THE SPECIAL LAWS (DE SPECIALIBUS LEGIBUS)
INTRODUCTION TO DE SPECIALIBUS LEGIBUS, IV
The first part of this treatise (1–135) deals with particular laws falling under the eighth, ninth and tenth commandments. We begin with the eighth. Note that robbery with violence is a worse crime than mere stealing, which is punished by a two-fold restitution, so if the thief cannot pay he may be sold into temporary slavery (2–4). Some considerations follow showing that this is not too severe (5–6). A housebreaker caught in the act may be killed in the night-time, but in daylight the ordinary legal process must be observed (7–10). Also the law provides a higher rate of compensation, if sheep and, still more, if oxen are stolen, reckoned, Philo thinks, according to the services they render to mankind (11–12). Kidnapping is another worse form of stealing, especially if the sufferer is an Israelite (13–19). Damage done by the trespassing of other people’s cattle, or by fire started carelessly, also calls for compensation (20–29). Then follows an account of the complicated procedure laid down by the law when anything deposited or lent is stolen from the depositary or borrower (30–38). And this part concludes with shewing how stealing leads up to other crimes culminating in perjury (39–40).
The ninth commandment. We begin with false witness in the literal sense, but pass almost at once to the thought that assent to evil, especially when it arises from subservience to the multitude, comes under the same head (41–47). And so do the deceits of the practisers of divination, which is really false witness against God (48–54). So, too, does any dereliction on the part of judges, who must remember the sacredness of their office (55–58). Three of their special duties are emphasized by the law. First, not to listen to idle reports (59–61). Secondly, to receive no gifts, even if no injustice results. To do this is to forget that just and honest actions may be vitiated by being done with dishonest motives (62–66). This leads to a digression on the supreme importance of truthfulness and how it is often lost by bad associations in childhood and how it is symbolized in the place given to it on the breastplate of the high priest (67–69). Thirdly, the judge must not respect persons but must consider only the facts (70–71). And the particular injunction not in giving judgement to show mercy to the poor causes him to point out that the law calls also on the possessor of any authority to remember his weaker brethren and only means that the guilty cannot plead poverty to escape from punishment (72–77). We now pass on to the tenth commandment (78).
The commandment “Thou shalt not desire” leads to a long disquisition, much of it repeating what was said of it in De Decalogo on the evils which spring from the desire of what one has not got (79–94). The lawgiver realizing this showed the necessity of restraining concupiscence by regulating, as an example, one particular form, the appetite for food and drink (95–97). He did this, first, by demanding the first fruits (98–99). Secondly, by the dietary laws on the use of the flesh of beasts, fishes and fowls (100–101). All carnivorous beasts are on the prohibited list, and only ten species, which divide the hoof and chew the cud, are allowed (102–104). An allegorical explanation of these two qualifications follows (105–109). Of fishes only such that have scales and fins are permitted, and again an allegorical explanation is given (110–112). So also creeping things with few exceptions (113–115), predatory birds (116–118), flesh of animals that have died a natural death or been torn by wild beasts (119–121) are forbidden. Eating strangled animals and taking blood and fat are also forbidden (122–125). The need of restraint is illustrated from the story of the quails and the visitation that followed that craving for flesh (126–131).
So much for the particular laws falling under one or other of the Ten Commandments, but the cardinal virtues belong to all the ten, and we must note how these virtues are exemplified in various laws. For piety, wisdom or prudence and temperance, this has been done sufficiently. There remain three others, justice, courage or fortitude and humanity or kindness. The rest of this treatise is concerned with the exemplification of justice (132–135). We need not here repeat what was said about judges and law-courts when treating the ninth commandment, but before going on to our subject, we give some general thoughts on justice (136). First, there is the injunction to record the laws in the heart, on the hand and before the eyes and on the doors and on the gates (137–142). Secondly, that nothing is to be added or taken away, which may be taken to suggest that each virtue is a mean, which must not be allowed to degenerate into the extremes on the other side (143–148). Thirdly, that in the law, “not to remove the landmarks which thy forefathers set up,” we may see a command to observe the unwritten law of custom (149–150).
Now for the exemplification of justice. First, as seen in the ruler or king. He must not be chosen by lot, a system which we see in ordinary matters to be absurd (151–156), but by election by the people, confirmed by God, and this ruler is not to be a foreigner (157–159). The ruler must copy out and study the law and its principles (160–169). Thirdly, he must follow the example of Moses in appointing subordinates to decide minor cases, but reserve the greater for himself (170–175). And the greater are those which concern not great people but the weak and helpless, the stranger, the widow and the orphan (176–178). And as orphanhood is the condition of the Jews as a nation (179–182), the ruler must use no guile but hold himself to be the father of his people (183–187). But the ruler or judge may sometimes find cases too difficult for him, in which case they are to be referred to the priests (188–192). Leaving the duties of the ruler, we have the following general rules of justice. There must be complete honesty in commerce (193–194). Wages must be paid on the same day (195–196). The deaf and the blind are not to be ill-treated (197–202). The ordinances about mating different species, ploughing with ox and ass together, and wearing garments of mixed material and sowing the vineyard to bear two kinds of fruit, are treated as rules of justice (203–207). This last is discussed at greater length as injustice to the land like the violation of the sabbatical year (208–218). Next we have the laws of warfare, willingness to make terms, severity if they are not accepted, but mercy to the women (219–225), and joined with this is the prohibition of destroying the fruit-trees (226–229). The treatise concludes with the praises of justice, the daughter of that equality which is the general principle of all life as well as of the cosmic system (230–238).