְהַיֶּה מִמֶּנּוּ הֲרֵי הוּא כָּמוֹהוּ. גַּבֵּי שׁוֹר הַנִּסְקָל כְּתִיב: ״לֹא יֵאָכֵל אֶת בְּשָׂרוֹ״ — בְּשָׂרוֹ אָסוּר, פִּרְשׁוֹ מוּתָּר. If you wish, say that this is learned from a verse: It is written with regard to an animal used for idol worship: “And you shall not bring an abomination into your house, and be [vehayita] accursed like it” (Deuteronomy 7:26). This teaches that anything that you create [mehayye] from the idol is prohibited like the idol itself. But with regard to an ox that is stoned, it is written: “The ox shall surely be stoned, and its flesh shall not be eaten” (Exodus 21:28). This teaches that only its flesh is forbidden, but its excrement is permitted.
מַתְנִי׳ נָתַן לָהּ מָעוֹת — הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ מוּתָּרִין. יֵינוֹת וּשְׁמָנִים וּסְלָתוֹת, וְכׇל דָּבָר שֶׁכַּיּוֹצֵא בּוֹ קָרֵב עַל גַּבֵּי הַמִּזְבֵּחַ — אָסוּר. נָתַן לָהּ מוּקְדָּשִׁין — הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ מוּתָּרִין. MISHNA: If one gave money to a prostitute as her payment, it is permitted to purchase an offering with that money, as the money itself is not sacrificed. If he paid her with wine, or oil, or flour, or any other item the like of which is sacrificed on the altar, sacrifice of those items is prohibited. If he gave her consecrated items for her services, their sacrifice is permitted. Since they were already consecrated, they do not belong to him, and one cannot prohibit an item that is not his.
עוֹפוֹת — הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ אֲסוּרִין, שֶׁהָיָה בַּדִּין: מָה אִם הַמּוּקְדָּשִׁין, שֶׁהַמּוּם פּוֹסֵל בָּהֶן — אֵין אֶתְנַן וּמְחִיר חָל עֲלֵיהֶן; עוֹף, שֶׁאֵין הַמּוּם פּוֹסֵל בּוֹ — אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁלֹּא יְהֵא אֶתְנַן וּמְחִיר חָל עָלָיו? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״לְכׇל נֶדֶר״ — לְהָבִיא אֶת הָעוֹף. If he paid her with non-sacred birds, their sacrifice is prohibited. The mishna elaborates: As, by right, it should be inferred a fortiori: If in the case of consecrated items, which a blemish disqualifies, the prohibition of payment to a prostitute and the price of a dog do not take effect with regard to them; with regard to a bird, which a blemish does not disqualify, is it not right that the prohibition of payment to a prostitute and the price of a dog should not take effect with regard to them? Therefore, the verse states: “You shall not bring the payment of a prostitute, or the price of a dog, into the House of the Lord your God for any vow” (Deuteronomy 23:19). This serves to include the bird in the prohibition.
כׇּל הָאֲסוּרִין לְגַבֵּי מִזְבֵּחַ — וַלְדוֹתֵיהֶן מוּתָּרִין. רַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹמֵר: וְלַד טְרֵפָה לֹא יִקְרַב עַל גַּבֵּי הַמִּזְבֵּחַ. רַבִּי חֲנִינָא בֶּן אַנְטִיגְנוֹס אוֹמֵר: כְּשֵׁירָה שֶׁיָּנְקָה מִן הַטְּרֵפָה — פְּסוּלָה מֵעַל גַּבֵּי הַמִּזְבֵּחַ. כׇּל הַקֳּדָשִׁים שֶׁנַּעֲשׂוּ טְרֵפָה — אֵין פּוֹדִין אוֹתָן, שֶׁאֵין פּוֹדִין אֶת הַקֳּדָשִׁים לְהַאֲכִילָן לִכְלָבִים. The mishna adds a principle: With regard to all animals whose sacrifice on the altar is prohibited, sacrifice of their offspring is permitted. Rabbi Eliezer says: The offspring of an animal with a wound that will cause it to die within twelve months [tereifa]shall not be sacrificed on the altar. Rabbi Ḥanina ben Antigonus says: A kosher animal that suckled from a tereifa is disqualified from sacrifice on the altar. With regard to all sacrificial animals that became tereifot, one may not redeem them and render them non-sacred, as their consumption is forbidden and one does not redeem sacrificial animals to feed them to dogs, as this is considered a degradation of sacrificial animals.
גְּמָ׳ תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: נָתַן לָהּ חִיטִּין וַעֲשָׂאָתַן סוֹלֶת, זֵיתִים וַעֲשָׂאָתַן שֶׁמֶן, עֲנָבִים וַעֲשָׂאָתַן יַיִן. תָּנֵי חֲדָא: אֲסוּרִים, וְתַנְיָא אִידַּךְ: מוּתָּרִין. אָמַר רַב יוֹסֵף: תָּנֵי גּוּרְיוֹן דְּמִן אַסְפּוֹרַק — בֵּית שַׁמַּאי אוֹסְרִין וּבֵית הִלֵּל מַתִּירִין. GEMARA: The Sages taught: If one gave wheat to a prostitute and she made the wheat into flour, or if he gave her olives and she made them into oil, or if he gave her grapes and she made them into wine, it is taught in one baraita that these products are prohibited to be used as an offering in the Temple, and it is taught in another baraita that they are permitted, as the physical change transforms them into new objects. Rav Yosef said that Guryon of Aspork teaches in a baraita: Beit Shammai prohibit these products and Beit Hillel permit them. If so, the two baraitot cited above reflect a dispute between Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel.
בֵּית הִלֵּל סָבְרִי: ״הֵם״ — וְלֹא וַלְדוֹתֵיהֶן, ״הֵם״ — וְלֹא שִׁינּוּיֵיהֶן. The Gemara explains that Beit Shammai and Beit Hillel both derive their ruling from the verse: “You shall not bring the hire of a harlot, or the price of a dog, into the House of the Lord your God for any vow; for even both of them are an abomination to the Lord your God” (Deuteronomy 23:19). Beit Hillel, who permit these items after they have undergone a physical change, maintain that the word “them” teaches that this prohibition applies only to the original items, but not to their offspring. Likewise, it applies only to them, i.e., the items in their original form, but not to their changed status.
בֵּית שַׁמַּאי סָבְרִי: ״הֵם״ — וְלֹא וַלְדוֹתֵיהֶן, ״גַּם״ — לְרַבּוֹת שִׁינּוּיֵיהֶן, וּלְבֵית הִלֵּל, הָכְתִיב ״גַּם״! ״גַּם״ לְבֵית הִלֵּל קַשְׁיָא. Beit Shammai maintain that one indeed derives: “Them,” but not their offspring. But they maintain that the word “even” serves to include in the prohibition items in their changed status. The Gemara asks: And according to the opinion of Beit Hillel, isn’t it written “even”? How do they interpret that word? The Gemara responds: The word “even” is in fact difficult according to Beit Hillel.
תָּנוּ רַבָּנַן: ״בֵּית ה׳ אֱלֹהֶיךָ״ — פְּרָט לְפָרָה, שֶׁאֵין בָּאָה לַבַּיִת, דִּבְרֵי רַבִּי אֶלְעָזָר. וַחֲכָמִים אוֹמְרִים: לְרַבּוֹת אֶת הָרִיקּוּעִין. The Sages taught in a baraita, with regard to the verse: “You shall not bring the hire of a harlot, or the price of a dog, into the House of the Lord your God,” that this excludes a red heifer, which is not brought to the House of the Lord, i.e., the Temple, but is slaughtered outside Jerusalem on the Mount of Olives. This is the statement of Rabbi Elazar. And the Rabbis say: This verse serves to include in the prohibition beaten plates of gold in the Temple, if the gold was used as payment to a prostitute or as the price of a dog.
מַאן חֲכָמִים? אָמַר רַב חִסְדָּא: רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בְּרַבִּי יְהוּדָה הִיא, דְּתַנְיָא: נָתַן לָהּ זָהָב, רַבִּי יוֹסֵי בַּר יְהוּדָה אוֹמֵר: אֵין עוֹשִׂין רִיקּוּעִין, אֲפִילּוּ אֲחוֹרֵי בֵּית הַכַּפּוֹרֶת. The Gemara asks: Who are the Rabbis cited here? Rav Ḥisda says: It is the opinion of Rabbi Yosei, son of Rabbi Yehuda, as it is taught in a baraita: If one gave a prostitute gold as her payment, Rabbi Yosei bar Yehuda says: One may not fashion hanging beaten plates of gold for the Temple from it, even for the area behind the Hall of the Ark Cover, i.e., the eleven cubits of space behind the Holy of Holies up to the wall of the Temple courtyard, which was at the western end of the Sanctuary. Athough this area is of lesser sanctity than the rest of the Temple, one may not place there any gold given as payment to a prostitute.
נָתַן לָהּ מוּקְדָּשִׁין — הֲרֵי אֵלּוּ מוּתָּרִין כּוּ׳. § The mishna teaches: If he gave her consecrated items for her services, their sacrifice is permitted, whereas if he paid her with non-sacred birds, their sacrifice is prohibited. The prohibited status of birds is derived from the verse: “You shall not bring the hire of a harlot, or the price of a dog, into the House of the Lord your God for any vow,” despite an a fortiori inference from consecrated animals that indicates they should be permitted.
וְיִהְיוּ מוּקְדָּשִׁין אֶתְנַן וּמְחִיר חָל עֲלֵיהֶן, מִקַּל וָחוֹמֶר: וּמָה עוֹפוֹת שֶׁאֵין הַמּוּם פּוֹסֵל בָּהֶן — אֶתְנַן וּמְחִיר חָל עֲלֵיהֶן, מוּקְדָּשִׁים שֶׁהַמּוּם פּוֹסֵל בָּהֶן — אֵינוֹ דִּין שֶׁאֶתְנַן וּמְחִיר חָל עֲלֵיהֶן? תַּלְמוּד לוֹמַר ״לְכׇל נֶדֶר״ — לְהוֹצִיא אֶת הַנָּדוּר. The Gemara objects: But if these birds are disqualified as sacrifices, let the prohibitions of payment to a prostitute and the price of a dog apply to consecrated animals, by the following a fortiori inference: If in the case of birds, which a blemish does not disqualify, the status of a prostitute’s payment and a dog’s price applies to them, then with regard to consecrated items, which a blemish does disqualify, is it not logical that the status of a prostitute’s payment and a dog’s price should apply to them? Therefore, the verse states: “For any vow.” This serves to exclude those animals that have already been vowed to be sacrificed.
טַעְמָא דְּמַעֲטִינְהוּ קְרָא, הָא לָא מַעֲטִינְהוּ קְרָא הֲוָה אֲמִינָא: כִּי יָהֵיב לַהּ מוּקְדָּשִׁין — חָל עֲלֵיהֶן אֶתְנַן וּמְחִיר? וְהָא לָאו מָמוֹנָא הוּא! The Gemara objects: The only reason consecrated animals are disqualified is that the verse excludes them, through the word “vow.” But had the verse not excluded them, I would say that if one gives a prostitute sacrificial animals, or gives these animals in exchange for a dog, the prohibition of payment to a prostitute or a dog’s price applies to them. But this conclusion is problematic, as a consecrated animal is not his property, and there is an established principle that one cannot render an item prohibited if it does not belong to him. How then could one render it prohibited by giving it to a prostitute?
אָמַר רַב הוֹשַׁעְיָא: בְּמַמְנֶה עַל פִּסְחוֹ, וְרַבִּי הִיא, דְּתַנְיָא: ״וְאִם יִמְעַט הַבַּיִת מִהְיוֹת מִשֶּׂה״. Rav Hoshaya says: This is referring to one who registers the prostitute for his Paschal offering (see Pesaḥim 61a), giving her a portion in it as payment for her services, and it is in accordance with the opinion of Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi, who maintains that a Paschal offering is considered one’s personal property for the purposes of allowing additional people to register for it. As it is taught in a baraita: The verse states, with regard to the Paschal offering: “And if the household be too little for a lamb, then he and his neighbor next to his house shall take one” (Exodus 12:4). The phrase “if the household be too little” is interpreted to mean that the household cannot afford the basic necessities of the Festival.
הַחֲיֵיהוּ מִשֶּׂה, מִכְּדֵי אֲכִילָה וְלֹא מִכְּדֵי מִקָּח. Based on this interpretation, the phrase “for a lamb [mihyot miseh]” is interpreted to mean: Sustain him from the lamb [haḥyeihu miseh], i.e., he may use the Paschal offering as a means of supporting himself. He takes money from his neighbor in return for registering that neighbor for a portion of his Paschal offering and uses the money to purchase his needs. This halakha applies only if one lacks sufficient means to purchase food to eat, but not if he lacks merely sufficient means to purchase other items.
רַבִּי אוֹמֵר: אַף מִכְּדֵי מִקָּח, שֶׁאִם אֵין לוֹ מַמְנֶה אֲחֵרִים עִמּוֹ עַל פִּסְחוֹ וְעַל חֲגִיגָתוֹ, וּמְעוֹתָיו חוּלִּין, שֶׁעַל מְנָת כֵּן הִקְדִּישׁוּ יִשְׂרָאֵל פִּסְחֵיהֶן. Rabbi Yehuda HaNasi says: This lenient halakha applies even if one lacks sufficient means to purchase other necessary items, as, if he does not have sufficient funds he may register others with him for his Paschal offering and for his Festival peace offering. And his money that he receives for registering that person is non-sacred, as it is on this condition of registering others in exchange for the money which he receives from them that the Jewish people consecrate their Paschal offerings.
כָּל הָאֲסוּרִים לְגַבֵּי מִזְבֵּחַ וְכוּ׳. אָמַר רַב: כָּל הָאֲסוּרִים לְגַבֵּי מִזְבֵּחַ וַלְדוֹתֵיהֶן מוּתָּרִים, וְתָנֵי עֲלַהּ: וְרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר אוֹסֵר. § The mishna teaches: With regard to all animals whose sacrifice on the altar is prohibited, sacrifice of their offspring is permitted. Rav says: This ruling that with regard to all animals whose sacrifice on the altar is prohibited, sacrifice of their offspring is permitted, is not unanimous but is the opinion of the Rabbis. And indeed it is taught with regard to this case: And Rabbi Eliezer prohibits their offspring to be sacrificed on the altar.
אָמַר רַב הוּנָא בַּר חִינָּנָא, אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: מַחְלוֹקֶת שֶׁעִיבְּרוּ וּלְבַסּוֹף נִרְבְּעוּ, דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר סָבַר ״עוּבָּר יֶרֶךְ אִמּוֹ הוּא״, וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי ״לָאו יֶרֶךְ אִמּוֹ הוּא״, אֲבָל נִרְבְּעוּ וּלְבַסּוֹף עִיבְּרוּ — דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל מוּתָּרִין. Rav Huna bar Ḥinnana says that Rav Naḥman says: This dispute applies in a case where the animals became pregnant and then were the objects of bestiality, thereby becoming prohibited to sacrifice on the altar. As Rabbi Eliezer holds that a fetus is considered the thigh of its mother and regarded as part of the animal, and is consequently prohibited like its mother. And the Rabbis hold that a fetus is not considered the thigh of its mother. But if the animals were the objects of bestiality and then became pregnant, everyone agrees that they are permitted.
רָבָא אָמַר: מַחְלוֹקֶת שֶׁנִּרְבְּעוּ וּלְבַסּוֹף עִיבְּרוּ, דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר סָבַר: זֶה וָזֶה גּוֹרֵם אָסוּר, וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: זֶה וָזֶה גּוֹרֵם מוּתָּר. Rava says: This dispute applies in a case where the animals were the objects of bestiality and then became pregnant, as Rabbi Eliezer holds that when both this permitted factor and that prohibited factor cause a certain situation, the resulting item is prohibited. Since the mother of this offspring is prohibited, the offspring is likewise prohibited, despite the fact that its father is permitted. And the Rabbis hold that when this permitted factor and that prohibited factor cause a result, it, i.e., the offspring, is permitted like its father.
אֲבָל עִיבְּרוּ וּלְבַסּוֹף נִרְבְּעוּ — דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל אֲסוּרִין. וְרָבָא לְטַעְמֵיהּ, דְּאָמַר רָבָא: וְלַד נִרְבַּעַת אָסוּר, הִיא וּוְלָדָהּ נִרְבְּעוּ, וְלַד נוֹגַחַת אָסוּר, הִיא וּוְלָדָהּ נָגְחוּ. But in a case where the animals became pregnant and then were the object of bestiality, everyone agrees that they are prohibited. And the Gemara adds that Rava conforms to his standard line of reasoning in this regard, as Rava said: The offspring of a female animal that was the object of bestiality when it was pregnant is prohibited to be sacrificed on the altar, as it is considered as though it, the mother, and its offspring were both the object of bestiality. Likewise, the offspring of a pregnant cow that gores and kills a person is prohibited, because it is as though it, the mother, and its offspring both gored.
לִישָּׁנָא אַחֲרִינָא אָמְרִי לַהּ. אָמַר רַב הוּנָא בַּר חִינָּנָא, אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: מַחְלוֹקֶת שֶׁנִּרְבְּעוּ כְּשֶׁהֵן מוּקְדָּשִׁין, דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר סָבַר בִּיזּוּי מִילְּתָא, וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי לָא. אֲבָל נִרְבְּעוּ כְּשֶׁהֵן חוּלִּין, הוֹאִיל וְהִשְׁתַּנּוּ — דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל מוּתָּרִין. Some state another version of the previous discussion: Rav Huna bar Ḥinnana says that Rav Naḥman says: This dispute applies in a case where the animals were the object of bestiality when they already had the status of sacrificial animals. As Rabbi Eliezer holds that the offspring are also prohibited to be sacrificed on the altar, as their sacrifice is considered a degradation of consecrated items, and degradation of consecrated items is significant. And the Rabbis hold that the offspring may be sacrificed, as they maintain that this is not considered a degradation of consecrated items. But in a case where the animals were the object of bestiality when they were non-sacred, and were subsequently consecrated, since their status was changed by their consecration, everyone agrees that they are permitted.
רָבָא אָמַר רַב נַחְמָן: מַחְלוֹקֶת כְּשֶׁנִּרְבְּעוּ כְּשֶׁהֵן חוּלִּין, דְּרַבִּי אֱלִיעֶזֶר סָבַר: בִּיזּוּי מִילְּתָא, וְרַבָּנַן סָבְרִי: הוֹאִיל וְהִשְׁתַּנּוּ — מוּתָּרִין, אֲבָל נִרְבְּעוּ כְּשֶׁהֵן מוּקְדָּשִׁין — דִּבְרֵי הַכֹּל אֲסוּרִין. In contrast, Rava says that Rav Naḥman says: This dispute applies in a case where the animals were the object of bestiality when they were non-sacred, as Rabbi Eliezer holds that even the sacrifice of this offspring is considered degrading to sacrificial animals, and degradation of sacrificial animals is significant, and therefore they are prohibited. And the Rabbis hold that since their status was changed by their consecration, they are permitted. But in a case where the animals were the object of bestiality when they already had the status of sacrificial animals, everyone agrees that they are prohibited.